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 “Friends Like These” examines the decision by elements of the Menominee, 
Dakota, Potawatomi, and Ho Chunk tribes to ally with the United States government 
during the Black Hawk War of 1832.  Because this conflict is usually depicted as a land-
grab by ravenous settlers and the war occurred within two years of the passage of the 
Indian Removal Act, the military participation of these tribes seems incongruous.  This 
work seeks to determine why various bands of these tribes cooperated with the U.S. 
Army when such alliance seemed inimical to the interests of their respective tribes.  
Moreover, it explores the extent to which the Americans conceived of themselves as 
allies to the Indians while assessing the consequences of this alliance for each of the 
tribes involved.  This study finds that the Indians participated in the Black Hawk War to 
fulfill their own wartime objectives, and that in so doing they sought to apply familiar 
forms to the new situation that unfolded in the years after the War of 1812.  Seeking to 
strike traditional tribal enemies, extract political advantage and material gain from the 
Americans, and fulfill important male gender expectations, the Indians generally 
achieved their objectives—but they also helped create conditions that wrought permanent 
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Some men looked away while others fixed their eyes with morbid curiosity on the 
spectacle of Dr. Addison Philleo amputating the arm of a child.1  Having just concluded the 
Black Hawk War by raining fire on the forlorn survivors of Black Hawk’s band as they 
attempted to swim across the Mississippi River, Illinois volunteers now took account of the 
damage they had wrought.  A single ball had nearly separated the limb from the gaunt, little 
body before killing the boy’s mother.  Indeed, most of the Sauk casualties at the “Battle of 
Bad Axe” were women and children—all of them were near starvation.  “It is to be hoped, 
that the women and children fell by random shots,” U.S. Army officer Philip St. George 
Cooke mused, but he knew full well “that a frontiersman is not particular, when his blood is 
up, and a redskin in his power.”2  Illinois volunteer John Wakefield acknowledged that “It 
was a horrid sight to witness little children, wounded and suffering through the most 
excruciating pain,” but consoled himself that “they were of the savage enemy, and the 
common enemy of the country.”3  Another frontiersman displayed no remorse whatsoever, 
                                                 
 1 John Dean, Wisconsin-Early History, Wis Mss AX, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, 5&6/12; 
Perry A. Armstrong, The Sauks and the Black Hawk War, with Biographical Sketches, etc (Springfield, Ill.: 
H.W. Rokker printer, 1887), 473; Cecil Eby, "That Disgraceful Affair," the Black Hawk War (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1973), 253; E. Duis, The Good Old Times in McLean County, Illinois, Containing Two 
Hundred and Sixty-one Sketches of Old Settlers.  A Complete Historical Sketch of the Black Hawk War, And 
Descriptions of All Matters of Interest Relating to McLean County (Bloomington: Leader Publishing and 
Printing House, 1874), 117-18. 
 
 2 Philip St. George Cooke, Scenes and Adventures in the Army: Or Romance of Military Life 
(Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1857), 188. 
 
 3 John A. Wakefield, Wakefield's History of the Black Hawk War (1834; reprint, Chicago: Caxton 
Club, 1904), 133. 
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observing after he killed an infant, “Kill the nits and you’ll have no lice.”4  Meanwhile, a 
short distance away, another Indian—a Menominee warrior—lay dead.   While Sauk corpses, 
scalped and stripped of their teeth, were left to float down the Mississippi, this warrior 
received a military burial with full honors, and U.S. Army soldiers interred him beside their 
own dead.5   
***** 
In April 1832, the Sauk war chief Black Hawk crossed the Mississippi River into 
Illinois in defiance of the United States to reoccupy ceded lands.  This act sparked a panic 
among Anglo-American frontier settlers as local newspapers conjured an Indian invasion and 
Illinois Governor John Reynolds requested federal troops and called up the militia.  Over the 
ensuing four months, federal and state forces pursued Black Hawk’s band through the Old 
Northwest, finally obliterating its emaciated remnants as they attempted to recross the 
Mississippi.  Standard historical accounts view the war as a disgraceful land-grab by Indian-
hating frontiersmen, but this partial rendition fails to explain the behavior of several hundred 
Menominees, Sauks, Ho Chunks, and Potawatomis who made common cause with the 
United States during the Black Hawk War.   
This unlikely alliance has escaped serious historical attention both because it proved 
insignificant to the outcome of the war and, more importantly, because it is difficult to 
comprehend.  On a historical stage populated by racist frontiersmen, capricious army 
                                                 
 4 William H. Perrin, ed., History of Crawford and Clark Counties, Illinois (Chicago: O.L. Baskin & 
Co., 1883), 232.   
 
 5 Council between Henry Atkinson and the Winnebago and Menominee Indians, 6 August 1832, The 
Black Hawk War, 1831-1832, vol. 37, Collections of the Illinois States Historical Library (Springfield: Illinois 
State Historical Library, 1975), 950.  Philip St. George Cooke observed an Eastern dentist harvesting the teeth 
from the Sauk dead and later commented, “doubtless some very fine Eastern personages now rejoice in savage 
ivories.”  Cooke, Scenes and Adventures in the Army, 188. 
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commanders, venal federal Indian agents, and a Native hero in the mold of Tecumseh, the 
United States’ Indian allies appear to be fools who fought on the wrong side of the contest.  
Indeed, some of their descendents are at a loss to explain the alliance, not wishing to believe 
that their forefathers helped defeat a nascent pan-Indian movement or facilitated Indian 
removal.  One early historian of the war implies as much, terming the American allies 
“treacherous Indians” who betrayed Black Hawk when they “should have been his friends.”6  
In fleeting mention of one tribe’s campaign participation, Cecil Eby suggests that these 
Indians foolishly blundered into an alliance with the army by failing to recognize “that their 
worst enemies were not Sauk but Chemokemons [Americans], who would absorb the tribal 
lands of the Potawatomie during the year to follow.”7  Implying that the Indians were 
submissive pawns rather than dupes, anthropologist Felix Keesing referred to Menominee 
allies as “guerilla  fighters for their white overlords.”8  In his recent and otherwise excellent 
history of the war, Kerry Trask simply terms these Indians “mercenaries.”9 
                                                 
 6 Armstrong, The Sauks and the Black Hawk War, with Biographical Sketches, etc, 475, 481. 
 
 7 Eby, "That Disgraceful Affair," the Black Hawk War, 201.  Although a professor of English during 
his academic career, Eby has written several creditable works of history, and this particular work stood as the 
only modern narrative of the conflict for over two decades.  It has since been eclipsed by Kerry A. Trask, Black 
Hawk: The Battle for the Heart of America (New York: Henry Holt, 2006) which is better researched and far 
more balanced than Eby’s work, which drips with the moral indignation characteristic of the era in which he 
wrote and published his book.  Chemokemon (or gchimookmaan) is the Ojibwa word for American. Originally 
applied to Virginians and Kentuckians, the moniker translates literally as “big knife,” an allusion to the swords 
worn by eighteenth-century Ohio Valley militiamen.  James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and 
Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1998), xvi. 
 
 8 Felix Keesing, The Menomini Indians of Wisconsin: A Study of Three Centuries of Cultural Contact 
and Change (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1939), ix. 
 
 9 Kerry A. Trask, Black Hawk: The Battle for the Heart of America, 1st ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 
2006), 280.  In a 1978 essay, Richard White noted similar, implicit interpretations of Plains Indian tribes who 
did not resist or ostensibly aided American expansion into their domain.  He briefly redressed the issue in the 
same article, and Thomas Dunlay provided a more thorough reappraisal in his 1982 book on Indian auxiliaries 
in the trans-Mississippi West.  Richard White, "The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux 
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," The Journal of American History 65, no. 2 (1978): 320, 342; 
Thomas W. Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 
1860-90 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 
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These interpretations fail, however, to comprehend the Indians’ motivations for 
joining against Black Hawk.  Nor do they acknowledge the importance of Indian 
participation, which, although militarily negligible, represented a turning point in the history 
of the Old Northwest and, indeed, the United States.  This work seeks to determine why 
various bands of Potawatomis, Menominees, Ho Chunks, and Dakotas cooperated with the 
U.S. Army when such alliance seemed inimical to the interests of their respective tribes.  
Moreover, it explores the extent to which the Americans conceived of themselves as allies to 
the Indians while assessing the consequences of this alliance for each of the tribes involved.  
This study finds that the Indians participated in the Black Hawk War to fulfill their own 
wartime objectives, and that in so doing they sought to apply familiar forms to the new 
situation that unfolded in the years after the War of 1812.  Seeking to strike traditional tribal 
enemies, extract political advantage and material gain from the Americans, and fulfill 
important male gender expectations, the Indians generally achieved their objectives—but 
they also helped create conditions that wrought permanent change on the world in which they 
lived.     
For over two hundred years, the tribes of the Western Great Lakes (also referred to 
here as the Old Northwest, the Upper Mississippi, and the pays d’en haut (“backcountry”)) 
had been in direct contact with Europeans.  First came the French, in terms of both 
precedence and significance.  Over the course of a tumultuous century and a half, the Native 
peoples of the pays d’en haut and the agents of French colonialism formed a relationship on 
the basis of trade and military cooperation.  Although rocky at times, this relationship was 
mutually beneficial, and the partners established protocols of reciprocity to ensure that it 
remained so.  This experience provided an important precedent for interracial interaction and 
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cooperation that the Indians hoped to emulate in the future.  Following the fall of New 
France in 1763 and the American colonists’ victory in 1783, the British disappointed the 
Indians in their uneven adherence to this model, but they realized a yet graver 
disappointment in 1816.  In that year, the Americans belatedly extended their suzerainty over 
what had become a remarkably diverse community in the Old Northwest.  Despite their 
traditional and recent animosity toward the Americans, the residents greeted the occupiers 
with the anticipation that they would now don the mantle worn previously by the French and 
British.  When passed to the officers of the U.S. Army and the agents of the Office of Indian 
Affairs, however, the mantle fit poorly. 
Indeed, these federal officers proved reluctant to assume these responsibilities.  
Occupying a country stocked with former enemies, be they French, English, or Indian, the 
Americans conducted themselves as conquerors.  Thanks in large part to the inhabitants’ 
eagerness to resume trade, however, relationships between the residents and their American 
administrators warmed, and it appeared as though the Americans would be able assume the 
paternalistic obligations of Onontio—the “Great Mountain” who had governed New France, 
treated his “red children” fairly, and mediated their disputes.  In his place, the Americans 
offered the “Great Father,” the president of the United States.  Although each epithet 
conjured up the same images of majestic paternalism, the Great Father was not the Great 
Mountain, and the Americans proved inept at fairly arbitrating disputes between the Indians.  
The extent of American inadequacy did not become evident, however, until the Great Father 
was called upon to mediate disputes between his red and white children. 
Coming first in a trickle, a deluge of miners occupied Indian lands in the 1820s.  A 
rough-and-tumble lot, these men shared the same complexion and language of the federal 
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officers who had preceded them, but they possessed dissimilar values and loyalties.  Typical 
of the pioneer wave that had steadily eroded Indian land holdings in the years since the 
Revolution, these were men known for their love of hard drink and hatred of the Indian.  
Heretofore only modestly successful at maintaining peace between the Indian tribes, federal 
officers now had to maintain the peace between Indians and frontiersmen—and failed 
spectacularly in 1832.   
Although their motives were diverse, Indians allied with the United States all fought 
Black Hawk to serve the best interests of their people in a time of considerable change, and 
they did so in accordance with familiar forms they had negotiated with earlier European 
powers.  In their federal Indian agents, the Natives saw shadows of Onontio and heard echoes 
from the Great Mountain.  The Americans differed markedly from their French and British 
predecessors, however, and over the course of the 1820s and 1830s the Indians became aware 
that familiar forms did not fit their new circumstances.  When the Menominees, Dakotas, Ho 
Chunks, and Potawatomis sent their warriors against Black Hawk, they deployed their forces 
within the last remnants of a cosmopolitan domain that was neither wholly Indian nor 
European.  In so doing, they helped stabilize a region in turmoil and, inadvertently, opened 
the gates to a new wave of settlement that consumed this cosmopolitan vestige of colonial 
North America.  Indeed, with the final operations of Menominee warriors in August 1832, 
the last chapter in the history of colonial North America gave way to the subsequent narrative 
of Manifest Destiny.10 
Herein, this transformation is presented chronologically.  The first chapter establishes 
the historical foundations of relevant intertribal animosities, the role of warfare in Native 
                                                 
 10 For a broad assessment of Manifest Desinty’s implications for Native peoples with the United States, 
see Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee, Studies in 
North American Indian History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 38-39. 
society, and the precedent for these Indians to form alliances with European powers.  Chapter 
2 focuses on the years 1816 to 1822 and treats the advent of the Americans into the region 
and their awkward efforts to replicate the earlier alliances of the French and British regimes.  
The following chapter examines the tremendous strain placed on this alliance during the 
1820s, when white lead miners began pouring into the region, the depletion of fur-bearing 
animals destabilized Indian economies, and successive presidential administrations signaled a 
new course in American Indian policy.  Chapter 4 refigures standard interpretations of the 
causes of the Black Hawk War from the perspective of the Sauks’ and Mesquakies’ Native 
enemies, particularly the Dakotas and Menominees. The following chapter details the 
precarious position of the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks within Illinois and how Black 
Hawk’s actions complicated their position further.  Chapters 6 and 7 narrate the campaign 
conduct of the various U.S.-allied contingents during the war, while the eighth chapter 
examines the limits of America’s loyalty to its Indian allies.  The final chapter offers a brief 
assessment of the military significance of the Indians’ contributions, summarizes the 
principal motives behind each group’s policy, and examines the collective consequence of 
these policies. 
This work attempts to explain the histories of these Indian allies and the several 
conflicts that culminated in the Black Hawk War of 1832.  To that end, the various Indian 
groups that played a part in this story are herein referred to in the same manner by which they 
referred to themselves.  Hence, the Sioux, Chippewas, Winnebagos, and Foxes are here given 
as the Dakotas, Ojibwas, Ho Chunks, and Mesquakies, respectively.11  As will become 
evident, these tribal distinctions do not represent discrete political units but identities based 
                                                 
 11 The use of “Sioux” is retained for reference to the broader linguistic and cultural group to which the 
Dakotas belonged. 
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on a shared language and culture.  Hence, the decision to ally with the United States was 
always local rather than tribal, and the alliance of particular bands of these four tribes should 
not be misconstrued as a “tribal” alliance.  As the cases of the Ho Chunks and Potawatomis 












CHAPTER 1.  ROOTS OF CONFLICT. 
 
 
 In a ritual common to northern Wisconsin in the seventeenth century, a Menominee 
hunting party of eight or ten men set out to hunt the Peshtigo River.  This particular morning 
was somewhat novel because the party carried firearms afield for the first time.  The 
excitement occasioned by this inaugural gunpowder hunt was heightened by the knowledge 
that a manitou had directed it.  One of the hunters invoked a dream in which spirits directed 
him to obtain a rifle and ammunition from the white men who traded in nearby Green Bay.  
He and his fellows obeyed the solemn edict of the spirit world, and their families prepared 
for a celebratory feast in anticipation of a most successful hunt.  Unable to foresee the day’s 
events, the Menominees did not realize that they were, in fact, preparing for a mourning 
feast. 
 When the hunting band brought their canoes to rest on the shores of the Peshtigo, an 
alien warrior, armed and painted for war, emerged from the woodline and startled the 
Menominees.  The recipient of the dream raised the weapon ordained by his dream, took aim, 
and fired.  The Sauk warrior, who had come forward to offer a friendly greeting, fell dead.  
Seeing their comrade fall, the remainder of the Sauk war party, which had prepared an 
ambush for their Ojibwa enemies, issued the war whoop and sprang upon the Menominees.  
Surprised, the hunters retreated to their canoes.  Those who made it that far soon drowned in 
the Peshtigo River, as the Sauks riddled their fragile vessels with arrows and watched as the 
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water swallowed both canoes and pilots.1  The accidental encounter gave rise to an enmity 
that lasted for nearly two hundred years. 
***** 
 Most narratives of the Black Hawk War begin on 3 November 1804.  On that day, 
Sauk and Mesquakie delegates ceded—perhaps inadvertently—all of their territory east of 
the Mississippi River to the United States.2  The U.S. Senate ratified this treaty, but the 
affected tribes did not, and when they refused to vacate their former lands in the early 1830s, 
war resulted.  This storyline, while vital to understanding Black Hawk’s motives in the spring 
of 1832, meant nothing to the Menominees, Dakotas, Ho Chunks, or Potawatomis who 
opposed him later that summer.  Nor does it help explain their decisions to align with the 
United States.  For several of these tribes, the Black Hawk War was another in a series of 
battles that stretched back over generations.  Contemporary white observers ascribed these 
“ancient” conflicts to dysfunctional traditionalism among the involved tribes without 
seriously considering their political engines—a mistake repeated by many historians.  
Understanding these Indians’ actions during the Black Hawk War requires familiarity with 
the events that shaped intertribal political relations over the preceding two centuries.  An 
examination of this period traces not only the roots of intertribal animosities but also the 
ways in which Native conceptions of warfare and alliance with European powers evolved 
and informed Indian practices in 1832.  The American narrative of the Black Hawk War may 
begin in 1804, but the Indian story begins much earlier. 
                                                 
 1 Alanson Skinner, Folklore of the Menomini Indians, vol. 13, part 3, Anthropological Papers of the 
American Museum of Natural History (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1915), 434. 
 
 2 Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2 (Treaties) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1904), 74-77. 
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 The Sauks on the Peshtigo River were among the more recent of a wave of interlopers 
who appeared on Menominee lands in the late seventeenth century.  Approximately fifty 
years earlier, the Menominees and their western neighbors, the Ho Chunks, enjoyed 
exclusive occupation of what is presently Wisconsin.  Calling themselves Kayaes 
Matchitiwuk (“original men” or “original people”), the Menominees have inhabited northern 
Wisconsin for at least three thousand years.3  Oral tradition maintains that they have always 
lived in Wisconsin and that the two principal clans of the Menominees, Bear and Thunder, 
originated around the mouth of the Menominee River and at Lake Winnebago, respectively.4  
Speaking an Algonquin language, the pre-Columbian Menominees shared many cultural 
similarities with neighboring Algonguian tribes such as the Ojibwas, Ottawas, and 
Potawatomis, but the Menominees were unique in their affinity for their Siouan neighbors to 
the west, the Ho Chunks.  
Tracing their own origins to the Red Banks on the east shore of Green Bay and 
originally calling themselves the Otchagras or Wau-chou-gra, the Ho Chunks enjoyed a 
reputation among their neighbors as a particularly powerful and bellicose people.5   By their 
own oral tradition, the Ho Chunks wished for war so that they would have the opportunity to 
slay as many of their enemies as possible.6  When denied the martial glory of combat, Ho 
Chunk men diverted themselves by playing “the kicking game,” a contest in which two men 
                                                 
 3 David R. M. Beck, Siege and Survival: History of the Menominee Indians, 1634-1856 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 1; Patricia K. Ourada, The Menominee Indians: A History (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), 4. 
 
 4 Beck, Siege and Survival, 1. 
 
 5 Reuben G. Thwaites, Winnebago Notes, US Mss 7E Folder 3, Correspondence, Articles, Miscellany 
on Wisconsin Indians, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, 1.  Ho Chunk translates as “People of the 
Original Voice.”  Nancy Oestreich Lurie, Wisconsin Indians, Revised and expanded ed. (Madison: Wisconsin 
Historical Society Press, 2002), xii. 
 
 6 Paul Radin, The Winnebago Tribe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 18. 
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kicked one another until one could bear it no longer.7  Not surprisingly, the Ho Chunks 
guarded their domain with uncommon ferocity and allegedly ate the envoys of other tribes 
who wished to establish trade.  Such treatment sat poorly with the Algonquians of the Eastern 
Great Lakes, who by this time were armed and supplied by the French.  In a series of 
campaigns, the Algonquians reduced the once populous Ho Chunks to four or five thousand 
souls, who consolidated into a single village.  Here, fortune continued to turn against them, 
and disease ravaged the Ho Chunks, killing over half of the remaining population.8  Although 
now numbering only about 1,500, the Ho Chunks mounted a retaliatory raid against the 
nearest of their aggressors, the Mesquakies who dwelt on the eastern shore of Lake 
Michigan.  Five hundred warriors launched their canoes into Lake Michigan, but a tempest 
struck the unfortunate party, and not one of its number saw land again.9 
Taking sympathy on the hapless Ho Chunks, the Algonquians ceased hostilities, and 
the Illinois Confederacy even offered aid to ease Ho Chunk suffering.  Although they needed 
the assistance, the Ho Chunks worried more about the spiritual consequences of leaving their 
dead unavenged.  Accordingly, the Ho Chunks murdered a large party of Illinois diplomats 
who had so recently brought succor to their killers.  Their otherworldly concerns thus 
addressed, the Ho Chunks now had more pragmatic problems with which to contend.  
Realizing that the Illinois—and perhaps other offended tribes—would respond to their 
treachery, the Ho Chunks fortified themselves on a single island on Lake Winnebago.  The 
Illinois devoted an entire year to mourning their dead then waited for winter, when nature 
                                                 
 7 Ibid., 73. 
 
 8 Bacqueville de la Potherie, "History of the Savage Peoples Who Are Allies of New France," in The 
Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes, vol. 1, ed. Emma Helen Blair 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 293. 
 
 9 Ibid., 293-95. 
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furnished an ice bridge to the Ho Chunk fort.  Upon entering the village, however, the Illinois 
warriors discovered that their quarry had vacated it to engage in their winter hunt.  For six 
days, the Illinois tracked the Ho Chunks, who traveled in one body for their security.10  Their 
concentration only made it easier for the Illinois to obliterate their foes.  While the Illinois 
generally granted mercy to Ho Chunk women and children, only a handful of warriors 
escaped.  In 1640, Jesuit priest Claude Allouez reported that the Ho Chunks had been 
“almost wholly destroyed by the Illinois.”11 
On the verge of extinction, the Ho Chunks offered no resistance when, in the early 
seventeenth century, the Mesquakies migrated from Michigan to Wisconsin to escape 
persecution from the Ojibwas.12  Seeking refuge rather than war, the Mesquakies occupied 
the western fringes of Menominee and Ho Chunk land in the Fox River Valley.13  The 
Menominees extended hospitality to their Algonquian relatives.  Through the practice of 
apēīkon ahkīhih, the Menominees granted the Mesquakies permission to “sit down upon” 
Menominee land while withholding some usufructuary rights.14  Remaining at the sufferance 
of the Menominees, the Mesquakies were welcome so long as they did not abuse the 
                                                 
 10 The usual practice was for a village to disperse into several smaller bands for the winter hunt to 
avoid overburdening a particular hunting ground with too many hunters. 
 
 11 Thwaites, Correspondence . . . on Wisconsin Indians, Folder 3, 1.  Even by the end of the 
seventeenth century, one French official placed the number of Ho Chunk men at a scant 150.  Potherie, "History 
of the Savage Peoples Who Are Allies of New France," 295-300. 
 
 12 Earlier interpretations maintain that the Mesquakies originated from the south shore of Lake 
Superior; William T. Hagan, The Sac and Fox Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 5.  
Others suggest that they relocated from Michigan during the more general “Great Displacement” of the 1640s 
and 1650s.  David Edmunds and Joseph Peyser provide a convincing argument for an earlier migration from 
Michigan.  R. David Edmunds and Joseph L. Peyser, The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France, 
The Civilization of the American Indian Series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 9-10. 
 
 13 Beck, Siege and Survival, 26. 
 
 14 Ibid., 17. 
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Menominee resources at their disposal.  The Mesquakies and the Menominees remained 
allies until the very early eighteenth century.15  In future years, the Ho Chunks also cemented 
an alliance with their former enemies and partly restored their population through 
intermarriage with the Mesquakies.16 
 
 
The unlikely harmony achieved by the Menominees, Ho Chunks, and Mesquakies did 
not last.  Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, the people of Wisconsin became party to 
                                                 
 15 Ibid., 28. 
 
 16 Radin, The Winnebago Tribe, 11. 
 
Map 1.  Great Lakes Region.  From Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History, edited by Helen Hornbeck 
Tanner.  Copyright © 1987 by the University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.  Reprinted by permission. 
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a conflict with origins across the Atlantic.  European fashion of the day placed a high 
demand on North American furs—especially beaver pelts.  The demand transformed the 
economies of the Iroquois of New York and the Algonquians of Lower Canada, who rapidly 
depleted their own supplies of fur-bearing animals.  Allied with the British, the Five Nations 
of the Iroquois Confederacy represented the preeminent military power on the continent, and 
it expanded westward and northward in search of new hunting grounds.  This expansion 
usually led to conflict with the various Algonquian tribes that traded their furs with the 
French.  Better organized and armed, the Iroquois displaced one Algonquian population after 
another, creating a refugee crisis that culminated at the far end of the Great Lakes.17 
Strangers began to appear in 1634, when the French visited Wisconsin for their first 
time.  Preceded by French trade goods and diseases, the arrival of the French wrought little 
immediate change.  In the ensuing decades, however, Sauks, Potawatomis, Kickapoos, 
Miamis, and even Huron refugees moved into Wisconsin to escape from the Iroquois and 
hunt for furs.  Menominee oral tradition suggests that the first encounters were not uniformly 
violent and that the Menominees may have extended the hospitality of apēīkon ahkīhih to the 
Sauks.  The Sauks lived in the very midst of the Menominees and maintained a village at the 
mouth of the Oconto River on Green Bay.  Relations between the two tribes were cordial 
until the incident on the Peshtigo River.  Afterward, both sides tried to make amends, but 
intractable Sauk warriors continued to claim Menominee lives.  Ultimately, the Sauks 
exhausted Menominee good will, and the tribes became inveterate foes.18  Now overwhelmed 
by aliens, the Menominees resurrected their traditional military alliance with the Ho Chunks 
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to defend their sovereignty.  Still no match for their many and populous enemies, the 
Menominees teetered on the brink of extermination by 1669.19  To make matters worse, the 
invaders were vectors for European diseases that threatened to terminate the tenuous 
existence of Wisconsin’s original inhabitants.20   
 Ironically, the Menominee and Ho Chunk survivors escaped extinction due to their 
own weakness and the persistent threat posed by the Iroquois.  Militarily impotent, both 
tribes sought rapprochement with the new Algonquian powers of Wisconsin, with whom they 
intermarried.  In doing so, the Ho Chunks and Menominees began the slow process of 
recovering their populations and forming the kinship ties that, in Native communities, 
provided the foundation for political alliances.  Yet, while amorous affection was vital to 
Menominee and Ho Chunk survival, fear and war completed their deliverance.  Facing 
renewed aggression by the Iroquois Confederacy, which sought prisoners to replace its own 
war dead and furs for their British trading partners, the refugee tribes of the western Great 
Lakes cast aside their antipathies for each other to form a military alliance under the aegis of 
New France.   
 Plagued by a variety of congenital defects that ultimately led to its fall, New France 
needed Indian allies as much or more than they needed it.  Serendipitously, one of these 
defects was conducive to the formation of this alliance.  While the English had transported 
married families into its colonial settlements, New France was almost entirely male and 
composed of Jesuit missionaries and hardy fur traders.  As moral compasses and outlets for 
sexual needs, Jesuit priests proved less effective than English wives, and French fur traders 
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routinely consorted with Indian women.21  Many Native leaders condoned the unions, which 
promised to reinforce the fictive bonds of trade with the more binding kinship ties.  Indeed, 
one historian has argued that these relationships “transformed French traders into Indian 
husbands, fathers, and brothers.”22  As such, the simple rules of supply and demand gave way 
to Native expectations of reciprocity and mutual obligation.  Indeed, by the end of the 
seventeenth century the French fur trade was less a commercial enterprise than a 
demonstration of Onontio’s faithfulness to his Indian allies.23 
 By virtue of geography, some tribes were better situated than others to capitalize on 
the French alliance.  The establishment of French trade hubs at Michilimackinac and Green 
Bay conveyed special privileges to the tribes that inhabited those places: the Ojibwas, the 
Ottawas, and—at Green Bay—the Potawatomis.  Like the Sauks and Mesquakies, the 
Potawatomis originally inhabited the Michigan peninsula but fled to Wisconsin to escape the 
Iroquois.  Settling on the shores of Green Bay, which by 1677 was home to an estimated 
twenty thousand Indians and had become the western epicenter of French fur trade, the 
Potawatomis controlled access to the French fur traders and thereby achieved a prominent 
station among their fellow tribes. 24  Evolving conceptions of tribal leadership allowed the 
Potawatomis to capitalize on their fortune.  Respected advisors rather than executives, 
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traditional civil chiefs of Algonquian cultures led by persuasion and lacked coercive 
authority.  Moreover, the formulation of policy was typically the business of bands or 
villages, not tribes.   
 This diffusion of already-weak power frustrated the French, who preferred to deal 
with Indian leaders who spoke for the tribe as a whole.  Although no such leaders existed in 
Native society, the Potawatomis contributed to the invention of the “alliance chief,” who 
accepted increased authority in return for loyalty to both the French and his own tribe.  These 
liaisons could maintain their position only so long as they met the not-always complementary 
expectations of their dual constituencies.  Such a task demanded rare talent, and liaisons 
between the French and Algonquians often achieved status beyond their ordinary station in 
life in recognition of their abilities.  The accumulation of too much privilege or the display of 
hubris, however, could erode support for an alliance chief.  The more successful liaisons in 
the pays d’en haut, of which Onanghisse of the Potawatomis was prototypical, were careful 
to place the good of their primary constituency and the alliance as a whole before personal 
interests.25  The practice and office of the alliance chiefs established an important precedent 
among France’s Indian allies, who learned the value and later necessity of relying on trusted 
liaisons to conduct diplomacy with their European counterparts. 
United, the Algonquians, Ho Chunks, and French turned back the Iroquois tide and 
even induced the mighty Five Nations to sue for peace.  At the “Grand Settlement of 1701,” 
the Iroquois Confederacy vowed to remain neutral in the continuing contest between France 
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and Britain and agreed to abandon their annexed hunting territories west of Detroit.26  Their 
homelands liberated, most of the Michigan tribes returned to their native soil, restoring 
Menominee and Ho Chunk control of their domains.  Significantly, however, the Sauks and 
Mesquakies remained. 
While the Potawatomis typified the best case of accommodation with the French 
regime, the Mesquakies represented the opposite.  Occupying the western edge of the 
Menominee and Ho Chunk country at the time of the “Great Displacement” of refugee tribes 
into Wisconsin, the Mesquakies responded to the influx by migrating southwestward toward 
the Portage of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers.  Here, the Mesquakies encountered the 
Dakotas, the easternmost of the Sioux tribes who, like their linguistic cousins the Ho Chunks, 
were reputable warriors.  Yet unaware of the future strategic significance of “the Portage,” 
the Dakotas jealously guarded their hunting grounds, and they forcibly evicted the 
intruders.27  These initial clashes between the Dakotas and Mesquakies gave rise to a mutual 
animosity between the two peoples that waxed and waned over the ensuing years, persisting 
through the Black Hawk War. 
Chastened, the Mesquakies fell back to the area around Green Bay, which by this 
time was home to several new immigrant groups.  Already expelled from Michigan by the 
Ojibwas and from south-central Wisconsin by the Dakotas, the Mesquakies erected oaken 
palisades and constructed earthworks to prevent their further displacement.28  Jesuits who 
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began to proselytize among these fortifications described the Mesquakies as “given to 
hunting and warfare”—vocations that did not endear them to their new neighbors.29  
Consequently, Father Claude Allouez reported that the other Wisconsin tribes held the 
Mesquakies “in very low estimation.”30  Regardless, the Mesquakies were able to rally the 
support of various tribes in intermittent forays against their new western antagonists, the 
Dakotas, for whom the Mesquakies nursed a special hatred.  Although the Dakotas 
outnumbered the Mesquakies, the latter were better armed due to their proximity to the 
developing French trade entrepôt at Green Bay.  Their advantage proved short-lived, 
however, as an Ojibwa-Dakota armistice opened French trade to the latter tribe in 1679.  
Supplied with French arms and ammunition by Ojibwa middlemen, the Dakotas gained an 
advantage over the Mesquakies in the next decade.31   
Blaming the French for their reversal of fortune, the Mesquakies courted the Iroquois 
and raided French traders on Wisconsin waterways.  A violation of intertribal law and 
apēīkon ahkīhih, Mesquakie piracy incurred the wrath of the French and their trading 
partners.  Even the Menominees, who had remained friendly to Mesquakies throughout their 
tenure in Wisconsin, now turned against them.32  Hoping to defuse the situation, the French 
invited the Mesquakies to relocate to the new French trading hub at Detroit, which promised 
direct trade.  Two Mesquakie villages accepted, but then made a nuisance of themselves by 
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abusing other tribes and boasting that they would seek a trade relationship with the British.  
Their behavior exhausted the patience of the French and most Michigan Indians, who urged 
the French to eliminate the Mesquakies once and for all.  In 1712, the French-Indian alliance 
nearly accomplished this objective following a sensational siege, but the Mesquakie 
communities that had remained in Wisconsin adopted a conciliatory tone and deflected 
French wrath, albeit temporarily.  In 1727, the French established a new trading post on the 
upper Mississippi that provided direct access to the lucrative Dakota fur trade and denied the 
Mesquakies a role as middlemen.    Despite the counsel of seasoned leaders, young 
Mesquakie warriors retaliated against the French and their few remaining allies.  By 1729, 
the Mesquakies stood alone.33 
Among the last to abandon the Mesquakies were the Ho Chunks, who, like the 
Menominees, had accommodated the Mesquakie migration to Wisconsin and intermarried 
with them.  Recognizing the foolhardiness of standing with the Mesquakies against the 
combined force of the French-Algonquian alliance, the Ho Chunks elected to reconcile with 
Onontio.  To prove their loyalty, they performed his bidding by striking Mesquakie 
settlements beside Ottawa and Ojibwa warriors.  Incensed, the Mesquakies laid siege to the 
Ho Chunks, who again took refuge in their island stronghold.  French and Menominee forces 
from Green Bay eventually lifted the siege, but the Mesquakie estrangement from their 
Wisconsin allies was nearly complete.34  
Thereafter, Onontio exhorted his Indian children to wipe the Mesquakies from the 
earth, nearly succeeding in 1730.  Afterward, the Mesquakie survivors—perhaps fewer than 
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two hundred—sought refuge with the Sauks, with whom they were intermarried and who had 
begun to question New France’s genocidal policy.  Bravely, the Sauks defended the last 
remnants of the Mesquakie people, but they could not withstand the combined power of the 
Menominees, Ho Chunks, and other Indians who drove the newly formed Sauk-Mesquakie 
confederation down the Fox River Valley.35 
Sauk and Mesquakie union represented an alliance between two enemies of the 
Menominee people who had abused their generosity.  The Sauks and Mesquakies persisted in 
levying tolls along the Fox River, providing the Menominees with a particularly appropriate 
opportunity to punish their foes for their impertinence.  On one day, a flotilla of French trade 
canoes approached the Sauk-Mesquakie village.  According to their practice, the toll 
collectors lowered long tribute poles over the river, bidding the canoe pilots to land and 
submit to inspection and taxation.  As the canoes neared shore, they were met by the better 
part of the Sauk and Mesquakie villagers, who had left their wigwams to witness the day’s 
spectacle.  The festive quickly turned to horror; the oilcloth canoe covers concealed not furs 
but French soldiers, who emptied their muskets into the assembled mass.  Unarmed and 
panicked, the Sauks and Mesquakies fled for their homes, only to find that Menominee and 
Ojibwa warriors had crept from the woodline and blocked the path.  In the ensuing rout, the 
Menominees overtook their enemies and exacted their own tribute.  Previously unnamed, the 
site of this gory attack garnered the name Winneconne—the place of the skulls.36 
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Having more recently enjoyed warm relations with the Mesquakies, the Ho Chunks 
were not so eager to see that people eradicated.  By one oral account, the Ho Chunks had 
attempted to reconcile with the Mesquakies, dispatching a delegation bearing wampum, 
fruits, sugars, and meat.  The Ho Chunks’ recent defection proved too great to forgive, 
however, and the Mesquakies rejected the envoys in emphatic fashion: “Their pipes of peace 
were thrown into the river, and their mangled bodies were hung upon the trees.”37  A great 
fight ensued near Lake Winnebago and, during its three-day course, the Ho Chunks “lost ten 
men for each day and night of the year, before it was ended.  On the third day our chief fell, 
covered with wounds.”38  Reinforced by the Menominees, the Ho Chunks drove their 
antagonists down the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers and engaged them in a thirteen-day battle 
near the Blue Mounds, which, according to Ho Chunk tradition, the Sauks and Mesquakies 
had constructed as defensive measures.  “Hundreds of brave men fell on each day,”  but a 
storm of thunder and lightning persuaded all combatants that the Great Spirit was displeased 
with the carnage, and the Sauks and Mesquakies were permitted to retire to the west side of 
the Mississippi.  Years later, a Ho Chunk chief recounting the legend of this fight remained 
bitter, vowing, “No Fox or Sac meets a Winnebago, (except in council,) but one must die.”39 
 By the conclusion of the Fox Wars, warfare had changed in the pays d’en haut.  Even 
before the “beaver wars,” males served in the complementary capacities of hunters and 
warriors.  While the former provided nourishment, the latter furnished prestige and 
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respectability.  Indoctrination began early for Indian men, who slept in cradles decorated 
with bows and arrows as infants, practiced archery and wrestling at a young age, and learned 
to venerate war veterans through ceremonies and oral tradition.40  The Menominees believed 
that the path of a warrior began in the womb, where the red war god Minisíno-häwätûk 
preordained his success in battle and length of life.41  Successful warriors in all tribes 
received eagle feathers for killing a foe, notched their war clubs to record their exploits, and 
expected to be memorialized in song and legend.42  Because offices of civil and spiritual 
leadership were awarded on the basis of heredity, moreover, war provided the only means for 
social advancement in Native society.43    Put simply, young Indian men aspired to become 
accomplished warriors when they grew to maturity.44   
 Still, their ambitions were held in check by the civil leaders and women of their 
villages.  While neither group had the authority to forbid warfare outright, they imposed 
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checks and balances on the bellicose passions of youth.  Civil leaders could decree that a 
venture under consideration was inimical to the interests of the tribe and deny participants the 
pomp and circumstance that usually accompanied sanctioned ventures.45  Worse yet, civil 
leaders and women could reproach returned warriors for their actions and thereby deprive 
them acknowledgement and honor.  Women could further dissuade military action by 
refusing to perform their traditional duties as logisticians, compelling the warriors to abandon 
their cause or carry on with empty haversacks and worn-out moccasins. 
But the protracted warfare that wracked the Great Lakes region during the late 
seventeenth century increased the prestige of war leaders, and martial prowess became the 
most exalted virtue in men.46  Ominously, war leaders began to usurp the authority of civil 
chiefs, and warriors paid less heed to the objections of their women, undermining the 
traditional balance of power within Indian communities.  In many tribes, particular clans 
directed warfare and diplomacy, and these clans now assumed unprecedented importance.  
Among the Mesquakies, the business of war became so important that its traditional 
stewards, the Fox Clan and the Kiyagamohag warriors’ society, relinquished their 
prerogative to the rest of the tribe.47  By the time of the Grand Settlement of 1701, the 
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Western Indians had endured a generation of continuous warfare.  Their children participated 
in the wars against the Mesquakies, and their grandchildren participated in the climactic 
struggle between Onontio and the British king during the French and Indian War.48  Whereas 
military experience had been a virtue in the past, it was a mandatory rite of passage by the 
mid-eighteenth century.  Young Sauk men were not even permitted to marry until they had 
proven their mettle in combat.49  In 1827, Indian Agent Thomas Forsyth described the 
significance of warfare to Sauk and Mesquakie society: 
Young Indians are always fond of war, they hear the old Warriors boasting of their 
war exploits, and it may be said, that the principle of war is instilled into them from 
their cradles, they therefore embrace the first opportunity to go to war even in 
company with a strange Nations so that they may be able to proclaim at the dance, I 
have killed such a person, &c. &c.  One or more Indians of the same Nation and 
village may at the same time fast, pray, and consult their Munitos or Supernatural 
Agents about going to war.  The dreams they have during their fasting praying &c. 
determines every thing, as they always relate in public the purport of their lucky 
dreams to encourage the young Indians to join them…. and if the warriors believe in 
his dreams &c. he is never at a loss for followers.50 
 
The Sauks and Mesquakies were indicative rather than unique, and by the American 
Revolution, the western Great Lakes had developed into a land of martial peoples, habituated 
to warfare and alliance with a European power.   
This conditioning served the Sauks and Mesquakies well as they migrated westward 
to escape Onontio’s vengeance and, later, to distance themselves from the persistent Ojibwa-
Dakota contest for control of the upper reaches of the Mississippi.  By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the Sauks and Mesquakies resided in about a dozen villages on either 
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bank of the Mississippi between the mouths of the Wisconsin and Des Moines Rivers.  Here, 
the Mesquakies gradually rekindled their old animosity for the Dakotas, who were widely 
regarded as the most warlike of all tribes on the upper Mississippi.   
Even upon first contact with Europeans, the Dakotas exhibited the sort of militaristic 
tendencies that the Algonquians acquired only with the passage of time.  When Pierre 
Radisson visited the Dakotas in the 1650s, he made careful note of the men he encountered 
but neglected the women altogether.  According to Gary Clayton Anderson, the oversight 
was understandable: “The lapse illustrates the chauvinistic nature of Sioux society; most 
functions revolved around the excitement of the chase and the glories of war.”51  Indeed, 
prepubescent Dakota boys accompanied their fathers to war at the tender age of nine or ten so 
that they might learn their future vocation.  In recognition and fear of their martial abilities, 
some Frenchmen referred to the Dakotas as the “Iroquois of the West.”52  One French 
commandant regarded the Dakotas as superior, claiming that “they surpass the Iroquois in 
bravery and courage” and used their bows and arrows as pillows, suggesting that they were 
ready for a fight even as they slept.53  The Dakotas’ Algonquian neighbors in Wisconsin 
shared this impression and, according to French observers, were paranoid of the eastern 
Sioux.54   
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The warlike disposition of the Dakotas appears to have been a product of their 
economy, in which hunting provided their primary means of subsistence.55  Unlike the 
Algonquians of Wisconsin, whose diverse economies relied far more on agriculture, fishing, 
and gathering, the Dakotas required vast expanses of untrammeled hunting land to provide an 
adequate supply of calories and proteins.  Hence, sustaining their population required the 
Dakotas to guard their domain with singular determination—and population growth 
compelled wars of conquest.  The advent of the fur trade did not improve the situation.  If 
anything, it increased competition over a limited commodity with almost limitless demand—
a circumstance that all but guaranteed conflict with fellow Indians, especially the Ojibwas 
and Mesquakies. 
While the contested hunting grounds around the upper reaches of the Mississippi 
fueled a seemingly endless war between the Dakotas and Ojibwas, the Dakotas reserved 
special opprobrium for the Mesquakies on account of their taxation of trade on the Fox River.  
By virtue of geography, this practice victimized the Dakotas more than any other tribe.  With 
no feasible alternative but to ship their furs up the Wisconsin and Fox Rivers to Green Bay, 
the Dakotas were unwilling benefactors of the Mesquakies until the French established a 
western trading post in 1727.  When the Mesquakies protested by raiding French commerce, 
the Dakotas willingly participated in the final French campaign against the Mesquakies. 
Their eventual defeat represented a tremendous boon to the Dakotas, who achieved 
ascendancy in the western fur trade by the mid-1730s.56   
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Having achieved economic security, the Dakotas acquiesced to Sauk and Mesquakie 
settlement in Iowa and along the banks of the Mississippi over the next twenty years.  
Despite their historical animosity with the Mesquakies, the Dakotas—like many tribes in the 
region—had begun to question Onontio’s willingness to extirpate an entire people and took 
pity on their vanquished foes.57  Even in concert with the Sauks, the harrowed Mesquakies 
posed no threat to the mighty Dakotas, who could field as many warriors as any other tribe in 
the region.58  In fact, young Mesquakie warriors looking to establish themselves sometimes 
joined Dakota war parties as they crossed the Mississippi to strike members of the Illinois 
Confederacy.59  Inexorably, though, the Sauk and Mesquakie position improved while the 
supply of fur-bearing animals diminished.  By the end of the eighteenth century, the mutual 
loathing of the Dakotas and Mesquakies had not only been resurrected, but it pulled in the 
Sauks and attained unprecedented intensity.  
For the most part, however, the French carefully guarded against the escalation of 
intertribal squabbles even as they imposed the wrenching economic change that gave rise to 
many of the disputes.  For the officials of New France, the prevention of conflict between 
their Native allies was a matter of good politics and better business.  The “Fox Wars”—New 
France’s nearly successful bid to eliminate the Mesquakies as a people—were both an 
exception to and manifestation of this principal.  The campaign against the Mesquakies was 
an exceptional instance in which the French regarded a single tribe as being so disruptive to 
both the Algonquian alliance and the fur trade that they had to be eliminated.  At his best, 
Onontio learned to mediate disputes between his various Indian children, lavishing them with 
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presents to maintain order and good will.  Despite the cost, he was willing to make this 
investment.  Hopelessly outnumbered by English colonists, France’s North American 
colonial empire rested on the stability of its Algonquian alliance and hard-earned Iroquois 
neutrality.60   
If imperial ambition compelled France to construct a remarkable, intercultural 
alliance, this same ambition proved its undoing.  Hoping to contain Britain’s North American 
colonies east of the Appalachian Mountains, French officials contested British expansion into 
the Ohio River Valley in the mid eighteenth century.  Here, Onontio’s kinship alliance had 
the shallowest of roots, and he relied on the military power of his Western allies.  In the 
main, these Indians were more than willing to go to war at his behest.  As war-making had 
become the premier occupation among Indian men and French officials attempted to resolve 
intertribal disputes peacefully, assailable enemies became a precious commodity in the pays 
d’en haut.  Consequently, young warriors were willing to travel great distances in search of 
martial accomplishment.  Moreover, Onontio compensated them with trade goods, 
provisions, and the prospect of war booty, thereby compounding the already strong incentive 
to make war.61   
But the French and Indian War (1754-1763) taxed the Franco-Algonquian alliance 
beyond its limits.  Maladroit French administrators demanded too much and gave too little, 
while military commanders from the Continent misused allies they considered more 
distasteful than necessary.62  Perhaps nowhere was this more evident than at Fort William 
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Henry in 1757, where the Marquee de Montcalm’s mismanagement of two thousand Indian 
allies resulted in the famous “Massacre of Fort William Henry,” in which warriors violated 
the European terms of surrender to reap the Indian fruits of victory.  The event proved 
calamitous for New France, as Britain prosecuted the remainder of the war with indignant 
vigor, and the disaffected western Algonquians returned to their wigwams.63  France endured 
a decisive defeat, and Onontio, the Great Mountain, turned to dust.  
Vengeful over real and imagined atrocities committed by various Native groups 
during the recent war, the victorious British initially treated the Indians like conquered 
subjects.  With varying degrees of concert, Indian groups from Michigan to Georgia 
responded violently to British pretensions during “Pontiac’s Rebellion,” which compelled a 
reappraisal of Britain’s post-war Indian policy.64  By their actions, the Indians made it clear 
that they were not defeated, and that the British would have to accord themselves with Indian 
expectations if they desired stable relations.  Desirous of maintaining the peace they had just 
won at extraordinary cost, the British redressed Indian grievances and moved to contain their 
principal cause: American colonists.   
To this end, the British continued to vest responsibility for Indian diplomacy in the 
offices of royal “superintendents for Indian affairs” rather than returning it to the jealous 
colonial assemblies, whose members were more concerned with tapping the economic 
potential of their newly won continent than with establishing friendly relationships with the 
Natives.  Indeed, in the wake of a particularly brutal race war along the Pennsylvania and 
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Virginia frontiers, such a goal appeared unobtainable, and British administrators realized that 
the fragile peace on the frontier depended upon the segregation of whites and Indians.  
Hence, the British issued a royal proclamation in October 1763 that forbade American 
colonists from violating the sanctity of the trans-Appalachian Indian country.  Often cited as 
among the earliest in a catalog of offenses that culminated in the American Revolution, the 
Proclamation of 1763 also announced Britain’s assumption of the duties of Onontio.65
Over the ensuing decade, the British replicated many of the functions earlier fulfilled 
by the French.66  Initially, the relationship was almost entirely commercial.  Although the 
Indians were growing increasingly dependent on European trade goods (and the British could 
offer these goods in greater quantities, in higher quality, and at lower prices than had the 
French), British traders soon realized that the economy of the pays d’en haut operated on 
more than the laws of supply and demand. The privilege of conducting commerce with the 
Indians was contingent upon demonstrations of reciprocity, and the British learned the 
necessity of reconstituting a kinship-based trading network.  Rather than squeezing out the 
French and métis traders who remained, the British co-opted not only the individual traders 
but also their invaluable networks.67  Typically, American merchants were shut out from this 
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trade, which simultaneously forestalled the development of commercial relationships 
between Americans and the western Indians and contributed toward a mounting disaffection 
among American colonists for the Crown’s Indian policy—indirectly contributing toward 
cooperation between the British and Indians in a venue other than trade.   
For many Indian groups, the American Revolution was very similar to the French and 
Indian War.  While many eastern Indian groups labored (often unsuccessfully) to maintain 
neutrality and a few allied with the Americans, most considered their interests best served by 
alliance with the British, with whom they were already bound by trade and who seemed to be 
the lesser of two evils.  Having not relied extensively on Indian allies since the seventeenth 
century, however, the British proved amateurish in sponsoring an Indian war, and many of 
the King’s Native allies paid dearly for their decision to oppose the Americans.68  The 
Indians of the Old Northwest, however, remained largely insulated from the vindictive 
retribution of the colonists.  Although victorious, the Americans lacked the strength to evict 
the British from their western posts, and British suzerainty over the western Great Lakes 
remained intact until 1795, when the British garrisons began to withdraw to Canada in 
accordance with the provisions of Jay’s Treaty.  This agreement, however, upheld British 
trading privileges in American territory, and the British continued to administer Indian affairs 
from nearby Malden.   
Militarily impotent, the Americans took meager steps to exert their influence in the 
region.  In 1797, the Americans unsuccessfully challenged the British fur trade monopoly by 
occupying Michilimackinac.69  Five years later, Indian-white disturbances in southern Illinois 
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prompted the government to station a company of troops at Kaskaskia.  The following year, 
another company established Fort Dearborn at the mouth of the Chicago River on the south 
end of Lake Michigan.70  The Americans did not make a concerted effort to extend their 
hegemony over the region, however, until the 1803 Louisiana Purchase at once expanded 
American claim to the western Great Lakes region, established the need for a military 
administration of the new possession, and excited further economic competition with Great 
Britain. 
Ultimately, this economic competition came to a head in the War of 1812.  While the 
Americans had made only temporary inroads among the Indians of the Upper Mississippi, the 
British exerted considerable influence through their network of fur traders, many of whom 
were French or métis and retained kinship ties to their trading partners.  Consequently, when 
the Battle of Tippecanoe and the War of 1812 brought war to the pays d’en haut, many 
Native groups aligned with the British.  Some attempted to retain neutrality, but precious few 
sided with the Americans.  As in the American Revolution, Indian groups chose their allies 
by carefully considering their prospects for success and the best interests of their people.71  
Unfortunately for the Indians, their best interests and best prospects proved mutually 
exclusive, and by 1814 even the most ardent of Britain’s Indian allies sensed the impending 
American victory.  Although he had worn the rank of a British general officer and led his 
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people against the Americans in two wars, the Dakota chief Wabasha laid down his 
tomahawk and prepared to make peace with the Americans.72   
In defeat, the British proved uncommonly loyal to their Indian allies, taking particular 
pains to ensure that the Americans not punish the Indians on account of their participation.  
Although the Treaty of Ghent restored the status quo ante bellum, the inhabitants of the pays 
d’en haut lived in a new world.  For the past two hundred years, European powers had 
engaged with them in economic and military partnerships, the first compelled by commercial 
interest, the second by necessity.  Antagonisms between the French and British and, later, 
British and Americans had rendered Indian warriors invaluable to successive European 
regimes.  By 1815, the Indians of the pays d’en haut were a martial people accustomed to 
alliance with powerful, European powers.  The contest for control of the Great Lakes region 
had been decided, however, and Indian warriors were no longer in high demand.  They 
previously had been able to leverage their indispensability to their advantage, compelling 
both the British and the French to conform to Indian expectations of reciprocity.  These days 
were now at an end; the Americans were coming. 
                                                 












 In the years following the War of 1812, the United States finally extended its 
suzerainty over the Old Northwest.  Beginning in 1816, the U.S. government established 
military posts and Indian agencies along the Fox-Wisconsin waterway to secure the fruits of 
America’s recent victory and sever the Indians’ ties to their British “father.”  Accustomed to 
a European patron and eager to resume trade, most Indian groups welcomed the Americans, 
who, for their part, administrated a relatively benign Indian policy.  Over the course of a 
quarter-century of trial and error, U.S. officials learned what the British had divined decades 
earlier: peace on the frontier required fair dealings with the Indians and the protection of their 
lands from illegal white encroachment.  Hence, the Americans who appeared in the pays d’en 
haut in 1816 attempted to replicate many of the diplomatic forms of their European 
predecessors, offering the “Great Father,” the U.S. president, as a new Onontio.  In other 
regards—especially the Americans’ insistence that the Indians cease all intertribal conflict—
the Indians discerned alarming departures from the French and British precedent.  Still, the 
Indians lacked alternatives and generally embraced the Americans as their new allies in trade 
and—eventually—arms. 
 The Americans were not complete strangers to the Indians of the Upper Mississippi.  
They had, of course, fought two wars with gchimookmaan or “Big Knives” over the past 
forty years, and the Indians on the banks of the Mississippi River had maintained sporadic 
diplomatic contact with the Americans since the time of the Louisiana Purchase.  With good 
reason, the Indians regarded the Americans as a warrior people; uniformed officers 
conducted warfare and diplomacy among the Indians, suggesting a similarity to the office of 
“war chief” familiar to the Indians.  Following the American Revolution, British-allied 
Indians treated with George Rogers Clark, who, according to Richard White, “seemed a 
familiar figure to the Algonquians” due to his stature as a warrior.  Although the Indians paid 
deference to the swaggering American general, he overestimated the significance of his 
purely military victories.  “Clark's mistake,” White continues, “was to think them the larger 
triumphs of alliance.”1 Yet Clark’s methods provided the Americans with what they 
considered a working model for the management of Indian affairs in the Old Northwest.  In 
the future, all diplomacy between the Indians and the United States would take place in a 
distinctly military milieu designed to both impress and intimidate the Indians. 
Zebulon Pike adhered to this model in 1807, when he traveled up the Mississippi to 
scout locations for military posts from which the army could erode the influence of British 
traders among the Indians.  During his trip, Pike discovered the internecine conflict between 
the Dakotas and the Ojibwas.  Because the former agreed to sit with Pike in council, the army 
officer concluded that they were the less offensive of the two parties, and he pledged to assist 
the Dakotas militarily should the Ojibwas refuse to accept a negotiated peace.  Accustomed 
to the French model of Indian diplomacy, the Dakotas welcomed Pike’s proposal to construct 
forts in the region, which the Indians construed as trading houses.   They balked, however, at 
Pike’s designs on arbitrating the Dakota-Ojibwa conflict.  For their part, the Ojibwas had no 
more interest in a settlement than did their foes.  Yet, Pike “commanded them, in the name of 
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their great father, to make peace,” and he pompously assumed that they would obey.2  
Further offending his hosts, Pike demanded that they relinquish the medals bestowed upon 
them by the British, which conveyed to their wearers the honor of alliance chiefs.3  Despite 
Pike’s transgressions, the Indians of the Upper Mississippi were encouraged by the prospect 
of a lively trade with the Americans. 
Yet even in this regard the Americans disappointed them.  In 1808, the army 
constructed a fort at the mouth of the Des Moines River to extend American military and 
economic influence over the Sauks, Mesquakies, and Dakotas.  With the exception of the 
Sauks, most tribes welcomed the Americans and their trade goods.  American traders were 
more interested in expanding westward into the Missouri River Valley and in leaving the 
Upper Mississippi trade to the British, who were more than willing to enter American 
territory illegally and offer their superior trade goods.  The British also established an 
entrepôt at St. Joseph’s Island, which offered the Indians a convenient trading site outside of 
American territory.4  Disappointed in the Americans’ failure to assume fully the mantle of 
Onontio, many Indians turned again to the British, who more than happy to oblige. 
Only after the War of 1812 did the Americans exhibit any serious interest in 
establishing a permanent presence in the region.  American motives were at once economic, 
military, and humanitarian.  Foremost, Americans wished to once and for all disassociate the 
Indians from the British, who continued to tap the valuable fur trade from afar and, according 
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to many suspicious Americans, to agitate the Indians against the Americans.  Accordingly, 
the Americans embarked upon an ambitious program of fortification construction aimed at 
subduing the Indians.  In the words of one officer, “The intervention of a fortress between an 
Indian and his home, is an insuperable obstacle to distant warfare.”5  Even Thomas Forsyth, 
later renowned as one of the most capable and conscientious Indian agents, subscribed to the 
necessity of the fortifications because they “would keep the Indians in awe, and might be the 
occasion of preventing many accidents.”6   
In 1816, the army constructed Fort Howard at Green Bay and Fort Crawford at Prairie 
du Chien.  Where they did not build fortifications, soldiers marched through the Indian 
country simply to show the flag and demonstrate military presence.  Two such ventures in 
1816 and 1818 impressed the Dakotas considerably.7   By 1819, Thomas Forsyth observed 
that the Indians of the Mississippi had by this time realized the waxing power of the United 
States.  “The Indians on the Mississippi, I am happy to say, from the best information I can 
collect, are perfectly peaceable.”  Even the Sauks—who, along with the Mesquakies, 
Kickapoos, and Ho Chunks of the Rock River in Illinois had been among the last tribes to 
sign peace treaties with the United States—appeared to be warming to the Americans.8  
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These Indians, Forsyth reported, “do not appear to express such a high opinion of their 
British Father as formerly; but, on the contrary, they begin to think that their American 
Father has the strongest arms, and his medicines are the best.”9  In 1820, the army completed 
construction of Fort Snelling at the confluence of the Minnesota and Mississippi Rivers, 
establishing an American presence that effectively terminated British influence over the 
Upper Mississippi.10  
 Most tribes welcomed the arrival of the Americans, who offered to take the important 
place of their departed British “fathers.”  When, in 1819, Colonel Henry Leavenworth 
traveled up the Mississippi to establish Fort Snelling, Indian Agent William Forsyth 
attempted to allay any anxiety occasioned by the arrival of a substantial military force.  
Among the Dakotas, Forsyth emphasized the economic benefits of the eventual Fort Snelling.  
In addition to providing the Indians convenient access to essential services such as 
blacksmiths, the post would double as a government-administered trade “factory.”11  A 
critical component of American Indian policy from 1795 until 1822, the factory system 
existed to increase U.S. influence over the Indians “by administering to their wants, 
increasing their comforts, and promoting their happiness.”12  Thus, the Americans offered to 
fill the important economic void they had created by expelling the British from the region.  
Forsyth discovered that the Dakotas were pleased at the American designs.  Just as the 
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French construction of a trading post on the Upper Mississippi in 1727 had proved a 
significant economic boon for the tribe, the arrival of the Americans promised to reinvigorate 
the Dakota economy.  Forsyth recorded that a chief named Little Crow voiced pleasure about 
the impending fortress construction, for “the Sioux would now have their Father with 
them.”13 In Green Bay, the reception was much the same, especially among the métis 
population, which quickly grasped the economic potential of the new garrison.14  In contrast, 
métis and French traders of Prairie du Chien—a bastion of pro-British sentiment—were put 
off by the army commanders, who occupied the village with the haughtiness of conquerors.  
Relations did not improve in 1817, when Lieutenant Colonel Talbot Chambers assumed 
command.  A notorious drunkard whom the army cashiered in 1826, Talbot awarded Jacques 
Menard twenty-five lashes for reproaching the colonel for his drunken, lustful pursuit of an 
unwilling young woman.15  Economic imperatives and the arrival of more temperate officers 
helped alleviate the situation, but Prairie du Chien was unique for the distance that remained 
between its Francophone citizens and U.S. administrators.  
 If the Indians and traders wished to restore the fur trade to its former prominence, 
they were less certain about the cannon-toting bluecoats garrisoning the most martial of 
trading posts.  Although the various contingents were miniscule by European standards 
(typically two infantry companies for each remote post), their purpose was not entirely clear 
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to the Indians.  While the French and British had maintained soldiers in the remote reaches of 
the pays d’en haut, they had typically done so only when at war with one another, and only 
when explicitly allied with indigenous population.  But the Americans were not at war, and 
they preached steadfast neutrality in Indian affairs.  What purpose were the soldiers to serve?  
In the corridors of American government, the forts were meant to subdue the Indians, but this 
was never communicated to them.  Forsyth assured the Dakotas that the army was there for 
their benefit and protection, and that “their enemies would not be allowed to injure any of the 
Sioux Indians at or near the fort.”  He added, however, an important caveat: “but at the same 
time the Sioux must not injure the Chippewas that might visit the fort.”16  Echoing Pike’s 
earlier admonishments, it seemed that the soldiers were intent on preventing warfare between 
the Indians. 
In Green Bay, which many officers regarded as the most important location in the 
region, the Americans paid the Menominees the diplomatic courtesy of requesting permission 
to erect a fort on their lands.17  The American commander and his officers sat in council with 
the famous Menominee chief Tomah, who addressed the advent of the soldiers with flattery.  
“My Brother!  How can we oppose your locating a council-fire among us?  You are too 
strong for us.   Even if we wanted to oppose you, we have scarcely got powder and shot to 
make the attempt.”  In this last statement, Tomah meant to communicate not only that his 
Menominees posed no threat to the Americans but that they were a people in need, subtly 
implying the Americans could demonstrate their beneficence by easing their privation.  
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Explicitly, Tomah requested only one favor from the Americans: “that our French brothers 
shall not be disturbed or in any way molested.”  Contingent upon this request, “You can 
choose any place you please for your fort, and we shall not object.”18
The Ho Chunks were not so acquiescent.  Although their population had by this time 
rebounded to approximately 4,500 persons living in nearly twenty villages stretching from 
the lower Rock River to Lake Winnebago, the Ho Chunks retained the fiery belligerence of a 
people who had narrowly survived their extermination.19  After chasing the Sauks and 
Mesquakies from the Fox River decades earlier, the Ho Chunks adopted the earlier 
Mesquakie practice of levying tribute on those traversing that important waterway.  Although 
the Ho Chunks had signed a treaty of good will with the Americans in St. Louis on 3 June 
1816, they continued this practice and were rumored to remain on the British payroll.20  
Upon learning of the American force at Green Bay, the Ho Chunks sent a deputation to 
protest the intrusion.  A chief informed the American commander “that if his object was 
peace, he had brought more with him than was necessary to treat; but if his object was war, 
he had brought too few to fight.” 21  The officer responded by showing the chief ten or twelve 
large cannon, which seemed to alter the Ho Chunk’s initial calculation. 22  The Ho Chunk 
deputation departed without incident, but relations between the tribe and the army remained 
tense. 
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Over the next decade, Americans formed a variety of opinions of the Ho Chunks, 
which ranged from loathing to admiring.  They were fairly uniform, however, in their 
judgment that the Ho Chunks were “a bold and warlike tribe.”23  Although no longer reputed 
to eat their enemies, they were known to adorn themselves with the body parts of slain foes.24  
Among early American civilians in Green Bay, such a demeanor was cause for considerable 
alarm.  In 1822, a missionary schoolteacher observed a Ho Chunk war dance in which “their 
stalwart men, [and] Amazonian women” displayed their “independent mien, athletic figures, 
and defiant bearing.”  Although clearly impressed, the teacher noted that “None could endure 
the scene unmoved—unappalled.”25  Others disagreed.  Perhaps raised to admire 
demonstrations of martial prowess, the son of Fort Snelling’s commander opined, “These 
people have more courage, and more national character, than any tribe of the North West.  
Drunkenness is not so common among them as among other tribes, and they are not so fond 
of mixing blood with the whites.”26  Because of their reluctance to intermarry with whites, 
the Ho Chunks had not developed the kinship networks that tied other tribes to the French 
and (to a lesser extent) the British.  Although they had fought beside the French, Pontiac, and 
the British, the basis of their various alliances remained almost entirely military and designed 
to preserve their existence as an independent people.27  Even by the time of the Black Hawk 
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War, the Ho Chunks exhibited no interest in normalizing relations with the Americans.  A 
visitor to Green Bay in the summer of 1832 described the Ho Chunks as “Tall in figure, 
haughty in his mien, proud of his nationality, and ever ready for war, he…repulses the 
advance of the white man.”28  Relatively unimpressed by American military power, the Ho 
Chunks fired on soldiers who refused to pay their Fox River toll and continued to demand 
tribute from military detachments traversing the Fox River as late as 1830.29   
In stark contrast to the Ho Chunks, tribes that had enjoyed privileged stations under 
the French regime were quick to adapt to the American presence—and to make the 
Americans adapt to theirs.  Formerly the hosts of significant French trade entrepôts at Green 
Bay and Lake Pepin on the Upper Mississippi, the Menominees, Potawatomis, and Dakotas 
exerted considerable influence over the Americans through their métis relatives in Green 
Bay, Chicago, and Prairie du Chien, respectively.30  Unimpressive to American eyes, these 
villages were in fact remarkable bastions of a cosmopolitan culture Lucy Eldersveld Murphy 
has described as “Creole.” 31  Because the tribes of the region were patrilineal, the Indians 
regarded the children of Indian women and white men as white, and over time these multi-
ethnic families built their own communities at these important sites of trade.  Upon American 
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arrival, the leading citizens in each of these towns were French or métis traders fluent in 
several languages, who, despite varying degrees of fluency in English, won early 
appointments as justices of the peace and other civil offices from territorial governors.  
Although most of the métis regarded army officers as capricious and overbearing, métis 
people rendered vital services to federal Indian agents, who employed them as interpreters, 
guides, and couriers to the Indian country.    
First authorized by Congress in 1793, Indian agents conducted the day-to-day 
business of managing federal-Indian relations from agency houses among the Indians, 
usually collocated with a military post and (until 1822) a trade factory.  While the soldiers 
awed the Indians and the government factor supplied them, the Indian agent dispensed 
annuities (perennial payments for ceded territory) and endeavored to administer federal 
Indian policy.  At the time of their arrival among the Indians of the Old Northwest, this 
policy aimed at “civilizing” and assimilating Indians into the dominant white society by 
exposing them to European agricultural practices and notions of individual property 
ownership.  Despite rabid anti-Indian sentiment along the frontier of white settlement, 
Secretary of War William Crawford sincerely averred in 1816 “that it is the true policy and 
earnest desire of the Government to draw its savage neighbors within the pale of civilization” 
rather than “to extinguish the Indian title, and settle their lands as rapidly as possible.”  The 
latter course, Crawford contended, would result in “continual warfare, attended by the 
extermination or expulsion of the aboriginal inhabitants.”  Aware that such an outcome suited 
some Americans just fine, Crawford admonished, “The correctness of this policy cannot for a 
moment be admitted.  The utter extinction of the Indian race must be abhorrent to the 
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feelings of an enlightened and benevolent nation.”32  Hence, while the army came among the 
Indians to awe them into submissiveness, the Indian agents came as advocates of beneficent 
paternalism—agents of a distant but omnipotent president who would provide for the 
Indian’s needs, afford them “occasional asylum” when chastised by enemies, and furnish 
“redress for any grievances.”33  In place of the “Great Mountain,” Onontio, the Americans 
offered a “Great Father,” the President. 
Despite the similarity of the name and paternalistic pretensions, the Great Father was 
notably inferior to his French—and even British—predecessor in a number of regards.  Most 
immediately noticeable to the Indians were the poor quality of American trade goods, 
which—with the single exception of tobacco—were so inferior to British manufactures that 
the Indians assumed that any article of shoddy workmanship was American-made. 34  Often 
times, the government-paid factors were of no better quality than the goods they dispensed.  
One of the first American residents of Green Bay deadpanned that the factor at that place was 
“as well fitted for the trust as any citizen totally unacquainted with the Indian country, its 
trade and inhabitants, could be—that is, not fitted at all.”  Devoid of any knowledge of the 
Indians and peddling the “sleazy, woolen blankets, cheap calico, and…poor unserviceable 
guns” furnished by the government, the factor stood no chance when competing with private 
métis traders (usually employed by British trading companies in Canada) who had dealt with 
the Indians for generations.  Consequently, “during his four years’ trade,” the Green Bay 
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factor “did not secure fifty dollars worth of peltries.”35  Other factors fared no better, and in 
1822 Congress ended factory system, which had incurred financial losses in every year of its 
existence and failed to demonstrate any progress toward its designed objectives of 
“civilizing” the Indians and distancing them from the British.36   
In 1819, Sauk and Mesquakie agent Thomas Forsyth ascribed a persistent affection 
for the British among the Indians to not only the superiority of their trade goods but also the 
superiority of their Indian agents, who uniformly spoke Native languages and were familiar 
with their customs.  In contrast, “A man is appointed an agent in the interior of the Union, 
who perhaps never saw an Indian until he came to the agency.  How, then, can it be supposed 
that a man who knows nothing about Indians, can do anything with them?”  Forsyth pilloried 
his colleagues for their ignorance of “Indian character” and their propensity to “promise fifty 
things to the Indians with a prior intention to put them off.”  “As long as we continue to 
pursue our present ignorant system of Indian affairs,” Forsyth warned, “we will always be in 
the dark, and the hatred of the Indian race will be handed down to successive generations.”37  
Warranted in some cases, Forsyth’s criticism did not do justice to many of his 
contemporaries, such as Henry Schoolcraft, who became one of the best known ethnologists 
of his day.  As Forsyth indicated, Indian agents achieved their office by political appointment 
rather than familiarity with the Indians, and few possessed any special qualifications for 
dealing with Indians.  Still, the men who won these appointments (which were ratified by the 
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Senate) were mainly ambitious, talented, and educated men who threw themselves 
wholeheartedly into the business of learning their trade and the Indians they served.  While 
certainly not as adept at their craft as had been the French commandants of a century past, 
they were not wholly incompetent, and they certainly are not to be confused with the 
infamously corrupt Indian agents of a later generation.  As Francis Paul Prucha has observed, 
the success of the various Indian agents inevitably depended upon the character of the 
individual agent, and the United States was fortunate to have enjoyed the services of “a 
number of capable and distinguished men of character and integrity that gave stature to the 
office of Indian agent.”38  If inferior to their predecessors, the U.S. Indian agents were 
usually the most accessible and sympathetic Americans known to the Indians, and—however 
poor their diction—they spoke a familiar language of alliance. 
But Forsyth was not alone in his fear that the agents were making promises they 
could not keep.  Adhering to customary forms of Indian diplomacy, agents spoke on behalf 
of their Great Father and pledged his undying affection and loyalty for his red children.  
Believing that they discoursed with true spokesmen for the president, the Indians were 
initially unaware that they communicated with lower-level functionaries of an inconstant 
government.  Undermanned and underfunded, the agents were responsible for the 
administration of an ambitious and important federal program in some of the most desolate 
corners of the nation.  And they did so from an ambiguous legal foundation that excited the 
jealousies of some authoritarian army commanders, who resented the agents’ prerogative.  
Recognizing that their organization was insufficient for the task at hand, Secretary of War 
John C. Calhoun established the Bureau of Indian Affairs within his department in 1824.  To 
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chair this important body, he appointed Thomas McKenney as the Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs.  Unfortunately, Calhoun established this office without legal authorization, and 
McKenney found himself powerless to effect meaningful change; he lamented that his 
extralegal bureau was “too powerless to be effective, and too responsible for its 
feebleness.”39  He championed legislation that would put the Indian Office on firmer footing, 
but it was never put to a vote during his tenure, and he rightly feared that “we shall go on 
slip-shod, as we have gone on.”40  Compelled by events, Congress finally passed the 
legislation advocated by McKenney in 1832—two years after McKenney left office.41  
Aware that McKenney’s loyalty to the Indians was stronger than his attachment to the 
president, Andrew Jackson dismissed McKenney in 1830. 
Much of McKenney’s frustration sprang from the fact that officials charged with the 
execution of American Indian policy shared little consensus regarding its proper course.  
Although later remembered as a champion of Indian Removal, McKenney was foremost an 
advocate of a program of “civilization,” believing that it was the government’s duty to wean 
the Indians from their “savage” habits through literary and moral instruction so that they 
could eventually assimilate into Anglo-American society.  In the southern United States, 
McKenney relied on the evangelical zeal of missionaries to effect this object, but such ex 
officio agents were sparse in the Old Northwest, and the business of civilizing fell principally 
to the Indian agents and army officers, who did not uniformly subscribe to McKenney’s 
vision.  Brigadier Edmund Pendleton Gaines, commander of the Western Department of the 
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U.S. Army for most of McKenney’s tenure, openly criticized McKenney’s emphasis on 
“literary and moral instruction” and instead advocated vocational and military training for 
the Indians.42  Believing the Indians possessed virtues absent in white men, Gaines favored 
only partial acculturation that would enable the Indians to live peaceably beside the 
Americans without surrendering their Native culture entirely.   
Part of this culture, Gaines recognized, was exaltation of the warrior.  Rather than 
eradicate Indian martial values, as McKenney and many missionaries intended, Gaines hoped 
to put them in the service of the United States.  Reflecting on America’s doleful performance 
in the War of 1812, Gaines asserted, “The only possible means of avoiding a recurrence of 
some of the worst of those evils is to instruct, civilize, and thus secure to ourselves the 
friendliness and future services of these numerous tribes.”43  Most Americans, he knew, 
dreaded the prospect of arming the Indians, but he insisted that “no nations can field better 
light troops than most of these Indians.”44  Moreover, Gaines insisted that Indians had always 
evinced themselves to be steadfast and loyal when they had been treated fairly.  Although 
this precondition had left the United States with a shallow pool of historical experience on 
which to draw, Gaines argued that, if the past performance of America’s Indian allies had left 
something to be desired, it was “because we forbid their fighting in the manner best known to 
them, viz.: as savages are in the habit of fighting.”  As proof, he pointed to the effectiveness 
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of Britain’s Native allies against the Americans, who fought in their traditional modes of 
war.45 
Like McKenney, Gaines demanded fair dealing with the Indians and exhibited sincere 
concern for their welfare.  His admiration of Native warrior values, however, put him at odds 
with McKenney, and the superintendent resented what he regarded as unenlightened 
meddling.  Gaines, meanwhile, recommended that Congress charge the administration of 
Indian affairs to army officers, who, he argued, wielded more authority and garnered more 
respect among the Indians.  Gaines recommended that majors of cavalry simultaneously 
serve as Indian agents and the commanders of large companies of mounted infantry.46  
Learning of the proposal, McKenney scoffed, “No man who knows his Alphabet in Indian 
concerns can listen a moment to it.  Officers of the Army to manage Indians!”47  Despite his 
flippant dismissal of Gaines’s proposal, McKenney realized that it was not without 
substance.  The Indians did, in fact, afford greater respect to military officers, and Indian 
agents routinely affected military titles on account of (often brief and ancient) militia service.  
Even McKenney himself saw fit to don a militia uniform when conducting his first treaty 
negotiations with the Ojibwas in 1826.48 
Whatever their disagreements over policy, Gaines and McKenney both recognized 
the Indians’ admiration of military strength.  In all important affairs, the Indian agent and the 
army commander represented the United States beside one another, usually beneath the 
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shadow of an American fortification.  If an army post was not nearby, an infantry company 
accompanied the treaty commissioners, partly for security but mainly to conduct parades and 
in-ranks inspections for the benefit of the Indians, who were impressed with such martial 
theater regardless of its tactical value.  For reasons of economy and convenience, the 
Americans preferred to treat with Indians at army posts, which obviated the need to detail a 
military escort for the commissioners and militated against the “introduction among the 
Indians of spirituous liquors,” which almost always disrupted the proceedings.49    Initially, 
the Americans conducted diplomacy in this martial milieu to awe the Indians, but they soon 
learned that the Indians preferred a military setting, as well.  In their experience, army 
officers were among the most trustworthy Americans they had encountered, and the presence 
of uniformed soldiers offered the Indians some confidence that they were not being cheated.  
Moreover, the Indians were genuinely impressed with demonstrations of military strength.  
Gaines recognized that “that the presence of a military force” did not operate “upon the fears 
of the Indians” but rather appealed to their “chivalric spirit.” 50  As the most manifest 
evidence of the Great Father’s power, the army was intended to convince the Indians of the 
folly of opposing the Americans by force of arms.  Instead, it convinced many Indians that 
the Americans were allies worth embracing. 
The primal urges of the military officers and some Indian agents may have furthered 
among the Indians the conviction that the Americans were interested in resurrecting a 
multidimensional alliance that, adhering to the French precedent, involved a union based on 
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blood as well as arms and trade.  As had always been the case, white women were a rare 
commodity in the pays d’en haut, and American women were rarer yet; the only unmarried 
American woman at Fort Snelling in 1823 was claimed by a lieutenant at the tender age of 
fifteen.51  Inevitably, and like the French voyageurs before them, federal officers sought and 
found carnal comfort in the lodges of nearby Indian villages.  Never given to regard chastity 
as a virtue in the first place, the Indians assented to these liaisons in the reasonable belief that 
they would yield the nearly indestructible kinship bonds upon which meaningful alliances 
must rest.  At first, however, it appears that the officers regarded their affairs as mere 
dalliances.  Dr. Muir, the surgeon at Fort Snelling, married his Mesquakie consort only to 
endure the merciless taunting of his fellow officers, which compelled him to abandon both 
his wife and their child.  When she traveled nine hundred miles by canoe with only the 
company of their infant to be reunited, however, Muir relented, surrendering his army 
commission and settling down with his multiethnic family in Galena, Illinois.52  Over time, 
Muir’s colleagues abandoned their own inhibitions, and at one point all but two of Fort 
Snelling’s officers had taken common-law wives among the Indians.   Although less common 
among the Indian agents, two notable cases beg mention.  At the Saint Peters Agency 
adjacent to Fort Snelling, Agent Lawrence Taliaferro wed the daughter of the Dakota war 
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chief Cloud Man.53  Fort Snelling’s schoolmaster, John Marsh, also took a Dakota bride, 
mastered the language of her people, and became the subagent at Prairie du Chien. 
Despite the likely apocryphal rumor that Zachary Taylor initially disapproved of 
Jefferson Davis courting his daughter on account of the latter’s cavorting with Indian women, 
commanders do not seem to have discouraged their officers from the practice (although, in an 
army plagued by desertion, no evidence suggests that enlisted men were permitted to do 
so).54  Some regarded their attachment as sacred, and at least one officer fought a duel over 
an insult directed at his bride.55  Agents Taliaferro and Marsh were devoted husbands and, by 
extension, friends to the Dakotas, the latter even losing his post as subagent because his 
superior believed him to be too partial to the tribe.56  Most military officers, meanwhile, 
appear to have regarded their lovers fondly, but few took their wives and children with them 
when they transferred to different duty stations.  Among those rumored to leave behind their 
métis children were Jefferson Davis and William S. Harney.  According to one soldier, “the 
alliance between officers and children of the forest was close, if not enduring.”57  Although 
most marriages did not last, the Indians did not necessarily regard the departure of husbands 
as unconscionable abandonment.  In accordance with their own practice, marriages were 
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often of short duration, and both men and women commonly took several spouses in their 
lifetimes.  Fragile though may have been the bonds of matrimony, the kinship ties manifest in 
the métis children endured.   
Sent to the region to cow the Indians, army officers also contributed to an Indian 
conception of a cross-cultural alliance.  Alarmed at first, the Indians grew accustomed to the 
forts’ cannon and the presence of armed troops at councils.  Indeed, these spectacles likely 
pleased the Indians, who admired military strength and experience.58  The Indians themselves 
sent both “war chiefs” and “civil chiefs” to represent their people in council, and the 
American practice seemed to suggest a degree of cultural congruence and a shared affinity 
for military strength.  When, after the War of 1812, the United States offered to the Indians 
treaties of peace and friendship, they could just as easily perceive the U.S. Army as an 
opportunity as a threat; the Americans’ willingness to take wives among their people seemed 
to remove any ambiguity.  To the Indians, who generally categorized all other groups of 
people as friends or enemies, the Americans appeared very powerful friends indeed, and the 
prospect of allying with them seemed to offer an opportunity to place American military 
power at their disposal.  After all, Pike, Forsyth, and other spokesmen of the Great Father 
promised to chastise the enemies of those Indians loyal to the United States.  None of them 
could envision how the terms of the alliance would change once the principal enemies of the 
loyal Indians were whites rather than other Indians. 
 In the early years of American occupation, however, such concerns were distant, if 
they entered Indian consciousness at all.  Although the Americans spoke the language of 
Onontio somewhat awkwardly and their trade goods left much to be desired, they resurrected 
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many of the earlier vestiges of alliance relied upon by the French and British.  Operating 
from a handful of posts separated by hundreds of miles of wilderness, the Indian agents 
found it infeasible to treat with dozens of disparate bands as distinct political entities.  Just as 
the French regime had relied on “alliance chiefs,” the Indian agents necessarily vested power 
in “principal chiefs” willing to represent all bands within the administrative lines of agency 
jurisdiction.  Although some Indians resented the erection of such synthetic chiefdoms, 
which elevated those best able to deal with the white man on his own terms, the practice was 
not unknown to France’s former allies.59  This fact did not escape Thomas McKenney, who 
later cited French and British precedent to justify the naming of a principal chief for the 
Menominees and the manufacture of three hundred silver medals bearing the likeness of 
President Jackson to award to principal chiefs (although the government neglected to replace 
the medals Zebulon Pike had taken from the Dakotas until 1833).60 
 Perhaps the most important—and problematic—way in which the Americans echoed 
earlier practices of the French and British was in their mediation of disputes among the 
various tribes and bands of the region.  While the Americans did not share their predecessors’ 
interest in assembling a large, multi-tribal military alliance, they did share the Europeans’ 
keen interest in profit, especially after 1822, when John Jacob Astor’s American Fur 
Company quickly filled the void left by the factory system.  According to historian William 
Nester, “All along, economic self-interest motivated the whites to be peacemakers.” 61  War 
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diverted Indian men from the hunt—some permanently—and threatened the lives and capital 
of whites engaged in the fur trade.  Although renowned for his compassion for the Indians, 
even Thomas McKenney could not discount the financial imperative for maintaining peace: 
“The great sufferers in general contests of this sort, next to the Indians, are the traders.  The 
hunting parties are broken up by these wars, and there is a corresponding reduction in their 
returns, and a loss to the companies”62
 Yet the motive for maintaining the peace was not entirely economic.  Intent on 
converting the Indians to full-time agriculturalists, proponents of the civilization program 
recognized the importance of curtailing traditional male pursuits (which frequently put them 
in conflict with the fur traders, who were not at all eager to see the Indians abandon hunting).  
War, which provided the only venue for male social advancement, had to go.  Denied the 
ability to gain honor and station by arms, the theory went, Indian men would necessarily take 
up the plow and adopt a more domesticated mode of life.  Problematically for the American 
policy, it required Indian men not only to abandon that which made them male but also 
required them to take up farming—a quintessentially female vocation in Indian society.  Not 
surprisingly, the Indians exhibited little enthusiasm for the venture.  Although it became 
evident to some that the goal of transforming the Indians into Christian farmers was 
infeasible, the supposed imperative of pacifying the Indians intensified throughout the 
1820s—they could not be removed to the trans-Mississippi West while at war with one 
another.63  Wisely, American officials never communicated this motive for pacification to the 
Indians. 
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 Indian agents did, however, appeal to the Indians to quit their wars on the grounds of 
humanity.  According to Thomas McKenney, “Humanity directs that these people, who sport 
so with each other’s lives, should be counseled frequently, and led, if possible, to cherish the 
more agreeable state of peace and friendship.”  Lest the Americans wean the Indians from 
their warrior ways, it appeared inevitable that they would “fight on until some one or other of 
the tribes shall become too reduced and feeble to carry on the war, when it will be lost as a 
separate power.”64  The Indians were unmoved by such logic, which appeared flawed to 
them.  Warfare was neither unnatural nor inhumane, but instead a vital component of their 
culture and the basis for many societal structures.  Despite the excesses of the Beaver Wars 
and Fox Wars—arguably products of European instigation—Indian warfare remained limited 
in scope and duration.  Their fragile, subsistence economies dependent on regular production 
from every hunter, Indians were adverse to inflicting, as well as sustaining, large numbers of 
casualties.   
 Because most Indian groups shared a relatively benign interpretation of warfare, they 
were bemused and later frustrated by American admonitions to refer all grievances to the 
Great Father for arbitration.  In 1819, Thomas Forsyth asked the Dakota chief Little Crow 
about the possibility of ending the incessant Dakota-Ojibwa feud.  Little Crow replied that it 
would be easy enough to secure a peace, but that the consequences would be doleful for the 
Dakotas.  Each year, Little Crow asserted, the Ojibwas and his people would lose a man or 
two to the conflict, but that the boundary between the two remained relatively static.  In the 
event of peace, “we, the Sioux, would lose all our hunting grounds on the north-east side of 
the river; why then . . . should we give up such an extensive country to another nation to save 
                                                 





the lives of a man or two annually”?  In his journal, Forsyth admitted, “I found the Indian’s 
reason so good, that I said no more on the subject to him.”65 
 As Little Crow indicated, intertribal conflict and bloodshed were, in fact, valued 
devices for the resolution of outstanding grievances.  Most Indian societies adhered to 
remarkably similar, legal systems characterized—like most facets of Indian life—by 
reciprocity.  Lives lost normally had to be “covered” or compensated for by a like number of 
lives from the offending group.  If the killing occurred within the population of the same clan 
or group, resolution was usually swift, and frequently the murderer would submit himself to 
the mercy of the aggrieved family.  Transgressions that crossed tribal boundaries, however, 
proved more difficult to arbitrate, and longstanding animosities between tribal enemies were 
often the product of unresolved feuds.  When Indians killed members of allied tribes—a 
happenstance often occasioned by alcohol—tribal leaders moved quickly to defuse the 
situation.   In 1819, a drunken Menominee stabbed a Dakota man near Fort Crawford.   
Although the young Dakota survived the assault, his tribesmen seized and bound the 
offender.  Rather than impose punishment in kind, Dakota leaders had the Menominee 
brought before them, presented him with gifts, and compelled him to eat from the same dish 
with his recovering victim, thereby forgiving his sin and averting a confrontation between 
allies.66  Other tribes were less magnanimous.  Perhaps because of their earlier travails, the 
Ho Chunks were hardly inclined to grant amnesty to any party and, indeed, regarded the lives 
of their own worth more than the lives of any other Indians.  According to the son of an army 
officer with a liberal view of Indian justice, “No tribe consider revenge a more sacred duty 
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than the Winnebagoes.  It is their ancient custom to take five lives for one, and it is notorious 
on the frontiers, that no blood of theirs has been shed, even in modern days, that has not been 
fully avenged.”67  This bellicose policy appears to have served the Ho Chunks well; once on 
the verge of extinction, they had no natural enemies when—or until—the Americans arrived. 
 Although desirous of peace with the Ho Chunks themselves, the Americans set out to 
eradicate their notions of justice.  In July 1820, Michigan Territory Governor Lewis Cass, 
whose domain encompassed all of modern Michigan and Wisconsin, attempted to negotiate a 
settlement between the Ojibwas and Dakotas at Fort Snelling. It established a pattern that 
became all too familiar over the ensuing years: faced with a carrot-or-stick proposition by the 
U.S., each party (both of which only represented portions of their respective tribes) 
reluctantly conceded to the American-brokered settlement, which would remain in effect a 
matter of months before some new incident rekindled the conflict and occasion another 
settlement.  Ostensibly, the forward-positioned garrisons of American soldiers served as a 
deterrent against intertribal violence, but these forces were essentially toothless in practice.  
Engagements in internecine tribal squabbles routinely amounted to no more than a half dozen 
casualties total, the government learned about them well after the fact, and each of the 
belligerents exercised effective, preemptive diplomacy with the U.S.—pleading their 
innocence to their respective agents and begging their Great Father to redress the wrongs 
committed by their nefarious foes.  Agents routinely endorsed the version of events related 
by their own charges, with different agencies thus proposing divergent responses.  The 
government, then, resorted to arbitrating anew.  The army could do little more than seize 
hostages from the offending tribes to be held until the surrender of the perpetrators, who 
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where then subjected to American justice.  Given the nature of the scant evidence available, 
these suspects were often acquitted after lengthy detention. 
 Perhaps aware that submitting the Indians to European justice produced discontent 
among the Indians, a few American administrators—particularly army officers—adopted a 
pragmatic accommodation with Indian modes.  In 1826 or 1827, a party of Dakotas 
treacherously killed some Ojibwas with whom they were smoking a pipe of peace near Fort 
Snelling.  Colonel Josiah Snelling, commander of the post that bore his name, seized some of 
the perpetrators.  Rather than submit them to the laborious American justice system, 
however, Snelling handed them over to the Ojibwas to do with as they pleased: “I deliver 
them into your hands…they have deserved death, and you may inflict it, or not, as you think 
proper…. I wash my hands of the matter.”68  Snelling was careful to ensure, however, that 
the executions occurred beyond the shadow of his fort and the sight of his garrison.  He also 
demanded that the Ojibwas dispose of the bodies so as to not excite the passions of the 
neighboring Dakotas.69   
 Although the Indians preferred Snelling’s expedients, they ran the risk of sullying the 
Great Father’s impartiality (as, in fact, happened in this case).  Moreover, they ran counter to 
the established policy of eradicating the Indians’ revenge-based justice system.  
Consequently, the Indian Office insisted that the standard mode of redressing the Indian 
grievances involved the apprehension of the principal offenders, followed by trial and 
punishment.  In the event that the offending tribe refused to surrender the offenders, the agent 
was to cooperate with the local military commander to escalate coercive measures.  Under no 
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circumstances were agents to permit Indians to take matters into their own hands.70  The 
absolute prohibition on resolving their own disputes frustrated the Indians considerably, but 
most Indian groups submitted to their Great Father’s will and permitted him to dispense 
justice on their behalf.  They did so, however, not out of fear of military retribution but due 
to the influence of Indian agents like Lawrence Taliaferro, whose kinship ties permitted him 
to work within the Dakota political system.71  He exercised a dutiful impartiality and earned 
the sobriquet “Four Hearts” because of his incongruous fairness to Americans, Britons, 
Frenchmen, and Indians.72 
 By 1822, most of the Indians of the Upper Mississippi Valley and the officers of the 
American government had reached an accommodation.  Although some army commanders 
could be capricious and overbearing (on rare occasion even submitting Indians to harsh, 
military punishments), most officers developed considerable sympathy for the Indians. 73  As 
Edward Coffman has revealed by meticulously combing through the correspondence of 
officers of the era and their professional journal, officers usually regarded the Indians as 
tragic victims of circumstance and—as soon became evident in this region—white 
frontiersmen.74  Drawn predominantly from educated families in the East, many officers 
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subscribed in some degree to the archetype of the “noble savage,” and very few expressed the 
patently racist view of Judge Advocate of the Army Samuel Storrow, who, while conducting 
an inspection of the western posts, “found none of the high qualities which they have been so 
lavishly imputed to them; nothing to justify the contradictory expression of savage virtue, or 
to warrant the belief of a radical difference between the Arab, the Algerine, or the Indian.”75  
Those who lived on the frontier and among the Indians knew better.  According to Juliette 
Kinzie, wife to an Indian agent at the Portage, the wretches observed by Storrow had been 
subjected to “the debasing influences of a proximity to the whites, … which no one will 
admit with so much sorrow as those who lived among them, before this signal change had 
taken place.”76  Although most frontier officers considered the Indians benighted, Captain 
Henry Smith expressed the predominant sentiment of the army officers when he wrote that 
the Indians were “almost always ‘more sinned against than sinning.’”77 
Among those who sinned against the Indians were the enlisted soldiers of the army 
garrisons.  Often immigrants, the soldiers often exhibited the same opprobrium for the 
Indians that marked the frontiersmen.  Although discharged soldiers were known to take 
Indian wives and engage in trade, commanders recognized the prudence of limiting contact 
between soldiers and Indians.  Infamously, unscrupulous fur traders victimized Indians 
during the annual payment of treaty annuities by plying them with liquor and cheating them 
of all of their money for mere trifles.  Not to be outdone, soldiers swindled the Indians with 
what little they had.  According to one soldier, “The Indians would pay any sum for an 
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ornament that pleased them, and the soldiers would sell pewter buttons and scales, costing 6 
or 8 cents, for as many dollars.”78  Conscientious commanders held their subordinates 
responsible for offenses against the Indians.  In Green Bay in 1832, a drunken soldier stabbed 
the notable Menominee war chief Poegonah (Big Soldier) in the thigh with his bayonet.  A 
witness later recalled that “The old chief seized the soldier, disarmed him with one hand, and 
grabbing him by the throat with the other, threw him to the ground, calling him a dog, and 
alleging that if he were an enemy, he would take his life for his insolence.”  The commander 
of Fort Howard at that time took no issue with Poegonah but had the offending soldier 
whipped before an assemblage of Indians.79  On other occasions, the Indians did not need 
commanders’ assistance to redress grievances against enlisted men.  In 1822, an Indian 
woman killed one soldier and wounded another when they attempted to steal her whiskey.80
Fortunately for all involved, conflicts between soldiers and Indians were rare, and the 
army came to depend on the Indians to render essential services for its remote garrisons.  Fort 
Winnebago, constructed at the Portage in 1828, was so isolated that it received mail only 
once every two or three months.  “There was, however, no lack of meat,” veteran John Dean 
recalled, because the Indians kept “the garrison well supplied with venison, wild ducks, and 
other game.”81  Dean also stated that it was common practice for the army to employ Indians 
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or métis to track down deserters, trailing them to Chicago, where the bounty hunters 
identified the fleeing soldiers to authorities.”82   
 By employing Indians to track fugitive whites and dispensing harsh justice against 
soldiers who abused the Indians, American officers may have contributed to a belief among 
the Indians that the Americans did not discriminate on the basis of race.  While successive 
frontiers of Indians to the east had learned otherwise, the Indians of the Upper Mississippi 
valley had remained isolated from brutal race wars of the eighteenth century and, to a lesser 
extent, the nativist movements of Neolin and Tenskwatawa.  In short, the Indians of this 
region had not yet forged a pan-Indian identity, and their experience offered ample precedent 
for Indians allying with whites against other Indians, and whites allying with Indians to make 
war on other whites.  When private American fur traders moved into the region following the 
demise of the factory system in 1822, the Indians saw further evidence that the Great Father 
reserved no special status for his white children. 
Most Indians welcomed the American Fur Company traders.  Unlike the government 
factors, the traders traveled throughout the Indian country rather than requiring the Indians to 
transport their furs to the factories.  More importantly, John Jacob Astor understood the 
Indian market and furnished articles in which the Indians were interested: British-
manufactured trade goods and liquor.83  As the doleful effects of alcohol on their 
communities became apparent, some Indian leaders began to preach temperance, but liquor 
remained a high-demand staple of the fur trade.  One of the supposed benefits of the factory 
system had been its ability to limit the supply of alcohol among the Indians.  With the demise 
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of that system, private traders realized that they needed to offer whiskey to remain 
competitive, and unethical traders came to appreciate how easily an inebriated Indian and his 
furs were parted.  The Indian Office and the army did not look kindly on the trade in 
whiskey, which was conducive neither to the stability of the frontier nor to the “civilization” 
of the Indians.84  For their own part, the traders resisted the federal government’s initiative to 
convert the Indians to small-plot agriculturalists.  Because their own livelihood depended on 
the Indians’ skill as hunters, the fur traders and their employers actively dissuaded the 
Indians from adopting the economic reforms advocated by the American government and 
even tried to undermine treaties between the Indians and the government if they promised to 
deprive Indian hunters of fur-rich hunting lands.  Hence, an antagonism developed between 
federal officials and the fur traders.  By 1831, an anonymous observer in St. Louis (likely 
Thomas Forsyth, who by that time had been relieved of his post as agent) wrote that “The 
American Fur Company seems to have made war upon the agents in all of the Missouri 
country, except one or two who belong to them.”85  Meanwhile, the agents made war on 
many of the traders, who became persona non gratis of the U.S. government in Prairie du 
Chien and other hubs of regional commerce.  Fully engaged with each party of this dispute, 
the Indians saw little evidence of a singular American identity. 
Until the mid-1820s, the Indians had not encountered American settlers in large 
numbers.  Painfully aware of the likely consequences of such contact, this suited the U.S. 
Government just fine.  As early as 1788, Secretary of War Henry Knox lamented the role of 
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frontier whites in fomenting Indian wars.86  He discerned a pattern that would repeat itself for 
over a hundred years with disastrous consequences for the Native peoples of the continent.  
In wanton violation of existing treaties defining the boundary between U.S. and Indian 
territory, squatters and land speculators constructed houses and planted crops on unceded 
land while abusing the local Indian population.  Thus confronted, the Indians responded in 
one of two ways: by appealing to the government for redress or by forcibly evicting the 
interlopers.  In the former case, leading citizens among the squatters eloquently pleaded 
ignorance of the treaty line and appealed to the government to secure an additional cession of 
land from the Indians lest they forfeit the considerable capital they had already invested in 
“improvements” upon the land.  Almost invariably, the government responded favorably to 
these entreaties, and it was by this process that the United States eliminated the claim to most 
Indian lands over the next century.  When the Indians responded to the intrusions with force, 
however, white frontiersmen generally responded with a vengeance, inciting a bitter brand of 
warfare that offered no protection to noncombatants.  Because of a disparity in numbers and 
the vulnerability of the Indian villages, the whites uniformly prevailed in these contests, and 
the “belligerent” Indians were made to relinquish territory without compensation as 
reparations.  However the Indians responded to the squatters, their land eventually passed 
from their control, prompting Knox to reflect that “a future historian may mark the causes of 
this destruction of the human race in sable colors.”87
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Knox recognized a problem that had been evident to the British colonial 
administration decades earlier: security on the western frontier required the separation of the 
white and Indian populations.88  Unable to maintain this separation in the past, the Americans 
resolved to get it right following the War of 1812.  The Treaty of Ghent had confirmed 
American territorial possessions that far exceeded the needs of the population, and the 
government demurred at the prospect of purchasing more lands from the Indians due to the 
“propensity of our frontier settlers to spread over the surface of every cession, however 
distant,” to instigate conflict with the Natives.89  Only in the Southeast, where the boundaries 
established by the 1783 Treaty of Paris and the Louisiana Purchase had put the Indians in 
close contact with “civilization” and left them “exposed to the contagion of its vices,” did the 
U.S. government endeavor to gain title to additional Indian lands—and only with the 
“voluntary consent” of the owners.90  In the Old Northwest, however, President James 
Madison ordered “the necessary measures for removing all white persons who have intruded 
and settled upon the lands of the Indians,” including the use of U.S. troops.91  This was more 
than a hallow proclamation, and an early American resident of Green Bay averred that the 
Indians, French, and army all discouraged settlement in Wisconsin until the 1830s, by which 
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time John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson had reversed the course set by Madison.92   
“If any attempted to ‘squat’ upon the lands,” Henry S. Baird testified, “they were forcibly 
removed at the point of a bayonet, or prosecuted by the United States officials as trespassers 
upon Indian lands.”93
Undeterred, some ambitious Americans opened business in the region as tenants of 
the métis, French, or Indians.  Not surprisingly, their relations with government officials—
especially army officers—were acrimonious.  According to one resident, “the officers of the 
army treated the inhabitants as a conquered people, and the commandants assumed all the 
authority of governors of a conquered country.”94  Henry Baird, who noted the steadfastness 
with which the army defended Indian lands, complained that the army subjected early 
Americans to martial law: 
 …it occasionally happened that some military genius, possessed of more tinsel than 
discretion, became the commanding officer, and to mark the era of his reign, would 
exercise his “little brief authority” in an arbitrary manner, and thus contrive to render the 
condition of the citizens as uncomfortable as possible.  Instances of high handed 
oppression and injustice were, in the early days of our history, frequently committed by 
some military martinet, upon the persons, liberty or property of those whom they were 
sent to protect.95
 
Baird’s conviction that the army was there to protect him no doubt gave rise to his indignity; 
few army commanders perceived their duty in such terms.  More concerned with upholding 
the letter of the law, commanders exhibited little concern for the interests of frontier 
Americans.  If they built houses on Indian lands, soldiers tore them down; if they cut trees on 
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Indian lands without permission, the army confiscated the timber.96  Some army commanders 
earned the enmity of American entrepreneurs by sheltering their soldiers from the collection 
of outstanding debts, but the principal grievances always revolved around the guardianship of 
Indian rights.97
 In this regard, perhaps no officer was as despised by his fellow Americans as Major 
David Twiggs.  Twiggs, who later gained infamy for turning his entire command over to the 
Confederacy at the outbreak of the Civil War, oversaw the construction of Fort Winnebago in 
1828 and commanded its garrison until 1831.98  One early Wisconsin resident described him 
as “a large, portly, pompous man” with “a reputation of being an arbitrary, overbearing 
officer.”  Another called him “A little god, who could do as he pleased, in his own 
estimation.” 99  John Dean, who served under Twiggs, acknowledged that Twiggs “left no 
very favorable record, or impression among the people,” but that he was also “severe and 
unreasonable with his men, and domineering over all who came within his reach.” 100  Tales 
of Twiggs horse-whipping his own surgeon, confining a soldier to “the hole” for six months, 
and binding another to a tree, where he was whipped for a period of days, gained currency 
among the Americans, who regarded Twiggs as a special sort of evil.101  Interestingly, the 
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son of one of the most prominent Ho Chunk chiefs remembered Twiggs as “a good man” 
who “very often furnished us with shot and powder to shoot geese with.”102
 Martinets were not uncommon in the army of the nineteenth century—Lieutenant 
Colonel Talbot Chambers was relieved for ordering the ears of one of his soldiers lopped off 
as a punishment—but Twiggs was particularly objectionable to whites due to his unwavering 
enforcement of the Trade and Intercourse Acts governing white-Indian relations.103  
Although cruel, Twiggs enforced the law to its letter, even requesting the Ho Chunks’ 
permission to cut the timber with which his men constructed Fort Winnebago.104  Although 
Daniel Whitney and Ebenezer Childs claimed to possess similar permission, Twiggs 
responded decisively to complaints from the Ho Chunks, burning $1,000 worth of shingles 
cut by the two men.105  For his actions, Twiggs found himself called into civil court, where 
the judge determined that he had exceeded his mandate.   
 The case was far from exceptional.  In 1824, Mackinac Indian agent George Boyd 
sent a party of Ottawas to arrest an outlaw trader who had gone among the Menominees 
without a license.  Delivered to him by a band of Ottawas sent for that purpose, Boyd 
confiscated Farnsworth’s trade goods and flogged and detained the Grand River Indians who 
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had illegally conveyed him.  The same evening, a Mackinac village court presided over by 
Justice John Dousman brought charges against Boyd, his Ottawas, and Major William 
Whistler (then commanding at Mackinac).  The Ottawas were released on the grounds that 
they had only followed orders, but both Boyd and Whistler were found guilty of aiding and 
abetting the “robbery” of Farnsworth and for flogging the Grand River Indians, respectively.  
Both federal officers were forced to post their own bail.  Appeals failed until they reached the 
threshold at which respect for federal authority prevailed over local autonomy.106  Over the 
next several years, sentiments even in Washington began to ebb in favor of private citizens 
when they ran afoul of the Trade and Intercourse Acts.  In 1829, Major Stephen Watts 
Kearny of Fort Crawford seized lumber cut on Indian lands by Jean Brunet of Prairie du 
Chien.  Brunet sued both Kearny and Indian Agent Joseph Street, and a circuit court awarded 
damages.107  The government eventually reimbursed its officers (although Twiggs, who 
neglected to keep receipts, paid his own attorney’s fees), but it was clear that a considerable 
gap was opening between federal Indian policy and popular sentiment during the 1820s.  As 
westerners accrued Congressional representation throughout the decade and elected one of 
their own to the presidency in 1828, the views of the federal government shifted to fall in line 
with those of its frontier constituents.   When Congress reluctantly awarded Twiggs partial 
compensation in 1832, it warned that officers and agents acting on behalf of the Indians were 
being “watched with jealousy by Congress for the security of the people” and that the 
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overzealous public officer would, in the future, pay his own court costs “without any hope or 
prospect that he will obtain relief by applying to Congress.”108 
 In the half dozen years following the War of 1812, the Indians of the Old Northwest 
and the agents of the U.S. government achieved an accommodation.  Dependent on European 
trade goods and inured to the necessity of a white patron, most Indians acquiesced to the 
American arrival and sought to recreate the symbiotic relationships they had known under 
the French and British regimes.  Bound by the Treaty of Ghent to respect tribal sovereignty, 
the Americans resolved to turn a new leaf in their spotty history of managing Indian affairs 
and conformed to Indian expectations in many regards.  Contentious issues remained: traders 
now offered better goods but defiled Indian society with liquor; the government denied 
Indians the freedom to settle their own disputes and, in the process, frustrated the ambitions 
of young warriors; and Indians resisted American overtures toward “civilization.”  
Meanwhile, the Indians of the Rock River—refugees from the French regime rather than its 
beneficiaries—eyed suspiciously the American occupiers.  The Sauks and some of their 
Mesquakie allies continued to nurse a grievance against the United States dating back to 
1804, when the Sauks supposedly surrendered all of their lands in Illinois to the Americans in 
return for annuities.  The Sauks protested the legitimacy of the treaty, but the issue was left to 
fester as they retained the right of occupancy until the Americans served notice that they 
would take possession of the land.  Indeed, all of the unresolved issues between the Indians 
and their new American “allies” simmered beneath a patina of tranquility that promised to 
burst if subjected to excessive pressure at any given point. 
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CHAPTER 3.  A MOUNTING STORM. 
 
 In 1816, an American shipper named John Shaw ascended the Mississippi from St. 
Louis, bound for a mining camp on the Fever River at the future site of Galena, Illinois—the 
heart of the Indian lead mining country in southwestern Wisconsin and northwestern Illinois.  
Various Native groups had mined this country for over four thousand years, and the present 
occupants—Sauks, Mesquakies, and Ho Chunks—relied on lead exports as a significant 
component of their economy.1  These same tribes, however, remained suspicious of the 
Americans, and they barred Shaw’s passage to the Indian mining camp, declaring that “the 
Americans must not see their lead mines.”  Speaking impeccable French and commanding a 
boat manned entirely by French crewmen, Shaw assumed the nationality favored by 
indigenous population and thus won the right to pass.  At the camp, Shaw and the genuine 
Frenchmen filled their boat with the valuable ore that would furnish the town’s namesake in 
a decade—after the Americans took possession of the mines, the minerals within, and the 
lands about.2 
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 This denouement was neither obvious to the Indians nor assured in 1816.  For all of 
their blustering, the American soldiers who established posts in the Old Northwest were 
committed to preserving peace on the frontier, whether by intervening in intertribal disputes 
or running off white violators of the Trade and Intercourse Act.  Although the Indians 
resented the Americans’ prohibition of intertribal war, they regarded American officials as 
evenhanded.  Reciprocity, it appeared, continued to characterize the politics of the pays d’en 
haut.  This began to change, however, as the lead country of northwestern Illinois and 
southwestern Wisconsin drew white miners to the country in ever increasing numbers.  
Illinois, made a state in 1818, became a magnet for roughneck opportunists in the mid 1820s.  
Backed by Illinois politicos, the miners showed no regard for Indian rights and, in fact, 
caused a war in 1827.  Once willing to flout local white interests to enforce the law, federal 
officials discovered that the miners enjoyed the sympathies of the nations’ highest leaders, 
who now advocated the removal of all Indians residing east of the Mississippi.   
 Meanwhile, competition over diminishing peltry spurred intertribal conflict between 
the Dakotas and the Ojibwas to their northeast and the Sauks and Mesquakies to their south.  
Although powerless to defend the Indians from white encroachment, Indian agents persisted 
in their meddling in intertribal affairs.  By the end of the 1820s, the Sauks, Mesquakies, and 
Ho Chunks entertained no illusions regarding the Great Father’s commitment to reciprocity.  
The Ho Chunks, in fact, took up arms against the Americans to protest their perfidy.  In 
defeat, however, they developed a modicum of resentful respect for the Americans; their 
complicated behavior during the Black Hawk War was very much a product of their 
experience during this tumultuous decade.   
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 For years the Americans had been aware of the mineral wealth of the Upper 
Mississippi.  Following the French and Indian War, Frenchmen hauled immense quantities of 
the ore down the Mississippi to New Orleans in twenty-ton river boats, and Julien Dubuque’s 
mining operation in present-day Iowa provided conspicuous testimony to the economic 
potential of the region.3  The United States staked its claim to this territory in 1803 with the 
Louisiana Purchase, which secured the west side of the Mississippi, and in 1804 through a 
treaty with the Sauks and Mesquakies, which ostensibly secured the eastern shore above the 
mouth of the Rock River.4  Hoping to parlay these acquisitions into federal revenue, 
Congress reserved the mineral lands from sale and resolved to grant leases in terms of three 
or five years.5  The Sauks and Mesquakies disputed the legitimacy of the 1804 treaty, 
however, and the Ho Chunks had yet to surrender any of their lands to the Americans.  
Hence, these Indians regarded early American efforts to mine their lands with ill humor, 
chasing off those bold enough to make the attempt.6  Treating from a position of strength 
after the War of 1812, the Americans compelled the Sauks and Mesquakies to confirm their 
cessions of 1804, although they neglected to consider the Ho Chunks, who occupied a 
significant portion of these lands.7 
                                                 
 3 Thwaites, "Notes on Early Mining in the Fever (or Galena) River Region," 277-78. 
 
 4 Treaty with the Sauks and Foxes, 3 November 1804, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2 
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 Despite their apparent concession, the Sauks and Mesquakies continued to resist 
American encroachment, preferring to deal with their habitual French Canadian trading 
partners.  Aside from Shaw’s smuggling, the first persistent efforts to draw wealth from the 
Indian mines began in 1819 or 1820, when James Johnson first established an illegal mining 
operation on the Fever River.  A veteran of the War of 1812 who continued to affect his 
former station as a colonel, Johnson cajoled the Sauks and Mesquakies into accepting his 
presence.  Johnson flourished, and by 1822 the government deemed the Illinois country 
stable enough to award leases.8  On 5 July 1822, Johnson established the first legal American 
mining camp on the banks of the Fever River.  Anticipating trouble from the Indians, 
                                                 
8 Thwaites, "Notes on Early Mining in the Fever (or Galena) River Region," 288-90. 
 
Map 2.  Distribution of Indian and White Settlements, circa 1830.  From Atlas of Great Lakes Indian 
History, edited by Helen Hornbeck Tanner.  Copyright © 1987 by the University of Oklahoma Press, 
Norman.  Reprinted by permission. 
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Johnson called upon Colonel Willoughby Morgan to furnish “a force sufficient to over-awe 
the Indians,” and the colonel assented, dispatching forces from Forts Edwards, Armstrong, 
and Crawford to cow the Sauks and Mesquakies.9 
 The government’s policy toward the lead region offered some of the most compelling 
evidence that the Great Father was not Onontio.  Under the French regime, the Indians mined 
the lead on their own lands and traded the ore to Frenchmen or other Indians in exchange for 
goods or furs.10  The Americans, in contrast, intended to deprive the Indians of both their 
land and their place in the chain of production.  In fairness, American officials believed that 
they were exercising their legal rights in lands ceded to them by formal treaty.  In calling on 
the army to protect these rights, however, the government placed the officers and agents of 
the War Department in an untenable position.  At once charged with implementing a benign 
Indian policy and with facilitating the exploitation of contested lands, these men behaved in a 
manner that the Indians could only interpret as duplicitous.  Perceptions did not improve in 
1825, when the War Department appointed Lieutenant Martin Thomas to serve as the 
“Superintendent of the Mines claimed by the U. S. Government in Missouri, and also of the 
Upper Mississippi Lead Mines,” a post designed to optimize government revenue derived 
from the mines.11  Whereas the agents of the Indian Office and most army officers at least 
endeavored to balance their divergent obligations, Lieutenant Thomas pursued his more 
proscribed duties with myopic diligence.  Interpreting the Indian cessions of 1804 and 1816 
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broadly and entirely disregarding the provisions of an 1825 treaty that confirmed Ho Chunk 
holdings, Thomas issued mining permits for lands well within the country of the Ho 
Chunks.12  Initially, the Ho Chunks simply ran off the intruders.13  When the miners asked 
Thomas how to respond to such confrontations with the Indians, he reportedly replied, “you 
must remain there untill [sic] blood is spilled, & something will be done.”14  Offered in July 
1827, Thomas’s advice yielded the desired results within a month. 
 At first white miners came in only a trickle.  Although St. Louis newspapers brimmed 
with notices “concerning the wealth of the Lead Mines of the Upper Mississippi” in 1822, 
when the government first decided to issue leases to the land, the terms of the government 
program were beyond most men’s means.15  Any man wishing to work the land had to post a 
$10,000 bond and to pay the government “one-tenth of all the lead made.”16  Few could 
afford this sum, but ambitious men of means assembled bodies of ambitious men in want to 
form the first white mining camps in the region.  When they arrived on the Fever River, they 
took station beside French and Indian mining camps and an American Fur Company trading 
post.17  Later, Americans would justify the annexation of Indian mining country by the 
principal of eminent domain and the supposition that the Indians could not make full use of 
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the minerals bestowed upon them by providence.18  Early American miners could not 
subscribe to this convenient fiction, however, as “The Indian women proved themselves to be 
the best as well as the shrewdest miners.”19  Still outnumbered by the Indians and their 
French allies, the white miners worked beside the Indians in relative harmony.  As late as 
July 1825, only one hundred white miners inhabited the Fever River camps.  Over the next 
year this number more than quadrupled to 453.  More ominously for the Indians, the white 
miners had discovered that the government was incapable of limiting the mining operation to 
lease-holders, and scores of illegal camps spread through the more distant reaches of the 
mining region.20  By 1826, the trickle had swollen to a torrent.   
 Grabbing whatever land they could find, the miners overwhelmed the Indians.  From 
Prairie du Chien, Subagent John Marsh reported that “Multitudes of men are flocking here 
from every part of America and Europe.”21  From Rock Island, a dismayed Thomas Forsyth, 
agent for the Sauks and Mesquakies, predicted that illegal intrusions onto Ho Chunk lands 
would incite a war with that tribe.22  Marsh concurred.  “You may easily believe,” he wrote 
his father, “that men, stimulated by such prospects of gain, would not pay that much regard 
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to the rights of the Indians who own the valuable part of the mineral country.”23  Indeed, the 
miners reveled in their reputations as hard-bitten Indian fighters.   Embracing norms of social 
advancement not entirely dissimilar from those of the Indians, the miner’s only means to 
become a man of consequence was to offer demonstrations of strength and bravado.  Among 
James Johnson’s party worked a “noted bruiser” named “Kentuck” Anderson who would 
later participate as a militia volunteer during the Black Hawk War.  By reputation, Anderson 
had engaged in fisticuffs thirteen times in a single day in the town of Mineral Point.24  
Because the miners held up such men as paragons of manly virtue while occupying mining 
camps as they saw fit, conflict with the Indians was all but inevitable.  On a Sunday, in the 
spring of 1826 or 1827, three of Moses Meeker’s men went to James Johnson’s camp and got 
drunk.  On their way home, they entered an Indian lodge and abused the occupants.  One of 
the Indians grabbed his gun in an effort to ward off the intruders, but the intoxicated miners 
wrested the weapon away and proceeded to beat the poor man to a pulp—breaking the gun 
over his head and shoulders.  Not contented, the miners “then beat his aged father 
shamefully.” 25 
 Fearing retribution, Meeker compensated the victims with gifts, but few Americans 
went to such lengths.26  Rightly fearing for the safety of their women and children, the Indian 
victims—principally Ho Chunks—demonstrated considerable forbearance, enduring further 
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insults rather than retaliating and subjecting their villages to the wrath of men like “Kentuck” 
Anderson.  Already among the most disaffected Indian groups, the Ho Chunks of the mining 
region found little succor from the Great Father, who was at least as interested in tapping the 
mineral wealth of the Ho Chunk country as he was in attending to their needs.  The army was 
not a willing party to the defrauding of the Ho Chunks; early miners complained of the 
army’s control of river traffic and attempts to arrest illegal lead miners, as well as “the 
despotism under which we lived”—but the military proved as ineffectual at protecting the 
Indians as it was at policing the miners.27  Years later, a Ho Chunk named Spoon Decorah 
recalled that the Great Father responded to their pleas for help by saying, “I want this land 
and will have my own people to work it, and whenever you go out hunting come by this way, 
and you will be supplied with lead.”  But the Great Father reneged, and “Never was a bar of 
lead or a bag of shot presented to us.”28  Instead, white miners took over the Indian mines and 
exhausted the region’s timber to smelt the lead.29  Had the miners been more perceptive, they 
would have realized that they were also exhausting Ho Chunk patience.  In the autumn of 
1826, the Ho Chunks sent a war pipe to the Mesquakies, requesting their aid should the 
whites attack the Indians.30 
 Just to the west, economic competition between Indians likewise seemed destined to 
foment an environmental crisis or a war.  Increasingly dependent on manufactured goods and 
encouraged by the American Fur Company, which enjoyed a monopoly on the fur trade 
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following the discontinuation of the factory system, Sauks, Mesquakies, Dakotas, and 
Ojibwas over-hunted their lands in the 1820s, effecting a precipitous decline in game animals 
throughout the region.  Only in two areas, the contested zones along the Des Moines and 
Chippewa River Valleys, did ample game remain.31  In the latter, the Dakotas and Ojibwas 
resurrected their traditional animosity for one another.  To the south, the Sauks and 
Mesquakies, who were simultaneously driven from many of their mines by the Americans, 
became increasingly belligerent and imperialistic toward their neighboring tribes, piquing the 
ire of not only the Dakotas, but their Menominee and Ho Chunk allies as well.32  In 1822, 
nearly one hundred casualties resulted from engagements between the Dakotas and their 
Sauk and Mesquakie enemies, prompting the War Department to ask Congress for authority 
to use troops to stop the violence.  When Congress denied the request, Lawrence Taliaferro 
resorted to diplomatic measures.  In 1824, Taliaferro took Dakota delegates to Washington to 
awe them with the grandeur of the Great Father’s capitol.  Few Indians joined the group, 
however, and the Sauks and Mesquakies killed the Wahpekute Chief Cloud on the return 
voyage.  Despite the inauspicious beginning to American mediation, Taliaferro convinced 
Secreatry of War John C. Calhoun to hold a large council the next summer at Prairie du 
Chien.33 
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 In 1825, Superintendent for Indian Affairs William Clark, brother of George Rogers 
Clark, convened a treaty council to resolve the conflict at Prairie du Chien, which, according 
to British practice, was a neutral gathering place for the Indians.34  Although none of them 
were eager to submit their disputes to American mediation, Dakotas, Sauks, Mesquakies, 
Ojibwas, Menominees, and Ho Chunks attended the council.  The treaty commissioners 
seemed to effect a compromise between the Dakotas and Ojibwas, roughly splitting the 
disputed territory down the middle.  The dispute between the Dakotas and the Sauk-
Mesquakie confederation was less easily resolved.  Considerable blood had been shed, and 
the disputed territory amounted to the northern half of Iowa; the depth of the dispute seemed 
to exceed the government’s capacity to adjudicate.  In the end, the Sauks and Mesquakies 
were pleased with the boundary set by the commissioners while the Dakotas were not—
conditions that augured poorly for what was intended to be a compromise settlement.  In a 
further bad omen, many of the Indian delegates became sick and some died on the way 
home.35  The treaty accomplished little because Congress never allocated funds to demark the 
agreed upon boundaries and the Indians had little incentive to set aside their differences.36  
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The fragile peace was short-lived; the Dakotas led a war party against the Ojibwas the 
following year, resurrecting the retaliatory war.37   
 Meanwhile, in the spring of 1826, the Ho Chunks killed a métis family that had been 
harvesting maple sugar about twelve miles above Prairie du Chien on the western side of the 
Mississippi.  Although no evidence suggests that the Indians had a particular vendetta against 
Monsieur Methode, his wife, five children, and pet dog, their charred bodies provided 
shocking testimony to the extent of Ho Chunk disaffection.  The disaffection became greater 
yet when the soldiers at Fort Crawford seized the perpetrators and (following their escape) 
proxy hostages.  Rumors circulated that the Ho Chunks intended to sack the American post 
and liberate their kinsmen, prompting Colonel Josiah Snelling, commander of the 5th 
Infantry, to reinforce Fort Crawford temporarily with three infantry companies from Fort 
Snelling. 38  The paranoia passed, but Ho Chunk resentment remained, and subagent John 
Marsh traced it to the government’s inability to protect the Indians from white encroachment.  
“The agents of the Government have not been able to control the miners,” he complained, 
“and nothing but a strong force can control them.”39  Hoping to defuse the mounting Dakota-
Ojibwa war, however, Snelling concentrated his 5th Infantry at Fort Snelling in the autumn of 
1826, leaving Fort Crawford entirely unoccupied—a movement that some Ho Chunks 
interpreted as a sign of American weakness.  Among those who made the voyage to Fort 
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Snelling were two of the Methode family’s killers, whom the Ho Chunks had surrendered to 
gain the release of their hostages.  Anticipating that they would be tried and executed, Marsh 
feared that American justice would spark a war with the Ho Chunks that would result in their 
destruction.  “This is now, has been, and I fear ever will be the fate of the redman when he 
comes into contact with the white strangers,” he lamented.40  Marsh came close to accurately 
predicting the future but, ironically, it was Indian rather than white justice that helped incite 
the war. 
 In May 1827, the Dakotas brazenly attacked an Ojibwa party encamped in the 
shadows of Fort Crawford, compelling Colonel Snelling to assert the futility of treaty 
negotiations so long as the army retained a defensive posture.41  Snelling, who felt powerless 
to enforce the provisions of the 1825 treaty, demonstrated his pragmatic accommodation with 
Indian modes of dispute resolution by delivering four of the Dakota murderers to their 
victims’ aggrieved kinsmen.  Snelling took some precautions to distance the government 
from the affair, dictating that the condemned be given a fair chance to escape and that the 
Ojibwas dispense their justice beyond the view of the fort.  Pursued by picked runners, the 
Dakotas did not have a chance, and word soon spread of their fate.  By the time it reached the 
Ho Chunks, however, it represented that Snelling had delivered Methode’s killers to the 
Ojibwas for execution.42  At about the same time, the Ho Chunks received the probably 
specious news that riverboat crews had molested Ho Chunk women along the banks of the 
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Mississippi.43  If the Americans could not conduct themselves as allies, the time had come to 
punish them as enemies. 
 The Ho Chunks began by breaking off diplomacy.  They informed their subagent on 
the Fever River that “they could put no faith in any act of the Government Agents” due to the 
violations of the Treaty of 1825, and that this was the last time they would complain.44  
Shortly thereafter, the Ho Chunks backed out of a planned council at Butte des Morts, where 
Michigan Territory Governor Lewis Cass and Thomas McKenney awaited for envoys in 
vain.45  Fearful that their absence portended violence, Cass set out for Prairie du Chien, 
where his fears were vindicated.  On 27 June 1827, the respected Ho Chunk war captain Red 
Bird and an accomplice named We-Kau (the Sun) had incited a panic by murdering another 
métis family that had reputably been on friendly terms with the Indians.46  In the absence of 
the army, white inhabitants stockaded themselves within Fort Crawford and helped 
themselves to the post’s provisions.47  Meanwhile, Red Bird’s followers terrorized the 
frontier settlements and attacked two army keel boats on the Mississippi.48  While Snelling 
tried to recover from his mistakes by sending four companies of the 5th Infantry back down 
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the Mississippi, Governor Lewis Cass tried to mobilize the militia, and Brigadier General 
Henry Atkinson deployed from Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, with an additional regiment of 
regulars.49  The Ho Chunks encountered only modest success in their efforts to enlist aid of 
their neighbors, the Potawatomis and the Dakotas.  While these tribes certainly sympathized 
with the Ho Chunks, the Potawatomis and Dakotas did not share the Ho Chunk 
“determination never to suffer themselves to be surrounded by the white settlements, but … 
[to] perish first, men, women, and children.”50  Cognizant of the risks associated with allying 
against the United States, most Native communities distanced themselves from the Ho Chunk 
“uprising.”  Still, rumors of a broader Indian war ran rampant, kindling a paranoia that had 
not been seen in this quarter since the Potawatomi betrayal of the garrison of Fort Dearborn 
during the War of 1812, when Potawatomis attacked a retreating American garrison that they 
had pledged to protect.  Perhaps aware that the Ho Chunks had sent war wampum among the 
Potawatomis and certainly recalling their earlier treachery, many Americans assumed 
Potawatomi complicity.51 
 Yet the Ho Chunks acted independently and, indeed, many of their tribesmen 
distanced themselves from Red Bird’s actions.  Spoon Decorah, son of the man many 
regarded as the principal chief of the Ho Chunks, recalled that Red Bird was a “bad Indian” 
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and that most of his people desired to remain at peace with the Americans.  His people, 
however, resided at Little Green Lake—between Portage and Lake Winnebago and well 
removed from the crisis in the lead country.52  The Winnebago War revealed significant 
divisions within Ho Chunk society, which was weakly confederated in the first place.  
Hoping to distance themselves from the actions of their southern brethren, Ho Chunks from 
the Lake Winnebago area joined a force of 101 regulars, twenty-three militiamen, and a band 
of friendly Menominees that marched to the Portage to make a show of united Indian-
American force.   
 Reaching the Portage on 1 September 1827, the contingent, which was accompanied 
by Thomas McKenney and John Marsh, learned that Red Bird and his accomplice, We-Kau, 
intended to surrender themselves.  In a regal processional, Red Bird and We-Kau marched 
into the Portage on 3 September, accompanied by 114 Ho Chunk warriors.  Clad in white 
leather with a scarlet cloth adorning his breast and carrying a calumet decorated with feathers 
and green paint—the color of peace—Red Bird was, according to Indian agent John Kinzie, 
“certainly the best looking Indian in the nation.”53  Perhaps not as handsome, Carymaunee 
the Lame (Walking Turtle) and Waukon Decorah wielded considerably more influence 
among the Ho Chunk people, and they made speeches intended to soften the Great Father’s 
rage at Red Bird, whom they depicted as a misguided but honorable warrior.  Offering nine 
horses in return for a promise that the Americans would treat the prisoners fairly, the chiefs 
also requested that McKenney take possession of the prisoners rather than the military 
commander, Major William Whistler.  Partly, this preference reflected American negotiating 
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practices, in which Indian agents and the army officers represented the Great Father’s 
benevolent and disciplinary sides, respectively.  In this particular case, the Ho Chunks might 
have detected the depth of McKenney’s empathy.  Terming Red Bird’s surrender “heroic,” 
McKenney acknowledged that the Ho Chunks had only enforced Indian law when American 
justice had left them wanting.54  Although McKenney turned the prisoners over to the army, 
he assured them that John Marsh would accompany them to Prairie du Chien, which 
appeared to comfort the Indians.55   
 The Ho Chunks were less comforted by the news that Brigadier General Henry 
Atkinson approached with thirteen companies of infantry.  “The nation is alarmed much,” 
Kinzie related; “They don’t know what to make of this.” 56  In talks with the Ho Chunks at 
the Portage and Prairie du Chien, Atkinson allayed Ho Chunk fears with his diplomatic 
bearing and assurances that the government would investigate white abuses in the lead 
region.57  Subsequently, it became apparent that the Ho Chunks were less alarmed by the 
seven hundred regulars under Atkinson, whom the Indians respectfully referred to as the 
“White Beaver,” than they were by the militia troops called up by Illinois Governor Ninian 
Edwards.58  Perhaps no other factor called into question the Great Father’s justice and 
wisdom more than his dependence on the militia, which comprised many of the Indians’ 
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most bitter antagonists.  While the President punished the Indians who took up arms to 
redress their own grievances, he rewarded the white instigators for doing the very same.  To 
some Ho Chunks at least, it appeared the Great Father reserved separate treatment for his red 
and white children. 
 Although troubled by the militia, there is no evidence that the Ho Chunks were 
alarmed by the Americans’ Indian allies, numbering as many as 250 and comprising 
Menominees, Stockbridges, and Oneidas.59  Relations between the Ho Chunks and the 
Menominees remained friendly, and it seems likely that their participation represented 
nothing more than a demonstration of allegiance to the United States—and that the Ho 
Chunks understood this.  Almost uniquely, contemporary and modern observations of the 
Menominees depict them as ardent friends of the white man, whether French, English, or 
American.  Historian Patricia Ourada has written, “The Menominees professed a loyalty to 
the French that surpassed that of any other nation in the West.”60   For their part, the French 
regarded Menominee women as “rather pretty, and more gentle than those of the neighboring 
tribes.”61  The French affinity for Menominee women likely served the tribe well by 
facilitating the formation of kinship bonds between the powerful French and a tribe 
struggling to survive.  These bonds, in turn provided the French with allies who compensated 
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for their lack of numbers by their fidelity.  According to his grandson, the famous French 
captain Charles Langlade considered the Menominees “the most peaceful, brave, and faithful 
of all the tribes who ever served under him.”62  Following the French and Indian War, the 
Menominees extended similar loyalty to the British.  After their defeat at the Battle of the 
Thames in 1813, Robert Dickson commented of the Menominees, “it is fortunate for us there 
are such Indians in such times.”63  Even among American frontiersmen, who lost little love 
on any Indians, the Menominees developed a reputation for fidelity and friendliness.  In the 
words of one, “they were neither treacherous nor belligerent.  Always friendly to the whites, 
they gained the friendship and confidence of the latter.”64  Given such praise, it is easy to 
imagine the Menominees as devoted “friends of the white man,” but they were hardly his 
pawns.  Out of the Beaver Wars, the Menominees had learned to embrace the prevailing 
white power as a means of sustaining their vulnerable people through troubling times, such 
as those that visited Wisconsin in 1827. 
While the Winnebago War furnished the Menominees an opportunity to strengthen 
their attachment to the Americans, it placed the tribes in closer contact with the white frontier 
in a precarious position.  Nothing struck fear in the hearts of white settlers like the prospect 
of a general Indian uprising, and violence on the part of a few Indians invariably elicited 
allegations against all Indians, particularly those closest at hand.  Occupying approximately 
fifty villages centered on the southern end of Lake Michigan and with nearly four thousand 
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people living within the boundaries of Indiana and Illinois, the Potawatomis endured more 
than their share of suspicion. 65  As Secretary of War John Eaton observed in 1829, “The 
States will not consent for their limits to be occupied by a people possessed of savage habits, 
and who claim to exercise the rights of government independent of any control but their 
own.”66  For the Potawatomis, the Winnebago War was something of a dress rehearsal for the 
Black Hawk War.  In each case, the Indians in conflict with the United States proposed 
alliance with the Potawatomis, and in both instances were rejected.  In both wars, the 
Potawatomis sympathized with the belligerent tribes—some going so far as to kill American 
livestock—but chiefs and elders refused to endorse opposition to the United States, fearing 
costs too great to bear.67  As their agent, Alexander Wolcott realized, the Potawatomi leaders 
appreciated “the power of the American People, and must dread to encounter it.  Being 
nearest to the settlements, they know that the blow would first fall on them.”68  Nonetheless, 
Wolcott recognized that young warriors and disgruntled chieftains sympathized with the Ho 
Chunks and shared their antipathy for the miners.  Leaving nothing to chance, Wolcott 
dispatched three men from the Chicago area to ride among the more remote Potawatomi 
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settlements to dissuade their kinsmen from joining the Hostile Chunks.69  Five years later, 
these same men—Billy Caldwell, Alexander Robinson, and Shaubena—would play a 
prominent role in preventing a Potawatomi alliance with Black Hawk.  Finally, in each 
conflict the Potawatomis had to contend with exaggerated or specious allegations of 
collaboration with the belligerent bands.  In the Winnebago War, the Potawatomis did so 
with pledges of fidelity.  In the Black Hawk War, words alone would not be enough. 
Nor had words proven sufficient to maintain peace between the Indians and the 
whites in 1827, so the government resolved to strengthen its frontier defenses.  Both 
Michigan Territory Governor Lewis Cass and Potawatomi Agent Wolcott recommended the 
immediate reoccupation of Fort Dearborn in Chicago, which had lain empty since 1823.70 
Even the usually beneficent McKenney was “of the opinion in regard to the defense of the 
frontier…that a show of Military force would be exceedingly judicious, as would be the 
occupation of the Portage, and Chicago.” 71  Aware that the Winnebago War had revealed 
only a meager portion of the discontent brewing among the Indians who were in close 
contact with the whites, McKenney doubted that “until these two positions are taken whether 
there will be any positive security from the acts of violence which the Winnebagoes and 
Potawatimies are at all times ready to commit, and which nothing but fear can effectually 
restrain.”72  Subject to Cass’s and McKenney’s recommendations, the 5th Infantry Regiment 
established headquarters at Ft. Howard, Green Bay, which it garrisoned with four companies, 
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reoccupied Fort Dearborn with two companies, and positioned another two each at 
Michilimackinac and Sault Ste. Marie.  The war also provided the impetus to construct Fort 
Winnebago at the Portage, where two companies of the 1st Infantry Regiment settled while 
four each garrisoned Forts Snelling and Crawford.73 
Even so, the reinforcements were not intended solely to quiet the Ho Chunks and 
their supposed friends.  In the aftermath of the Winnebago War, vindictive white miners 
resumed their invasion of unceded Indian lands.  A distraught Joseph Street reported that 
they had mutilated the face of a respected Menominee woman before killing her by caving 
her head in with the heel of a boot.   “The Indians are not so stupid, or astounded at late 
events, as to let these things pass unnoticed,” he informed Secretary of War James Barbour.”  
“I am not without serious apprehensions,” he continued, “that if a more vigilant eye is not 
kept upon the heterogeneous mass of population, which Europe and the United States have 
furnished at the mines.”  Although Streets xenophobia was misplaced, he correctly predicted 
that the miners would not honor Atkinson’s promises to the Indians.74 
Thomas McKenney shared Street’s anxiety.  He wrote to General Alexander 
Macomb, Commanding General of the U.S. Army, and directed him to furnish whatever 
military aid William Clark might deem necessary to evict trespassing white miners from 
Indian lands.75  McKenney also enjoined his agents to “execute the law spiritedly upon all 
those who encroach upon Indian rights.  The miners, as reported in a former letter in the 
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fever river country, should be ferreted out, and punished as the law provides.”76  The agents 
of the Indian Office did their best to adhere to McKenney’s directions, but they soon 
discovered that the resolve of the miners matched that of their superintendent, and that the 
miners’ reinforcements dwarfed those of the army. 
Deserted during the Winnebago War, the lead country was now overrun by 
opportunistic whites hoping to cash in on the Indians’ misfortune, thereby compounding it. 
According to one early chronicler, the reports made by the officers and men of Atkinson's 
force “first drew public attention to the unbounded fertility and exhaustless resources of 
south-western Wisconsin—and their return was followed by a large immigration to the lead 
region.”77  By January 1828, Subagent John Marsh estimated that ten thousand white miners 
were illegally working Indian lands.78  Among the offenders was Henry Dodge, the man 
destined to become the American hero of the Black Hawk War and Wisconsin’s first 
governor.  Dodge established his camp with fifty armed men in the winter of 1827-28, 
compelling Carymaunee to complain to Joseph Street in Prairie du Chien that “the hills are 
covered, more are coming and shoving us off our lands to make the lead.  We want our 
Father to stop this before blood may be shed.”79  Street dispatched John Marsh to “Dodge’s 
Diggings” in the bitter January cold with an eviction notice penned by Street.  At Dodge’s 
camp, Marsh discovered approximately 130 well-armed men, none of whom seemed 
particularly awed by the Harvard graduate wielding a piece of paper.  Dodge sent Marsh on 
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his way with some assurance that he would move his camp when it was practicable, but 
Dodge subsequently constructed a stockade and boasted to his men that the regular army 
could try to evict them if they wished.  Learning of Dodge’s intransigence, Street called upon 
Major John Fowle at Fort Crawford to send 180 troops to evict the trespassers.  The major 
responded that he had only 130 men fit for such duty and, in a statement reflecting the 
prevailing sentiment in Washington, that it was beyond his power to comply with that 
request.80  In St. Louis an anxious William Clark commissioned an investigation to resolve 
the dispute.  Conveniently, the investigating officers found that Dodge’s Diggings were 
within U.S. territory, and an appreciative Henry Dodge retroactively filed for a lease to his 
claim and paid outstanding royalties due the government.81  Afterward, Dodge and another 
illegal miner, Alexander Hamilton’s son William, further ingratiated themselves to the 
government by, paradoxically, offering to help Lieutenant Martin Thomas remove illegal 
miners from Indian lands.82  Without recourse, the Ho Chunks formally ceded their title to 
Dodge’s Diggings on 25 August 1828.83 
Although the Sauks and Mesquakies had surrendered their Illinois lands nearly a 
quarter-century earlier—and confirmed the cession in 1825—they continued to occupy their 
villages on the Rock River.  Beginning in the spring of 1827, white squatters took possession 
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of Saukenauk, the principal Sauk village, and mercilessly abused the Indians when they 
returned from their winter hunt.84  This pattern repeated itself in subsequent years and, 
although the Indians were clearly the aggrieved party, it provided Illinois Governor Ninian 
Edwards the leverage he needed to agitate for their permanent removal.  If the federal 
government would not do it, he threatened William Clark, he would see to it himself, “and 
that very promptly.”85  No doubt aware of the dreadful consequences an Illinois-effected 
removal would hold for their people, most of the Sauks and Mesquakies drew close to their 
Great Father through their agent, Thomas Forsyth, and pledged their peaceful intentions.  Not 
all of the Sauks and Mesquakies concurred with this course, and a renegade faction 
developed that rejected the accommodationist spirit of the councils.  In council with Forsyth, 
these Indians vowed “that they would not move from the place where the bones of their 
ancestors lay, and that they would defend themselves against any power that might be sent to 
drive them from their permanent villages.”86  This faction gained a measure of support in the 
spring of 1829, when the Rock River Indians returned from their winter hunts in Iowa to find 
that white squatters, anticipating the public sale of these lands in October, had laid claim to 
the Indian cornfields and destroyed their lodges.87  Forsyth found himself in an impossible 
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position, attempting to at once assuage two constituencies with mutually exclusive interests.  
On 16 May 1829, he advised the Sauks and Mesquakies to leave their Illinois lands.88  
In response, the Sauk “Peace Party” under the chief Keokuk and the renegade faction 
decided upon irreconcilable courses.  While Keokuk vowed to abide by the 1804 land cession 
and remain west of the Mississippi, the more recalcitrant members of the tribes proposed 
resistance.  Within this group, a fiery war captain rose in prominence.  His name was Ma-Ka-
Tai-Me-She-Kia-Kiak, or Black Sparrow Hawk, and those who followed him garnered the 
epithet of “British Band” on account of their idle hope that the British would aid them in a 
war against the Americans and their continued display of the Union Jack as a deliberate snub 
of the U.S. government.  In 1827, Sauk civil chiefs had frustrated Black Hawk’s designs to 
mount a campaign against the Dakotas, and the current impasse with the Americans offered 
him a new outlet to vent his martial ambitions.89  On 20 May 1829, three members of the 
British Band visited their agent, Thomas Forsyth, and “spoke very fiercely on the subject” of 
the land cession.  In no uncertain terms, they repudiated the treaty and vowed to resist 
removal, if necessary, with force.  To add bite to their rhetoric, the Sauks assured Forsyth 
“that they had formed an alliance with the Chippeways, Ottaways, Pottowatomies, Kickapoos 
& Menomonies who were ready to assist them at any time in defending their country against 
any force whatever.” 90  Forsyth had no reason to doubt the existence of such a coalition; 
upon questioning “a number of” Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis, they affirmed their 
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solidarity with the aggrieved Sauks.91  In all likelihood, the Indians Forsyth interviewed were 
already adopted members of the British Band and in no way representatives of their 
respective tribes.   
A legitimate delegation from these tribes, loosely confederated as the “Three Fires,” 
gathered in Prairie du Chien in the summer of 1829 at the request of their Great Father, who 
wished to complete the extermination of the Indian title to the mineral country.92  Unsatisfied 
with the extent of the Ho Chunk cessions from the previous year, the Great Father also 
beckoned the now-compliant Ho Chunks.  Although the government compensated the 
Indians for the title to their lands, the terms were hardly equitable.  In return for perpetual 
annuities of $16,000 and $18,000 to the Three Fires and Ho Chunks, respectively, the United 
States gained possession of 8-10 million acres “of Land of as great fertility as any in our 
country, A large proportion of which contain the richest Lead mines perhaps in the world.” 93  
Secretary of War John Eaton was optimistic that, by ridding the lead country of “claimants 
who can never work the mines with any advantage to themselves,” the United States had 
quieted “the agitations of that frontier by leaving the title to its occupancy by our citizens free 
from the collisions which have heretofore so often disturbed the peace of that frontier.”94 
To further ensure this tranquility, the Americans had sent a Ho Chunk delegation to 
Washington the previous winter “with the view of impressing upon them opinions of our 
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power which they have never had the means of forming; and which it is believed may tend to 
quite their restlessness, and tame their ferocity.”95  From October to December 1828, White 
Crow and more than a dozen other head men of the Ho Chunks toured the eastern United 
States, where they witnessed diplomatic theater.  Although feted and treated to shows, the 
Indians also observed a purposeful demonstration of the manifest power of the United States.  
Teeming cities, serried ranks of mustered militia (who were in truth far better fitted for 
parades than for campaigns), and the firing of gunboat cannon all served to demonstrate to 
the Ho Chunks the folly of further resistance.  An article in the Washington Intelligencer 
explained, “The humane design {of bringing them East} is to introduce in their minds a 
conviction that it is ruin to contend against us.”96  Thomas McKenney concurred: “This mode 
of conquering these people is merciful, and it is cheap, in comparison to what a war with 
them would cost, to say nothing of the loss of Human life.”97  A more cynical correspondent 
from Washington Telegram had a different interpretation of the impressive display made to 
the Indians: “This is all to get a better contract for their lands.”98 
During the Ho Chunk visit, President John Quincy Adams prudently pardoned We-
Kau and another Ho Chunk prisoner named Chick-hon-sic (The Little Beuff).99  That spring, 
the Indian agent in Chicago reported the likelihood of another Indian war should the 
Americans decide to execute the Ho Chunk prisoners (as a Green Bay judge in fact decreed), 
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and matters did not improve when Red Bird died during his imprisonment in Prairie du 
Chien.100  Thus, the government hoped at once to awe the Ho Chunks with American might 
and assuage them with the Great Father’s mercy—but the Americans could not offer any real 
protection from further encroachments.  Without resort to more effective devices, the Ho 
Chunks blazed the trees along the new line that demarked their country, but, as one wag 
observed, it was “a prohibition about as effectual as the whistling of the wind.”101 
Had they listened closely during their visit to Washington, the Ho Chunks might have 
discerned a momentous wind of change regarding the Great Father’s attitude toward their 
people.  His Secretary of War, Peter Buell Porter, appeared perplexed to discover that the 
United States had developed a relationship with the Indians that exceeded the simple 
“relations of war” that had characterized the early years of the Republic.  “We have been 
entering into treaties with them, not of peace merely,” Porter exclaimed, “but of property, of 
intercourse, and trade; and have actually contracted between them and ourselves most of the 
complicated relations which appertain to the municipal state.”102  A matter of sound 
diplomacy in 1816, the fostering of these relations burdened the Adams Administration with 
a political yoke stone in 1828.  In the interim, white settlers had enveloped Indian 
communities in various quarters of the frontier, and state and territorial governments chafed 
at the presence within their boundaries of Indian groups that considered themselves sovereign 
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allies of the United States.  Fortunately for John Quincy Adams, the Winnebago War had 
helped discredit the idea that the Indians could be assimilated into the mainstream white 
society, which called for a reassessment of government’s policy toward the Indians.  
Addressing Congress on 2 December 1828, Adams signaled a new direction in American 
Indian policy by proclaiming the failure of the civilization experiment and that the only 
rational and humane alternative was to isolate the Indians west of the Mississippi and beyond 
the reach of the whites.103 
Adams’s proclamation caught few by surprise.  Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe 
had each considered Indian removal inevitable but left the unhappy business to their 
successors.  Always the pet project of Eastern intellectuals and evangelicals, the civilization 
program was never popular in frontier states, and the failure of the factory system in 1822 
seemed to offer further evidence that assimilation was impossible.  In that same year, 
Congress attempted to eliminate federal funding for the civilization program, and by 1826 
McKenney was aware that many of his own agents were working to undermine the program.  
When questioned by Congress in 1830, McKenney had to admit that the program was a 
failure.104  During the 1820s, McKenney and other proponents of the civilization program 
came to the conclusion that the Indians could never assimilate while subjected to the 
insidious influence of white traders and the “ardent spirits” they often distributed among the 
Indians.  Believing the Indians’ salvation depended on it, in 1827 McKenney began to urge 
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Congress to pass legislation providing for the voluntary removal of Indians to the trans-
Mississippi west.   
Removal proved a divisive issue within the humanitarian-missionary community that 
labored to “civilize” the Indians, estranging McKenney from many former comrades and, 
ironically, aligning him with the Western, anti-Indian lobby.  Although Indian Removal 
always enjoyed the support of men like McKenney, who sincerely believed the policy best 
served Indian interests, the driving impulse behind removal was the discontentment of 
America’s frontier population, which regarded the Indians as a savage menace and lobbied 
their state and territorial representatives for relief.  An Adams partisan, McKenney was 
stunned by the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson, who employed humanitarian rhetoric to 
justify Indian Removal but quite clearly represented a constituency unconcerned with Indian 
welfare.  Alarmed by the new administration’s priorities, McKenney issued a circular to his 
agents in February 1829, blaming frontier instability on white intruders and placed on the 
president responsibility to extirpate “The evil of their presence.”105  In addition to enjoining 
his agents to screen carefully all supplicants seeking entry into the Indian country, he 
directed the application of military force to evict unlawful or disruptive whites.  
Provocatively, he suggested that, if U.S. military forces were not at hand, the agents should 
employ Indian warriors to enforce this law.106   
Accurately reading the prevailing political climate, none of McKenney’s agents took 
such drastic measures.  Indeed, even the employment of federal troops for such purposes was 
becoming infeasible.  Although the army chased illegal miners from the Dubuque Mines in 
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the unorganized territory west of the Mississippi, army commanders and officials within the 
War Department grew increasingly reluctant to use federal troops to defend tribal sovereignty 
within the defined boundaries of states and territories.107  Hence, Major Fowle denied Joseph 
Street’s request to march troops against Henry Dodge’s Diggings in 1828, and by 1830 
Secretary of War John Eaton concluded that the provision of the 1802 Trade and Intercourse 
Act allowing the use of military force to evict white squatters was unconstitutional.108  The 
following year, Eaton’s successor, Lewis Cass (formerly governor of Michigan Territory and 
one of the most vocal advocates of removal), went so far as to contend that the Trade and 
Intercourse Acts no longer held sway within the states and organized territories.109  
Gradually, then, the legal foundation on which America had dealt with the Native peoples of 
the Old Northwest had eroded under the pressure of white settlers until, by 1831, it had 
disintegrated altogether.  Unbeknownst to many Indians on the periphery of his domain, the 
Great Father was no longer interested in making allies of the Indians—he wished to see them 
removed.  
Before they could be removed, however, the Indians would have to set aside their 
internecine squabbles and accept peace.110  The Menominees, Dakotas, and Ho Chunks were 
never satisfied with the 1825 treaty; they considered the Sauks and Mesquakies the 
aggressors in the ongoing conflict and sought an opportunity to exact revenge for a growing 
                                                 
 107 William Clark to Henry Atkinson, 7 July 1828, and Atkinson to Col. McNeil, 7 July 1828, National 
Archives, Prairie du Chien Agency LR, 1824-1847, 63v., 66r.-67r.; P. G. Randolph (Acting Sec. of War) to 
Clark, 23 March 1831,  Indian Office Letter Books, Vols. 1-15, vol. 7, 163-64; American State Papers: Military 
Affairs 4, 588.   
 
 108 Annual Report from the Department of War, Showing the Operations of that Department in 1830, 7 
December 1830, American State Papers: Military Affairs 4, 586-87. 
 
 109 Annual Report from the Department of War, Showing the Operations of that Department in 1831, 7 
December 1831, Ibid., 713. 
 
 110 Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind, 131. 
 
 107
catalog of Sauk and Mesquakie insults.111  In November 1828, a Mesquakie band abducted 
the child and pregnant wife of a prominent Dakota chief, and the following year a Sauk and 
Mesquakie war party decapitated a Dakota woman.112  In another sensational slaying, a 
Menominee man died with a Mesquakie blade in his throat.  Although the Mesquakies later 
claimed that this event was a tragic case of mistaken identity, the killers availed themselves 
of the opportunity to take possession of the Menominee’s scalp—a gesture reserved for 
enemies.113  Joseph Street, the Indian agent at Prairie du Chien who was a self-described 
“novice in Indian affairs,” suggested constructing buffer zones in the disputed areas by filling 
them with Ho Chunks recently defeated in the 1827 Winnebago War.114  Secretary of War 
John Eaton liked this idea and, in 1829, authorized William Clark to organize a council to 
implement such a policy.115  In May 1830, Wynkoop Warner, subagent on the Fever River, 
invited Mesquakie and Dakota delegations to the council at Prairie du Chien.116  The 
Mesquakies would send diplomats—the vengeful Dakotas and Menominees would send 
warriors. 
To many Indians, the 1820s revealed the limits of the Great Father’s commitment to 
his allies.  Although pledging justice and beneficence to all of his children—white and red—
his conduct regarding the lead country suggested partiality toward the former.  During the 
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Winnebago War, Ho Chunks lashed out to teach the Americans the errors of their ways, but 
the Indians came away with the most salient lessons.  The Great Father did not uphold his 
obligations to his red children, it was true, but he was too powerful to oppose by force of 
arms.  Observing the Winnebago War from a distance, the Sauks and Mesquakies concurred 
on the first point, but militant members of both tribes were willing to test the latter.  The 
Dakotas and Menominees exhibited little concern for the plight of their neighbors in the lead 
country.  Instead, they remained fixated on the escalating conflict between themselves and 
the Sauks and Mesquakies over the fur-rich Des Moines River Valley.  Incapable of 
preventing white encroachment on Indian lands, Indian agents and army officers discovered 
in 1830 that they were no more capable of preventing Indians from killing one another. 
 
Map 3.  Indian Villages of Illinois and southern Wisconsin, circa 1830.  From Atlas of Great Lakes 
Indian History, edited by Helen Hornbeck Tanner.  Copyright © 1987 by the University of 











In the evening twilight of 5 May 1830, three or four Mesquakie canoes came ashore 
just south of Prairie du Chien.  Beckoned by Captain Warner, the delegation consisted of a 
Mesquakie chief named the Kettle, fifteen warriors, a woman, and a boy of about fourteen.   
Hungry from their journey and well within the neutral grounds of Prairie du Chien, the 
Mesquakies retrieved from their canoes only what they needed to prepare a meal, leaving 
their guns and war clubs in the birchbark vessels.  In the shadows, a war party of fifty 
Menominees and Dakotas waited patiently for their prey.  Made aware of the Mesquakie 
voyage by a report from their friend John Marsh, the former Prairie du Chien subagent, they 
had anticipated the Mesquakie landing site and now seized the opportunity presented to them 
and attacked their helpless foes.  Only the boy survived, and the Dakotas and Menominees 
permitted or enjoined him to carry both his broken arm and the identity of his attackers back 
to the Mesquakie villages.1
Whatever may be said of the circumstances of the attack, the Menominees and 
Dakotas were unashamed, and they wanted the Sauks and Mesquakies to know who was 
responsible.  Afterward, the blood-smeared victors paraded through Prairie du Chien to the 
accompaniment of a drum and rattle, proudly displaying their trophies of war, which 
                                                 
 1 Mrs. Henry S. Baird, "Indian Customs and Early Recollections," in Report and Collections of the 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Years 1880, 1881, and 1882, vol. 9, ed. Lyman C. Draper 
(Madison: David Atwood, State Printer, 1882), 324-25; Anthony F. C. Wallace, Prelude to Disaster: The 
Course of Indian-White Relations Which Led to the Black Hawk War of 1832 (Springfield: Illinois State 
Historical Library, 1970), 33; George D. Lyman, John Marsh, Pioneer: The Life Story of a Trail-Blazer on Six 
Frontiers (Chautauqua, New York: The Chautauqua Press, 1931), 152. 
 
included not only the standard scalp poles but sundry dismembered body parts and a head at 
the end of a stick.2  To the evident dismay of one of the very few American women in that 
town, the Dakota and Menominee warriors also “danced the war-dance and scalp dance, 
ending with yells characteristic of incarnate devils.”   As if this was not spectacle enough, the 
victors roasted the heart of a Mesquakie chief in plain view, divided it among several 
warriors, and ate it.3  This proved too much even for the commander of Fort Crawford, who 
compelled the Indians to take their celebration to islands in the river.4
From their own perspectives, the attackers had just evened the score.  Their 
sanguinary celebration attested to the fact that they had done no wrong and, indeed, had only 
obtained justice.  The Mesquakies begged to differ, and efforts by William Clark and Thomas 
Forsyth to make amends failed to assuage Mesquakie grief.  On 7 July, Colonel Willoughby 
Morgan, commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment at Fort Crawford, tried to use threats to 
secure peace: “Your Great Father the President commands me to say to you, if you continue 
your wars he will march an army into your country, and take side with those who regard his 
admonitions, and chastise those who refuse to regard his council.”  To drive home the now 
evident point that the Great Father did not love all of his subjects equally, Morgan added, 
“and more especially will he do this, if in your wars your young men should kill any of his 
white children.” 5  Although Morgan could not know it, his blustering would prove prescient. 
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***** 
The burgeoning conflict between the Sauks and Mesquakies and their Dakota and 
Menominee foes was no mere sideshow on the road to the Black Hawk War.  Indeed, the 
army’s initial orders in the spring of 1832 made no mention of Black Hawk, who had not yet 
conducted his fateful “invasion” of Illinois.  Instead, federal officials hoped to intervene in an 
intertribal conflagration that threatened to engulf the frontier.  As far as the Menominees and 
Dakotas were concerned, the “Black Hawk War” had nothing to do with the Sauk war leader 
or Illinois land disputes.   Their participation in the conflict is best understood as the brief 
convergence of two wars: the American campaign to remove the Sauks and Mesquakies from 
Illinois and the enduring intertribal contest for control of hunting grounds in the Upper 
Mississippi watershed.  
Although their inability to protect the Indians from white encroachment contributed 
to the first conflict, federal officers persisted in their efforts to stem the second.  They were 
not helped by the Andrew Jackson Administration, which gutted the Indian Office of 
qualified agents, replacing them with loyal party men.  Not surprisingly, federal officials 
struggled to defuse either situation in the two years before the Black Hawk War.  
Increasingly, Illinoisans regarded all Indians as a mortal threat, drawing the Potawatomis and 
Ho Chunks into a conundrum in which the stakes were clear but the proper responses were 
not.    Hoping to simply ride out the storm, most of these tribes advocated neutrality, but their 
environment left no room for such a policy.  By 1832—after two years of federal efforts to 
preserve the peace—the entire region was primed for war. 
                                                                                                                                                       




In July 1830, Colonel Willoughby Morgan convened a council at Prairie du Chien.  
Previously intended to implement Joseph Street’s “buffer zone” scheme, the meeting now 
aimed at nothing more than restoring peace among the tribes.  Morgan began by singling out 
those tribes who had kept to “the good road of peace”—Omahas, Ioways, Ottoes, and Ho 
Chunks.6  He reserved special praise for the Ho Chunks, who complained of five injustices at 
the hands of the Sauks and Mesquakies and yet remained at peace: “Your conduct will merit 
the high approbation of your Father the President of the United States.” 7  On the second day 
of the council, William Clark patronized the remaining tribes, who were active parties to the 
present conflict: “You are losers by a war among yourselves: you lose your bravest men and 
neglect the cultivation of the Earth, which compels your women to work harder for your 
support.” 8  Despite decades among the Indians, Clark had apparently not yet grasped that the 
Indians regarded farming as women’s work in the first place, and by commanding them to 
lay down the hatchet and take up the plow he was requiring them to surrender their 
masculinity.  Clark waited for some response from the head men of the Menominees and 
Dakotas, but none was forthcoming.  Finally, an exasperated Keokuk, the accommodationist 
Sauk chief, interjected that it was incumbent on the agents of the Great Father to redress the 
Mesquakie grievance.  Regarding any blood debts owed the Dakotas, Keokuk insisted that 
“their bodies have been paid for, and all arranged,” but that the Dakotas had persisted in 
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seeking vengeance.9  Keokuk concluded by holding Warner responsible for the deaths of his 
delegates and, consequently, for arranging compensation from the Dakotas.10
For their part, the Dakotas were now satisfied and expressed eagerness “before these 
white people to make peace with you, and forget it all.”11  That the Dakota chief Wabasha 
saw fit to articulate this desire “before these white people” is significant.  So long as the 
Great Father persisted in his attempts to mediate this conflict, it benefited the Dakotas to 
even the balance sheet in the presence of his agents.  In the entirely likely event, then, that 
the Mesquakies attempted retaliation, it would be they who garnered the ire of the Great 
Father.  The Sauks and Mesquakies, too, recognized the Great Father’s self-mandated 
prerogative to maintain peace among the Indians, but they were less than certain of his 
sincerity or effectiveness.  On the third day of the council proceedings, the Mesquakie chief 
Wapalaw reported to the treaty commissioners that the Mesquakies and Menominees had 
made peace.  Rather than seeking the endorsement of the U.S. government, however, 
Wapalaw sardonically commented, “and I hope you the white people will not meddle in our 
peace.”12  Keokuk pledged to observe this peace, but, also managed a swipe at the 
peacekeeping skills of the government.  Referring to the disaster occasioned by the Warner’s 
invitation earlier that year, Keokuk quipped, “we hope you will see that your Agents and Sub 
Agents observe it like-wise, and not make themselves too busy.”13
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This exchange at Prairie du Chien illustrates two persistent themes in Indian-U.S. 
relations in the Old Northwest.  First, Indians acknowledged the U.S. government’s role as a 
peacekeeping agency, but they typically did so only to achieve some relative advantage over 
their antagonists.  The Dakotas, having achieved satisfaction in their recent attack, were more 
than willing to enlist the gratis assistance of the U.S. Army in preventing a reprisal.  It is 
therefore not surprising that the Dakota Little Crow expressed a steadfast desire for peace 
and confidence that the U.S. would fairly settle the boundary dispute.14  Based on prior 
performance, Little Crow’s trust was misplaced, but it was likely a disingenuous gesture 
designed to effect a de facto alliance with the U.S.  Second, tribes and their assigned agents 
often formed affiliations with each other that transcended nationality.  Keokuk’s aspersion 
against Wynkoop Warner was less an indictment against the Indian agents as body than an 
attack on those agents aligned with the enemies of the Sauks and Mesquakies, which were 
many.  The Sauks and Mesquakies enjoyed the ardent support of their own agent, Thomas 
Forsyth, until June 1830, when “public policy and the public service combine[d] to make it 
advisable to appoint another person in his place.”15   
Ostensibly relieved because he frequently absented himself from his place of duty, 
Forsyth was both one of the most capable Indian agents in the region and a vocal critic of 
Jacksonian Indian policy, and his dismissal no doubt contributed to the Sauk and Mesquakie 
sense of disenfranchisement.  Having served as a fur trader in the region since 1804 and a 
U.S. Indian agent since 1812, Forsyth rightly believed his services to have been 
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indispensable to the government, and his dismissal appears to have caught him off guard.16  
He inquired of friends in Washington to learn the cause and discovered that complaints of 
supposed “negligence and laziness” had surfaced in Washington and that politicos there used 
the opportunity to lobby for his relief—and the appointment of their friends in his place.  
William Clark, who had not helped Forsyth’s case, expressed regret when he learned that he 
would lose the former agent’s services.17  In his place, the government appointed Felix St. 
Vrain, whose inexperience did not bode well at this critical juncture in U.S. relations with the 
Sauks and Mesquakies.  With good reason, the remarkable nineteenth-century archivist 
Lyman Copeland Draper later opined that, had Forsyth “been continued over them, it is 
believed, the Sauk war of 1832 would never have occurred.”18   
Unfortunately, Forsyth’s dismissal was not exceptional.  Shortly after succumbing to 
the pressure to relieve this important agent, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas 
McKenney was likewise excused from federal service.  Despite his patronizing 
ethnocentrism, McKenney had been a tireless advocate for a humane Indian policy through 
four presidential administrations.  Jackson peremptorily dismissed him in 1830.  When 
McKenney enquired of Acting Secretary of War Philip Randolph the reason for the 
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dismissal, Randolph responded that “General Jackson has long been satisfied that you are not 
in harmony with him, in his views in regard to the Indians.”19   
Treating the office of Indian agent as little more than a sinecure, Jackson dispensed 
appointments as a form of patronage with little regard for qualifications.  The previous year, 
the talented John Marsh lost his post as subagent in Prairie du Chien because he had grown 
too close to the Dakotas.20  The government replaced Marsh with Thomas Burnett, whose 
only commending quality was that he was “one of Gen. Jackson’s early friends and firm 
supporters.”21  Although this was sufficient to earn him “favorable notice and fraternal 
feelings” among Jackson cronies, it did not prepare him for the job which he was to 
undertake; upon arriving in Prairie du Chien in June 1830, Burnett discovered that, according 
to his father-in-law, his duties “did not exactly suit his taste, or meet the pre-conceived idea 
he had formed of it.”22  To compound matters, Burnett worked for the equally unqualified 
Joseph Street, who marginalized his own influence over the Indians by his overbearing 
manner.  The injured Forsyth took refuge in St. Louis, where he attacked the administration 
in anonymous newspaper articles, but the Indians disadvantaged by Jacksonian patronage 
could only retire to their villages.   Of the twenty agents and thirty-six subagents who held 
office when Jackson assumed the presidency, fully half of the agents and nineteen of the 
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subagents failed to retain their posts through September 1831.23  Between Prairie du Chien 
and Rock Island—perhaps the most important 150-mile span on the American frontier—the 
Great Father had replaced the agents of alliance with paragons of political loyalty.24
Without Forsyth’s counsel at Prairie du Chien in 1830, the Sauks and Mesquakies 
brooded. Not only had the Mesquakies suffered the affront of ten killed, but they also had to 
endure the Great Father’s enjoinments to bury the hatchet and to leave justice to his hands.  
History suggested, however, that white justice was intolerably slow and rarely gratifying.  
The government secured a treaty of nonhostility and further land cessions from the concerned 
tribes on 15 July, but only the latter provisions stuck.  Almost wistfully, the text of the treaty 
began, “The said Tribes being anxious to remove all causes which may hereafter create any 
unfriendly feeling between them.”25  This passage failed to convey the true sentiments of the 
signatories, though, least of all the Sauks and Mesquakies.  As Keokuk would latter claim, 
“we did not wish to make peace, but we did make peace for fear of the Americans, we acted 
from fear like whipped children.”26  Soon, they would act from vengeance as ferocious 
warriors. 
 The peace accord of July 1830 was no more successful than that of 1825.  The 
Dakotas renewed their attacks against the Ojibwas within weeks of signing the treaty.27  The 
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Ojibwas responded with blows against the Dakotas and their Menominee allies, as well—
killing two women of the latter tribe in the autumn of 1830.28  Winter brought with it an 
abatement in the violence, although the Ojibwas killed a young Menominee man in his 
winter hunting grounds.29  On 2 February 1831, the Menominees implored Joseph Street to 
uphold the government’s pledge to keep the peace.  Their losses compelled the Menominees 
to reappraise the wisdom of conceding the right of peacekeeping to the U.S. at Prairie du 
Chien in the previous summer.  At that time, the Menominees had (to their minds) evened the 
score with their enemies and were more than willing to let the U.S. Army enforce a peace 
that would work to their benefit.  Having conceded to their Great Father the responsibility for 
adjudicating intertribal disputes, however, the Menominees could consider taking revenge 
now only at the risk of incurring the wrath of the same.  Consequently, the western bands of 
Menominees around Prairie du Chien appealed to Street to deliver justice.  A Menominee 
spokesman explained that “The Chippewas believe we do not revenge because we are afraid” 
and rhetorically asked, “Shall we sit still in our lodges with folded arms till the Chippewas 
kill more of us?” 30  Although Street was sympathetic to the Menominees and admitted to 
Eaton that Ojibwa “speeches shew much caution, and want of candour,” he could not tell the 
Menominees anything they wanted to hear. 31  Citing a refrain that would become tired over 
the next year and a half, Street directed the Menominees to leave matters to their Great 
Father.  As the winter months passed, however, the Menominees received no satisfaction.   
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 Appreciating the depth of discontent among the competing Indian groups, Street 
warned the War Department of “the probability of a War between them in the Spring if not 
anticipated by some earlier movement on the part of the Government.”32  The first indication 
of this war arrived in May 1831, when the Dakota chief Wabasha arrived in Prairie du Chien 
to complain that the Sauks and Mesquakies had violated the agreed upon boundary and killed 
at least three of his people.  Realizing that they were, at least for the present, in the good 
graces of the Americans, both the Dakotas and the Menominees reluctantly pledged to 
remain at peace while they waited for the Americans to dispense justice.33  The Sauks and 
Mesquakies moved more quickly than the Great Father. 
In April 1831, Black Hawk crossed the Mississippi in defiance of the United States 
and returned to his summer village of Saukenauk, by this time the private property of 
American settlers.  If Black Hawk entertained ideas of retaking these lands by force, he 
reconsidered them upon learning that Major General Edmund P. Gaines, Commander of the 
Western Department of the U.S. Army, was en route with six companies of regulars from 
Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, and—more ominously—Illinois Governor John Reynolds had 
called up seven hundred militiamen.34  Black Hawk resolved to die in his village rather than 
give it up, and he was encouraged by an influential shaman who dreamt that the approaching 
American force would do the Sauks no harm.35  Not all of Black Hawk’s followers shared his 
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determination, however, and approximately fifty families defected to Keokuk’s peace party 
by retiring to the west side of the Mississippi.36  Convinced that Gaines, a “great war chief” 
of the Americans, would not harm the Sauks as long as they remained at peace, Black Hawk 
remained defiant.37  The arrival of Reynolds’s militiamen finally induced Black Hawk to 
surrender his designs of reclaiming Saukenauk.  “I would have remained and been taken 
prisoner by the regulars,” he later explained, “but was afraid of the multitude of pale faces, 
who were on horseback, as they were under no restraint of their chiefs.”38  Although the 
dialogue between Black Hawk and Gaines was often heated, the general impressed Black 
Hawk with his “manly conduct and soldierly deportment.”  Empathetic to the plight of the 
Sauks and eager to avert bloodshed, Gaines offered to compensate the Sauks for their corn 
crops if they would peaceably quit their fields and return to Iowa.39  Reluctantly, Black Hawk 
agreed to abandon Saukenauk—much to the chagrin of the bellicose militiamen who mocked 
Gaines’s “corn treaty.”40
Animated by Black Hawk’s movements, the Illinois volunteers now turned their 
attention to the state’s other indigenous tribes.  From the outset of this “crisis,” the citizens of 
Illinois labeled the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks accomplices of the British Band.  
Responding to a crescendo of complaints, General Gaines assured Governor Reynolds, “If I 
find this to be true, I shall gladly avail myself of my present visit to see them well 
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punished.”41  The previous summer, Black Hawk had, in fact engaged the Potawatomis of the 
Peoria area in talks but come away frustrated.  Black Hawk had ample reason to expect 
support or at least sympathy from these Potawatomis; they too had been subject to insult and 
injury from white trespassers, and they considered themselves disenfranchised by the 1829 
treaty, in which Potawatomis from the Chicago area took it upon themselves to cede land 
belonging to their western brethren.42  Senachewine, principal chief of one of the Peoria-area 
bands, saw no benefit in allying with Black Hawk against the United States, and he 
impressed this opinion on his people.43   
They were not bound to follow his lead, however.  By the nature of his office, 
Senachawine could withhold support for ventures he considered deleterious to the best 
interests of the band or tribe, but he could not coerce compliance.  This dynamic of 
Potawatomi politics was understood—and shared—by their neighboring tribes, but not the 
white residents of Illinois.  Consequently, Senachawine’s success in persuading most of his 
people to forswear allegiance with Black Hawk would be seen by many whites as a failure of 
the Potawatomis to ensure absolute fidelity to the United States.  Like the Winnebago War, 
Black Hawk’s abortive “invasion” of 1831 followed a discernible pattern: the belligerent 
band courted the Potawatomis, they refused, rumors of the courtship implicated them 
nonetheless, and the Potawatomis labored to distance themselves from the belligerent band.  
Although they had done so successfully in 1827 and 1831, the Potawatomis were becoming 
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something of a usual suspect.44  It was therefore not surprising that their loyalty to the United 
States would come into question the next time frontier whites feared an Indian “uprising.”  
Memories of Ho Chunk “treachery” were even fresher in white minds, and they were 
likewise presumed guilty by association.  In fact, the Ho Chunks’ relationship with the Sauks 
and Mesquakies was complex and often ambiguous.  In the Prairie du Chien area, Ho Chunks 
frequently fell victim to Sauk and Mesquakie raiding parties, fueling century-old enmity and 
deterring Ho Chunks on the Wisconsin from traveling toward the Mississippi.45  At the 
Prairie du Chien council in the summer of 1830, Carymaunee the Lame complained of 
injuries endured at the hands of the Sauks and Mesquakies and proclaimed union with their 
archenemies: “With the Sioux and Menominies, we are as one; our hands have never been 
stained in each others blood.”  He closed his talk by reemphasizing, “The Sacs and Foxes 
have hurt us.”46  Ho Chunk chief Waukon Decorah’s daughter, married to a Dakota man, had 
been slain in the autumn of 1829.47  In 1830, Waukon agreed to let the Americans bring his 
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daughter’s killers to justice, but a year had passed without satisfaction, and Waukon’s 
patience grew thin.48
Yet while many Ho Chunks continued to regard the Sauks and Mesquakies as their 
mortal enemies, those residing on the Rock River gradually achieved détente with their 
Indian neighbors.   Early American miner Moses Meeker observed that, when the Ho Chunks 
came to trade with the Americans, the Sauks and Mesquakies relocated to the west side of the 
Mississippi until the Ho Chunks departed.  A Sauk named Mock-to-back-sa-gum (Black 
Tobacco) explained “that they were friends, and that it was better to keep it so.”49  
Throughout the 1820s, shared adversity and a common enemy in the American miners 
facilitated a rapprochement between the Ho Chunks and the Sauks.  Although the treaty of 
1828 formally secured peace between the Unites States and the Ho Chunks, the assault on 
Indian lands and liberties continued.  White miners continued to take liberties with Ho Chunk 
mines and with Indian women along the Rock River.50  Having learned the folly of seeking 
redress from their agents, many of the Rock River Indians turned inward for guidance.   
Half Sauk and half Ho Chunk, the “Winnebago Prophet” Wabokieshiek provided 
disillusioned Sauks, Ho Chunks, Kickapoos, and Potawatomis with an alternative vision of 
alliance—one that fulfilled their needs far better than that offered by the Great Father.  
Approximately fifty miles up the Rock River from Saukenauk, Wabokieshiek’s village, 
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“Prophetstown,” developed into a gathering place for the disaffected of every tribe.51  
Although later demonized as an instigator of the Black Hawk War—one historian calling him 
the “evil genius” behind its occurrence—Wabokieshiek actually discouraged his followers 
from resorting to armed conflict with the whites.52  His vision that the U.S. Army would not 
harm the British Band had stiffened Black Hawk’s resolve in the summer of 1831, and 
subsequent visions of a Sauk-British alliance would encourage the Sauk to return to Illinois 
in the coming year.  Even then, Wabokieshiek envisioned a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
with the Americans, believing that the American army officers would not dare attack the 
Sauks so long as they behaved peaceably.53  Interestingly, Wabokieshiek’s visions were 
partly vindicated by subsequent events; the army posed no threat to the British Band—even 
after reentering Illinois—while the Sauks abstained from violence.  Wabokieshiek erred 
catastrophically, however, in failing to account for the Illinois militia, which adjudged any 
movement by the Sauks to be hostile.  Rightly fearing that this militia would neither 
discriminate between the obstructionist Indians of Prophetstown and the Great Father’s loyal 
followers, Ho Chunk chiefs appealed to William Clark “to break up Prophets Town, which is 
considered by them as composed of renegadoes from their own nation, as well as from other 
Tribes.”54  Feasible or not, the Americans never acted on this request; more pressing 
concerns demanded their attention. 
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On 31 July 1831, thirty to forty Menominee men, women, and children encamped a 
mile and a half above Fort Crawford.  The men may have been drunk, and very few were 
armed. 55  Similar circumstances had provided the Menominees an enticing target fifteen 
months earlier; now the Menominees were vulnerable.  Just before dawn, as many as one 
hundred Sauks and Mesquakies approached the camp under the cover of darkness.56  They 
approached the thresholds of the Menominee wigwams with impunity, leveled their weapons, 
and opened fire.  A young Menominee warrior named Me-she-nau-tau-wa (Great Rattle 
Snake) later claimed to see the attackers approach but lamented, “we had no guns or axes to 
defend ourselves.”  After the initial volley, which did not appear to harm anyone, “they then 
attacked us with spears and knives.”57  At least one of the Menominees was armed; he 
returned fire and killed two assailants but fled after seeing his family killed.58  Wounded in 
the foot himself, Me-she-nau-tau-wa had no means to defend his family, and his wife 
sustained a serious wound.59  They were among the lucky.  When the smoke cleared and the 
sun rose, ten men, four women, and nine children lay dead.  Another eight were wounded, at 
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least two mortally.60  The loss of the women and children were particularly objectionable to 
the Menominees.  They did not subscribe to Western morals that regard women and children 
as immune from war, but valued women as producers of food, mothers of children, and 
keepers of the hearth; children represented the future of the Menominee people.  The death of 
wife and child incurred not only emotional anguish, but a considerable loss to the clan, band, 
and tribe, as well.  
 Their grievous losses exhausted the patience of the Menominees, who sent envoys 
among their allies to coordinate a counterattack.  That same day, runners carried red 
wampum belts to the Dakotas, who had suffered two killed by the Sauks and Mesquakies as 
recently as 25 July, and the Menominees of Green Bay.61  On 1 August, the Menominees 
made their first attempt to enlist the aid of the United States.  In council with Joseph Street, 
the western Menominees pleaded, “We hope you, our Father will take pitty on us all and help 
us;—and we will wait a little while to see what our G. F. [Great Father] will do for us.”62  
The Menominees were still smarting from the murder of some of their people at the hands of 
the Ojibwas the preceding winter—murders that had gone unpunished by the United States—
and were looking for any sign of good faith on the part of their allies.63  
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 Street urged forbearance and issued clothing to the Menominees as a sign of good 
will, but he could do little more.64  Sympathetic to the plight of the Menominees, he 
recognized the gravity of the situation.  “If something is not speedily done,” Street warned 
Eaton, “the whole of this frontier will in all probability be involved in a cruel, retaliatory 
Indian War.”65  Even within the city of Prairie du Chien, a fight seemed to be brewing.  
Although Street sought to see them leave, the wounded Menominee victims—two of them 
near death—remained in the village to agitate against their foes, getting into altercations with 
the Sauk and Mesquakie wives of French traders.66  Individual Menominees continued to 
approach Street, both in search of help and to level accusations: 
Now at your own land, and near to your Fort, I had a wife and brother and children at 
night_I laid down & slept_in the night the Saukies & Foxes came into my lodge, and 
in the morning I was alone_They murdered all my family—And I have no wife nor 
brother nor child:_Who will revenge me?_Your Chief of the Soldiers is gone_I see no 
person going against the murderers.  You do not even promise that I shall have help 
to revenge my people & my family.67   
 
Unable to give succor and unsure what to do, Street appealed to his superior for guidance: 
“For myself I feel much at a loss how & what to assure them, and will be obliged by your 
instructions.”68
 By 15 August, a Menominee envoy had reached Green Bay.  In council, the Great 
Rattle Snake related the events of 31 July to the U.S. agent and then sat.  Kaush-kau-nau-nieu 
(the Grizzly Bear), a respected orator and war leader of the Green Bay Menominees, then 
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addressed Acting Agent Samuel C. Stambaugh: “Now, my father, you have heard the 
mournful story of our children’s murder, and we ask you to help us to make war against our 
enemies.”  To give weight to his words, the Grizzly Bear presented Stambaugh with three 
strings of red wampum and three plugs of red-painted tobacco.  The Grizzly Bear also 
informed Stambaugh that he had dispatched runners to other Menominee bands in 
northeastern Wisconsin to deliver similar invitations to war.  Bound by instructions, 
however, Stambaugh refused to accept the wampum and tobacco, and he enjoined the 
assembled Menominees to exercise patience.  Distraught, the Grizzly Bear motioned to a 
picture of President Andrew Jackson on the wall of the agency building.  Recalling a meeting 
with the president the previous winter, the Grizzly Bear protested, “He told me that he would 
help our nation when we got into trouble, & we now want his assistance.”  Although the 
Sauks and Mesquakies considered the recent attack just retribution, the Menominees felt 
otherwise.  The Grizzly Bear opined that the attack on the Mesquakie camp in 1830 had 
evened the score and that, prior to this injury, the Menominees had no grief with the Sauks 
and Mesquakies.69
Stambaugh, in whom the Indians vested considerable trust, continued to preach 
patience and to promise that the government would provide redress, but he also believed that 
the Menominees had every right to seek revenge.  In addition to satisfying the wants of an 
ally, such a course promised to solve the problem of Sauk and Mesquakie intransigence once 
and for all.  “The Menominies are much excited,” he wrote the new Secretary of War, Lewis 
Cass, “and, although one of the most peaceable and Friendly Tribes on this Frontier, when 
they become roused by frequent insults and aggressions, a sanguinary war terminating only 
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in the total overthrow and destruction of one of the contending parties, is sure to be the 
Consequence.”70  Unlike Street, Stambaugh told the Menominees much they wanted to hear.  
In the company of influential Green Bay citizens and the officers of Fort Howard, Stambaugh 
resolved the necessity of punishing the murderers: “Justice, humanity, the peace of this 
frontier demands it . . . the honor of the government demands it.”  Further, he could report 
that even the Great Father himself, President Jackson, was “much grieved to hear of this 
aggression” and pledged a delivery of justice.71  Satisfied with what he had heard, the Grizzly 
Bear reluctantly pledged to obey, but cautioned that the Menominees could not be expected 
to exercise unlimited patience: “we have been promised redress so often that we almost tired 
[of] waiting.”72
By winter, Menominee patience was exhausted.  The War Department continued to 
forbid them from taking matters into their own hands without demonstrating the diligence 
seemingly promised by the Great Father.73  Colonel Willoughby Morgan leaned on the Sauks 
and Mesquakies to deliver up ten of the Indians involved in the attack on the Menominees, 
but most of the perpetrators had taken refuge in the British Band and were beyond the reach 
of the chiefs who maintained diplomatic relations with the U.S.74  Only the tactful diplomacy 
of Agent Stambaugh, whom the Menominees regarded as an ally, maintained the peace.  The 
western bands did not place such confidence in Agent Street at Prairie du Chien, and they 
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spent the winter of 1831-32 forming a coalition army to punish the Sauks and Mesquakies for 
their aggression, sending strings of war wampum among the Dakotas, Ojibwas, Ottawas, and 
Potawatomis to solicit their aid.75  In January 1832, western Menominee warriors began to 
gather at a rendezvous site on the Black River.76  By March, Indian agents in Wisconsin were 
detecting rumors of a Dakota and Menominee coalition that was plotting a spring offensive.77  
In April, Street learned that the Menominees intended to strike the Sauks and Mesquakies 
when the “‘grass would be half leg high.’”78
To avert the impending conflict, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Alexander 
Macomb ordered the Western Department of the U.S. Army to deploy the “efficient force 
now at Jefferson Barracks,” Missouri, with the object of seizing hostages involved in the 
previous summer’s attack and thereby averting an Indian war that threatened to consume the 
northwestern frontier.79  With Edmund Gaines recovering from influenza and rheumatism in 
Memphis, command of the expedition fell to Brigadier General Henry Atkinson, who 
acquitted himself as a skilled peacekeeper and Indian diplomat during the Winnebago War of 
1827.  In the eyes of the Jackson Administration, however, Atkinson’s most redeeming 
quality was simply that he was not Edmund Gaines, who had fallen out of favor with the 
president over Indian Removal, which the general regarded as immoral.80  Patient, cautious, 
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and conscientious, Atkinson was destined to similarly disappoint the president.  On 3 April, 
Atkinson informed Commanding General Alexander Macomb that he would soon depart for 
Rock Island, Illinois, where he intended to call the Sauks and Mesquakies to council and 
compel the surrender of the Menominee killers.  Optimistically, Atkinson ventured, “I am 
persuaded that I shall be able to carry your views into effect without much difficulty.”  
Presciently, he added, “In this however I may be mistaken.”81
 While Atkinson assembled six companies of infantry and the Menominees prepared 
for war, Black Hawk attempted to form his own coalition against the Americans.  In 
February 1832, the Sauk war captain invited the Ho Chunks and Potawatomis to form a 
united front against the settlers of Illinois.82  Although sympathetic, the response from the 
Potawatomi and Ho Chunk chiefs was tepid—the risk of making an enemy of the United 
States was too great.83  Despite the failure of this council, Black Hawk remained optimistic, 
thanks to the assurances of his advisors: Neapope, the principal hereditary chief of the British 
Band, and the “Winnebago Prophet” Wabokieshiek, who had invited the British Band to 
plant corn at his Rock River village in the coming summer.84  Claiming to secure the 
allegiance of some Potawatomi villages on the Rock River and in Wisconsin, Neapope and 
Wabokieshiek also promised support from the British in Canada and all of the other Illinois 
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tribes. 85  Whether they believed such support to be forthcoming or they were practitioners of 
wishful thinking is unclear.  In either case, it was all Black Hawk needed to hear.  On 5 April 
1832, his British Band crossed the Mississippi into Illinois for the final time. 
Possibly unaware of Black Hawk’s movements, a Ho Chunk war party departed 
Prairie du Chien under the cover of darkness on 8 April.  Led by Waukon Decorah and 
accompanied by the Menominee chief Carron, the party hoped to settle old and new scores 
with the Sauks and Mesquakies.  Two and a half years had passed since Sauk and Mesquakie 
raiders had killed Waukon’s daughter in Iowa, but it had been only eight months since 
Carron had lost his entire family in the Mesquakie attack near Prairie du Chien.  Each of the 
chiefs had endured Joseph Street’s admonitions to remain at peace and to permit the Great 
Father to dispense justice, but the government’s inactivity compelled the disgusted headmen 
to seek justice themselves.86  Learning of the foray the next day, Street called on the army to 
pursue the war party and compel its return.  Assisted by former subagent John Marsh, a 
thirty-man force succeeded in performing this mission, but it did little to placate Waukon 
Decorah or Carron.87  The Menominee chief, in particular, bided the American’s interference 
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but seethed with indignation and took a measure of consolation in the news that the Great 
Father had finally deployed the army to bring the Menominee killers to justice. 
On 13 April, Atkinson convened a council with the principal Sauk and Mesquakie 
chiefs at Rock Island, Illinois.  Believing the British Band to field as many as five hundred 
warriors and noting that it had yet to evince a hostile disposition, Atkinson resolved to avoid 
provocative movements and to seek a diplomatic solution.  Here he learned that about half of 
the Menominee killers—fifty or sixty warriors including the “principal persons engaged in 
that affair”—took shelter with the British Band.88  Undeterred, Atkinson demanded hostages 
to remain in U.S. custody until the apprehension of the murderers.89  Less than a week later, 
the Mesquakie “Prince” Wapello surrendered three of the murderers.  Estranged from the 
British Band, Keokuk still could give none, but he hoped that this offering would suffice to 
cover the debt.  Although hoping to imprison four murderers from each tribe, Atkinson was 
satisfied with the effort and pledged that he would seize the remainder from the British 
Band.90  “Up to this time,” one of Atkinson’s officers recalled, “it appeared have been the 
general belief of the officers of the army…that the Indians…would under the forbearing, 
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dignified and determined course pursued by the General, be brought to a sense of their 
conduct and situation, and induced to comply with the demands of the Government."91   
The Menominees were less enthusiastic.  On 21 April, Menominees at the Wisconsin 
Portage indicated a willingness to let the government arbitrate, but those near Prairie du 
Chien remained disgruntled.92  Although dismissed from federal service, John Marsh 
remained indispensable to his government, which dispatched him up the Mississippi to gauge 
the sentiments of the western Menominees.  On the morning of 17 April, Marsh met with 
them at the mouth of the Black River and found their mood dour.  Finding his reputation 
among the Menominees diminished on account of his role in turning back the Decorah-
Carron war party, a despondent Marsh reported to Street that “they are resolved to fight the 
Foxes at all hazards: that though they are few and feeble they have resolved to fight until 
they are killed to a man or until they have subdued the Foxes.”93  Disgusted with their Great 
Father’s inactivity, the Menominees also informed Marsh that they would no longer visit 
Prairie du Chien.  Hence, when Street called the Menominees to a council several days later, 
only thirteen warriors attended.  Covering tired ground, Street again admonished the 
Menominees to remain at peace.  The warriors replied that they were not chiefs—that the 
chiefs had stayed away because they had no wish to be treated like children, and that they 
would convey the message.94  Although several chiefs, including Carron, remained obdurate 
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and refused to accept any presents, Street—aided by the news that Keokuk had turned over 
three of the killers—ultimately convinced the western bands to stand down.95  In Green Bay, 
the Menominees appealed to Stambaugh “to redeem the promise I made them last Summer, 
that if the murderers of their people were not punished last fall or very early this Spring, that 
I would permit them to take up the hatchet, and would myself accompany them.”  
Stambaugh, however, induced the chiefs to sign a pledge to remain at peace for an additional 
three months. 96  The prospects for peace, however, were fleeting. 
This was not evident to Henry Atkinson.  By early May 1832, he had reason to hope 
that the situation was under his control; the British Band remained peaceable, the Mesquakies 
had surrendered hostages, and the Menominees had agreed to stand down.  In fact, Atkinson 
achieved not peace but a respite, during which he hoped to negotiate the British Band’s 
withdrawal from Illinois.  Moreover, Atkinson had no control over the white citizenry of 
Illinois, which lacked the general’s patience or forbearance.  So long as it remained in 
Illinois, the British Band destabilized the region, eliciting panic, ambition, hope, or fear in 
each of its societies—oftentimes simultaneously within the same society.  Discerning 
opportunity, those with much to gain yearned for war.  Others, threatened with the loss of 
everything they had, hoped for peace.  Any other denouement threatened to refigure the 
region for all time. 
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On 8 April 1832, Billy Caldwell anxiously wrote to U.S. Indian Agent Thomas 
Forsyth, his former employer, to solicit advice on behalf of his Potawatomi associates.  
Caldwell, a man of European and Indian descent, acted as an intermediary between the 
Potawatomis and their government-assigned agents, serving as what one anthropologist has 
termed an “intercultural broker.”1  Versed in both cultures, Caldwell moved comfortably 
between his roles as white bureaucrat and Indian diplomat, but he increasingly identified with 
his Native comrades as the Potawatomis came under pressure from white settlers, and the 
well-informed Caldwell understood that the Indians’ days in the Old Northwest were 
numbered.  After morbidly inquiring about western tracts of land like a terminally ill man 
picking out his own headstone, Caldwell observed, “the thunderstorm looks black to us.”2 
  The cloud seemed blacker still when Caldwell learned of Black Hawk’s crossing, 
which the roughly 200,000 white inhabitants of Illinois regarded as an invasion.3   The 
British Band’s movements placed the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks of Illinois in a very 
                                                 
 1 James A. Clifton fully explores the notion of “intercultural broker” in James A. Clifton, "Merchant, 
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Chicago," Chicago History 4 (1977-1978). 
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awkward situation.  Over the preceding decade, each tribe had endured abuse from white 
miners and settlers, and many members of each tribe sympathized with the Sauks and 
Mesquakies.  Others, more familiar with the scope of American power, urged caution.  With 
the assistance of invaluable “intercultural brokers,” the Potawatomis mitigated divisions 
within their tribe to promulgate a remarkable, multi-band neutrality policy.  Geographical 
dispersion and divergent experiences precluded such unity for the Ho Chunks, whose various 
bands developed independent policies as the situation developed.  Like Henry Atkinson, a 
majority of both tribes hoped for a peaceful settlement to the standoff with the British Band; 
like Henry Atkinson, they were destined for disappointment. 
 On 14 May 1832, imprudent militiamen attacked Sauk envoys and shattered the 
prospects of nonviolent resolution.  Discerning opportunity in Black Hawk’s tactical victory 
at the “Battle of Stillman’s Run,” disaffected Ho Chunks and Potawatomis lashed out at their 
American tormentors.  Gratifying to a few, the attacks vindicated white claims of 
Potawatomi and Ho Chunk perfidy.  Hoping to disguise their role, some Ho Chunks resorted 
to duplicity.  Alarmed Potawatomi leaders, realizing that the actions of a few indicted the 
entire tribe, reacted more decisively.  Considering alliance with Black Hawk foolhardy and 
neutrality impossible, the Potawatomis offered their military services to the United States 
Army.  Under normal circumstances, Henry Atkinson likely would not have accepted such 
support.  In late May 1832, Henry Atkinson did not enjoy normal circumstances. 
***** 
 Although the Potawatomis had carved out a peaceful coexistence with the whites 
around French and métis-dominated Chicago, they were less appreciated elsewhere.  Three 
generations following the collapse of New France, the influence of French traders in the Old 
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Northwest had finally reached its nadir, and the good feelings of the Creole population of 
Chicago mattered far less than the loathing of Anglo-Americans in Peoria and Galena. 
Possessing valuable land along the shores of Lake Michigan and having betrayed the garrison 
of Fort Dearborn during the War of 1812, the Potawatomis excited more than their just share 
of jealousy and anxiety among the white populations of Illinois and Indiana, which assumed 
the worst about their neighbors when Indian troubles beckoned in 1827 and 1831.  On both 
occasions, the Potawatomis had been assailed by rumors of conspiracy with the “hostile” 
Indians.   Now, with Black Hawk’s crossing, the Potawatomis soon found themselves again 
disparaged in the press and threatened with violence on their own hunting grounds.  If 
Potawatomi removal appeared likely in April, it had nearly become a forgone conclusion by 
the end of May. 
However awkward the Potawatomi position was following Black Hawk’s crossing, 
the Ho Chunks were at an even greater disadvantage.  Having only five years earlier made 
war against the United States, the Ho Chunks were always the subject of fear and loathing.  
Moreover, they had limited means at their disposal to ameliorate white sentiments.  Unlike 
the Potawatomis, who enjoyed the services of Billy Caldwell and other métis brokers in 
Chicago, the Illinois Ho Chunks had relatively few voices among the Americans.  Reluctant 
to intermarry with whites, the Ho Chunks did could not turn to influential métis relatives for 
advice, and the experience of the previous decade had induced many Ho Chunks in Illinois to 
withdraw from their assigned government agents.4  Yet perhaps the greatest disadvantage 
under which the Ho Chunks labored was their complete lack of unity.  Numbering close to 
six thousand souls in villages ranging from Green Bay to Rock Island, the Ho Chunks vested 
                                                 
 4 The absence of a substantial Ho Chunk-métis population also posed a problem for the U.S. 
Government, which habitually struggled to secure the services of qualified Ho Chunk interpreters.  
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all political authority in local chiefs who developed policies based upon their own experience 
and the perceived interest of their people.   
Not surprisingly, the Ho Chunks of the Rock River—many of whom were 
intermarried with the Sauks—exhibited considerable sympathy for Black Hawk.  Like the 
Sauks and Mesquakies, they had endured dispossession and abuse by the whites.  While the 
denouement of the “Winnebago War” cowed the Ho Chunks, many shared Black Hawk’s 
aspirations to evict the Americans with a pan-Indian confederacy.  Here, the single Ho Chunk 
voice that rose above the din of 1831 and 1832 was that of Wabokieshiek, the “Winnebago 
Prophet,” who encouraged Black Hawk to recross the Mississippi and whose followers 
exhibited considerable hostility toward the United States.   
 Elsewhere, the Ho Chunks wanted nothing to do with Black Hawk.  Beyond the reach 
of American settlers and abuse, the Ho Chunks of Wisconsin did not bear the same vendetta 
nursed by their southern brothers.  To these Indians, the Winnebago War represented a costly 
folly rather than unfinished business.  It had disrupted the fur trade and attenuated important 
relationships with whites.  At the Portage, the Ho Chunks were divided.  Some favored 
joining the Americans while others nursed latent sympathies for the British Band—or feared 
its vengeance.5  In several villages, however, family ties compelled involvement in the Black 
Hawk War.  In the vicinity of Green Bay and Prairie la Crosse (approximately sixty miles 
north of Prairie du Chien on the eastern shore of the Mississippi), Ho Chunks were 
intermarried with Dakotas and Menominees, and the bonds of kinship proved strong enough 
to draw young men into the conflict.  Among the Decorah family of Ho Chunks, the 
animosity was more personal, and Waukon Decorah called on his followers and those of his 
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brothers to join the war against Black Hawk and thereby avenge his daughter.  Among the 
Ho Chunks, ties of blood and village mattered more than a more diffuse conception of the Ho 
Chunk people as a tribe. 
To complicate matters, the Ho Chunks reported to no fewer than three different 
Indian agents who rarely offered complementary advice.  Following the Winnebago War, the 
government established new subagencies at the Portage and on the Rock River to better 
attend to the tribe, but their appearance only reinforced existing divisions among both the Ho 
Chunks and the agents of the Indian Office.6  Ostensibly the sole agent for the Ho Chunks 
prior to 1828, Joseph Street resented this intrusion on his authority and questioned the 
wisdom of establishing agencies in areas where the government hoped to extinguish the title 
to Indian lands.7  Although himself the beneficiary of patronage, Street decried the political 
appointments of Henry Gratiot and John H. Kinzie to the Rock River and Fort Winnebago 
subagencies, respectively.   Son of two of the most influential French trading families on the 
American frontier and brother to the chief engineer of the U.S. Army, Henry Gratiot seemed 
ideally suited to Indian diplomacy.  Gratiot’s principal motive was commercial, and he had 
gained his familiarity with the Ho Chunks of the Rock River by trespassing on their lands to 
establish his own mining camp.  Called to account by the Indians, Gratiot compensated the 
Ho Chunks and appears to have subsequently enjoyed amicable relations with them, but it 
was not without reason that Street complained that the Jackson Administration had created 
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the Rock River Subagency for the good of the Gratiots rather than the furtherance of U.S. 
Indian Policy.8   
 Street was even less fond of John H. Kinzie, whose father had traded among these 
Indians since 1804 and who had himself clerked for the American Fur Company since he was 
fifteen.9  In a lifetime of service to the AFC, Kinzie mastered the Ho Chunk language and 
developed a deserved reputation for fair dealing among the Indians.  Indeed, one biographer 
has claimed “that John Kinzie was a white man gone Indian.”10  For this reason—and for 
Kinzie’s ties to the AFC—Street loathed Shaw-nee-aw-kee, as the Indians called Kinzie.  
Whereas Street advocated civilization and removal, Kinzie obstructed both, hoping to 
preserve the Old Northwest as an Indian hunting ground protected from the encroachment of 
white settlement and even culture.  In this endeavor, Kinzie found a willing ally in 
Scachipkaka, or “Old Decorah,” a cousin of Waukon Decorah and principal chief of the 
Portage Ho Chunks.  When presented a proposal for the education of his people in 1830, 
Scachipkaka responded that “if the Great Spirit had wished us to be like the whites, he would 
have made us so.  As he has not seen fit to do so, we believe he would be displeased with us, 
to try and make ourselves different from what he thought good.”11  To Street’s chagrin, 
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Kinzie refused to push the issue, and an animosity developed between the two men.  Hence, 
while the Potawatomis at least enjoyed the leadership of a man determined to stake out a 
coherent course, different engines within and without Ho Chunk society were pulling it in 
different directions and, ultimately, apart. 
Although the majority of both the Ho Chunks and Potawatomis favored neutrality, 
such a policy proved impossible to maintain in the face of Black Hawk’s “invasion.”  With a 
few enlightened exceptions, most Americans failed either to understand or accept the divided 
political authority of the “tribe.”  Divergent courses by bands of the same tribe suggested 
duplicity, and any activity hostile the United States furnished a pretext for punishing the tribe 
as a whole.12   Hence, allegations of complicity with the British Band posed a grave threat to 
all bands of Ho Chunks and Potawatomis.  Such charges—some substantiated but most 
baseless—surfaced the moment Black Hawk set foot in Illinois, and they gained in volume 
and intensity in the weeks that followed.  Eventually, the cacophony of calls for the removal 
or extermination of the Ho Chunks and Potawatomis swelled into a torrent that outlasted the 
war and carried both tribes west of the Mississippi.  
The initial reports of Black Hawk’s movements indicted nearly every tribe that lived 
in the region.  On 9 April, John Bliss, commander of Fort Armstrong, reported Black Hawk’s 
crossing to Brigadier General Henry Atkinson and subsequently indicated that the British 
Band comprised six hundred warriors augmented by some one hundred Potawatomis and 
Kickapoos and an unspecified number of Ho Chunk and Menominee allies.  Significantly, 
these “allies”—if present at all—were adopted members of the British Band, independent of 
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their respective tribes (otherwise they would have had no need to cross the Mississippi with 
Black Hawk—they would have already lived in Illinois).  This distinction was lost on Bliss, 
however, and Atkinson had no reason to question the report, corroborated by influential fur 
trader George Davenport.  Consequently, Atkinson listed “a few Pottawattamies” among the 
belligerents in his report to Commanding General of the Army Alexander Macomb and 
Governor Reynolds.13  As for Wabokieshiek’s Ho Chunks, Atkinson reported that they “have 
assumed a hostile attitude, at least One of defiance.”14 
Such reports alarmed Indian agent Henry Gratiot, who operated from his mining 
camp (Gratiot’s Grove) in southern Wisconsin.  Of Wabokieshiek’s warm feelings for Black 
Hawk there was little doubt, but Gratiot rightly feared for the security of the neutral Ho 
Chunk villages along the Illinois-Wisconsin border.   In mid-April, he visited such a 
community on Turtle Creek, where he was reassured by its leaders.  Three times Black Hawk 
had sent them red wampum, an invitation to join them in war, and three times they had sent it 
back.  The Ho Chunks avowed their desire to remain at peace, but they were alarmed that 
their brothers from the Rock River had not distanced themselves from the British Band.  
They asked Gratiot to accompany twenty-six of them to Wabokieskiek’s village to win its 
residents over to a policy of neutrality.15 
It was very nearly the last trip Henry Gratiot ever made.  Upon arriving at 
Wabokieshiek’s village, the Turtle Creek Ho Chunks found that Black Hawk and his 
followers had taken up residence there, and none evinced much good will toward the agent.  
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Rightly fearing for his life, the Turtle Creek Ho Chunks raised a white flag over Gratiot’s 
tent and stood guard.  The Sauks replaced it with the Union Jack—as much a symbol of their 
antipathy for the United States as for their affinity for the British—and danced a war dance 
around the tent.  The tension abated, however, and a perplexed Gratiot was permitted to 
continue on to Rock Island.  Black Hawk later claimed that the Turtle Creek Ho Chunks had 
deceived Gratiot into making this trip, and that they promised Black Hawk that he enjoyed 
considerable support among the upper Rock River Indians.16  Although grateful for this 
intelligence, Black Hawk considered Gratiot “a good man” and placed a guard on his tent to 
prevent anyone from harming him.17   Gratiot remained ignorant of any intercession by Black 
Hawk on his behalf.  When he arrived at Rock Island, his Ho Chunk escorts claimed to have 
ransomed the lives of Gratiot and another white companion with great difficulty and at great 
cost. 18  Whether duped or not, Gratiot remained convinced of the fidelity of the Ho Chunks 
of his agency, and he became an outspoken advocate of their interests throughout the war. 
The Potawatomis had an advocate of their own, Billy Caldwell, the son of a British 
officer and his Mohawk consort.  Unlike most children of such unions, Billy received an 
excellent education and English upbringing.19  Groomed for service in the colonial 
administration of British Canada, the young Billy Caldwell considered himself “a true 
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Briton.”20  The subject of much Chicago folklore, he fought for Great Britain during the War 
of 1812 and, after a failed career in the British Indian Department in Canada, found a niche 
as a middleman between the Chicago Indian Agency and the Potawatomis. 21  Married to the 
daughter of the important Potawatomi chief Nee-scot-nee-meg, the charismatic and learned 
Caldwell gained influence among the Potawatomis, who adopted him as their representative, 
counselor, and (by some accounts) leader.22  His value to the Potawatomis is captured in his 
adopted Indian name, Sau-ga-nash, which meant, very simply, “Briton.”23  Conversant in two 
worlds, Caldwell provided the Potawatomis a cultural bridge that they desperately needed. 
 Like Henry Gratiot, Caldwell recognized the threat Black Hawk posed to the fragile 
neutrality of the Indians of Illinois.  Upon learning of Black Hawk’s crossing, he assembled a 
team of riders from the village of Shaubena, a chief who, although Ottawa by birth, had 
married and risen to prominence among the Potawatomis.  Caldwell and Shaubena rode 
among the Potawatomi villages in Illinois and urged them to abstain from joining Black 
Hawk.  Likely unaware that unkind words about their adopted tribesmen were circulating in 
official correspondence, Caldwell and Shaubena probably made this journey because they 
recognized the existence of disaffected bands and individuals among the Potawatomis, and 
they endeavored to ensure that sympathies toward Black Hawk remained latent.  Although 
“perfectly satisfied” that the Potawatomis wished to remain at peace with the whites, 
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Caldwell could only cover so much ground.  After canvassing the countryside, Caldwell and 
Shaubena traveled to Chicago, where they determined to convene a formal council of the 
Potawatomis on 1 May to adopt a peace policy. 24 
In the meantime, the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks found their fidelity assailed from 
all quarters.  Atkinson, who was in the process of deploying from Jefferson Barracks, 
Missouri, to deal with the crisis, feared that he would soon face “at least a thousand desperate 
Indians, and should the Winnebagoes and Pottawattamies join, a much larger number.”  On 
18 April, the novice agent for the Sauks and Mesquakies, Felix St. Vrain, reported that some 
Potawatomis in the British Band rudely rebuffed peace overtures from Keokuk’s band, 
knocking the hat off Keokuk’s interpreter, and confirming Potawatomi representation in 
Black Hawk’s ranks.  While the reports of these officials reflected the incomplete 
intelligence with which they operated, the popular press indicted the Potawatomis with more 
conviction.  On 26 April, The Sangamo Journal printed a letter in which several prominent 
citizens appealed to Governor Reynolds for aid in the face of an imminent onslaught by “the 
hostile Sacs, and the Pottawattomies . . . who, it is pretty certain, will join them.”  The 
authors closed with a melodramatic flourish: “WAR IS CERTAIN—and the inhabitants here 
entirely at the mercy of the savages.”  These same writers informed Governor Reynolds 
directly that “we regard it as entirely certain that the pottawattimes will join the Sacs.”  
Reynolds seems to have accepted this assertion as gospel, echoing it throughout the war and 
making it an article of faith for the residents of Illinois.25 
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 No one knew exactly what Black Hawk intended to do.  His own followers 
entertained divergent thoughts about their captain’s designs, ranging from the reoccupation 
of their old village at Saukenauk to waging a pan-Indian war against the United States with 
British backing.  In all likelihood, Black Hawk was looking for an opportunity to restore 
some modicum of Sauk sovereignty, first by simply reentering Illinois and later by planting 
corn or making war as the circumstances allowed.  Although Atkinson had bragged at Rock 
Island that the British Band could be as easily crushed as a “piece of dirt,” he regarded Black 
Hawk’s military capability with some anxiety.26  As of 27 April, Atkinson reasonably 
estimated that the Indians could field 486 warriors against his own 320 regulars, and he 
feared that area tribes would join Black Hawk, swelling his ranks to over one thousand 
warriors.27  Leary of his prospects, Atkinson made an ill-advised appeal for help.   
 On the same day he met with the Sauk and Mesquakie chiefs at Rock Island, 
Atkinson informed Governor John Reynolds that “I think the frontier is in great danger.”  
Unauthorized to mobilize the Illinois militia on his own, Atkinson left it to the governor “to 
judge of the proper course to be pursued.”28  Atkinson dropped another thinly veiled 
suggestion to the governor several days later, but Reynolds had already jumped at the 
opportunity presented to him.  Reynolds was up for reelection, and nothing promised 
political capital like leading the citizen soldiers of Illinois in a campaign to rid their state of 
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the Indian scourge.29  On 16 April, Reynolds informed Atkinson that he had called up the 
state militia.30  Hoping to avert an Indian war, Atkinson instead made it inevitable. 
 Unwittingly setting the stage for a contest of arms between the citizenry of Illinois 
and the British Band, Atkinson returned his attention to the task of preventing a war between 
Indians.  He fired off a series of messages to the military officers and Indian agents at posts 
throughout the region, authorizing the use of force to prevent the Dakotas, Menominees, Ho 
Chunks, and Potawatomis from entering the fight for or against the Sauks and Mesquakies.31   
On 8 May, Atkinson ordered Brigadier General Hugh Brady, recently arrived from Detroit, to 
station himself at Fort Winnebago “to admonish the Winnebagoes against joining the hostile 
Indians at their peril, and advise the Menominies to be quiet till measures are taken to bring 
the Sacs and Foxes to an account for their outrage against their tribe.”  Atkinson specifically 
addressed the Potawatomis on 18 May when he requested their Chicago agent, Thomas J. V. 
Owen to “advise the Indians of your Agency to remain quiet, and take no part in the present 
difficulties.”32 
 Meanwhile, Ho Chunk and Potawatomi leaders were taking measures to retain control 
of their respective fates.  On 28 April, the Ho Chunk chiefs White Crow and Whirling 
Thunder visited Atkinson at Rock Island.  Representing Ho Chunk villages from the upper 
reaches of the Rock River, White Crow and Whirling Thunder sympathized with Black 
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Hawk but hoped to insulate their people from the brewing conflict.  White Crow claimed that 
the purpose of his visit was to recall the members of his band then residing in 
Wabokieshiek’s village.  Asserting that Black Hawk had sent him war wampum, White Crow 
assured Atkinson, “We want nothing to do with these bad birds.”33  Aware that extensive 
intermarriage between the Rock River Ho Chunks and the Sauks complicated his efforts to 
disassociate the two groups, White Crow publicly disavowed any Ho Chunks who remained 
with the British Band.  In truth, the bonds of kinship were not so easily severed, and 
subsequent events revealed that White Crow was unprepared to abandon his own flesh and 
blood. 
Among the Potawatomis, the situation was no less complex.  On 1 May, Billy 
Caldwell and other Potawatomi leaders from southern Wisconsin and northern Illinois 
gathered outside of Chicago to promulgate a multi-band response to the British Band’s 
activities.  The tone of the council was acrimonious at times, owing largely to young warriors 
who wished to join Black Hawk so that they could make a name for themselves in battle.  
When calmer minds prevailed, the assembled bands passed a resolution declaring any 
Potawatomi who supported Black Hawk a traitor to his tribe.34  Following this council, white 
attitudes toward the Potawatomis cleaved fairly neatly along federal-state lines, army officers 
and Indian agents trusting the tribe, state politicians, settlers, and militiamen convinced of 
their nefarious scheming.  While Atkinson and Superintendent of Indian Affairs William 
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Clark informed their superiors of the Potawatomis’ refusal to aid Black Hawk, Reynolds’s 
subordinates continued to indict the tribe.35 
By this time, well-informed members of the Potawatomi, Ojibwa, and Ottawa tribes, 
known collectively as the Three Fires or United Tribes, recognized the gravity of their 
position.  On 12 May, they sent a deputation to agent Thomas J. V. Owen, and expressed the 
rational concern that the Illinois militia would mistake them for hostile Indians.  Owen held a 
council with the alarmed chiefs, in which they pledged their fidelity to the U.S. and 
expressed apprehension that the British Band might intentionally mingle with their 
population, exposing them to indiscriminant violence at the hands of the militia.  In response, 
Owen dispatched subagent Gholson Kercheval, Billy Caldwell, and Alexander Robinson 
(another métis “broker”) to urge the vulnerable Indians to move toward Chicago and “out of 
the reach of the exasperated militia.”  Owen also recommended to Governor Reynolds the 
propriety of guarding against acts of indiscriminant violence by the militia, admonishing him 
that it would be “productive of the worst of consequences should any of them unfortunately 
fall a sacrifice to the Militia under your command.”36 
Black Hawk made his last bid for Potawatomi support on 13 and 14 May 1832.  
Moving up the Rock River after his crossing, Black Hawk found that his Ho Chunk “allies,” 
who by this time were alarmed by the extent of American agitation, lacked enthusiasm for 
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collective action.  Accompanied by Wabokieshiek, he continued northeast into Potawatomi 
country in search of safe harbor from the pursuing militia under Reynolds and regulars under 
Atkinson.  Black Hawk met a deputation from the Potawatomis on 13 May, but was 
disappointed to find his questions met with “unsatisfactory answers.”  Finally realizing “that 
the Winnebagoes and Pottowatomies were not disposed to render us any assistance,” Black 
Hawk resolved to accept whatever terms Atkinson would offer.  The following day, Black 
Hawk graciously prepared a feast for the Potawatomis who had denied him succor, but the 
feast was interrupted by advancing cavalrymen who did not fancy dog on a spit.  It was not 
Atkinson who first encountered the British Band, but Isaiah Stillman’s militia battalion.  
Unlike Atkinson or Gaines before him, the Illinois militia offered no terms for Black Hawk 
to accept.37 
Upon learning of the militia’s approach, Black Hawk dispatched a delegation under a 
white flag of peace.  A nervous militiaman answered on Stillman’s behalf—with ball and 
powder.  The ensuing fight seemed to confirm one U.S. Army officer’s characterization of 
the militia as “that prosopopœia of weakness, waste, and confusion.”38  Fleeing the battlefield 
in a panicked rout, Stillman’s battalion suffered at least eleven men killed while Black Hawk 
lost only three.39  Much to the chagrin of Isaiah Stillman, the fight garnered the moniker, 
“Stillman’s Run.”  Although the battle was a tactical victory for Black Hawk, it was a 
strategic disaster for the British Band.  With few friends or provisions and hundreds of miles 
from sanctuary, the British Band was now on the warpath but at the end of its rope. 
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Stillman’s Run placed the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks in an extremely awkward 
position.  After the fight, most United Tribes villages evacuated to Chicago, abandoning their 
corn crop for the safety of Fort Dearborn.  Concurrently, Governor Reynolds issued a 
proclamation of profound consequences.  Contrary to available evidence, Reynolds was “of 
the opinion that the Pottawotamies and winnebagoes have Joined the hostile Sacs and all may 
be considered as waging war against the United States.”  The Potawatomi leadership and its 
Indian agent were taken aback by this invalid allegation by the state’s chief executive.  The 
fallout was immediate and widespread, extending to neighboring Indiana, where the Indian 
agent for the Potawatomis feared for the lives of his charges and had them call in their 
hunting parties.  On 17 May, Caldwell and Robinson arrived at Atkinson’s headquarters and 
assured him of the peaceful intentions of their tribe, also pledging to encourage the Ho 
Chunks to pursue a similar policy.  Meanwhile, Owen received a dispatch from his charges, 
recounting their unsuccessful attempts to dissuade the British Band from continuing their 
belligerence following the Battle of Stillman’s Run.  Owen was “much pleased to see that the 
Indians of this Agency have fully evinced their determination to render no aid to the Sacs 
whatever in this matter” and that they were relocating to Chicago for their safety.40 
Not all Illinois Indians responded to Stillman’s Run with trepidation.  To the contrary, 
Black Hawk’s victory animated latent animosities borne by several Ho Chunk and 
Potawatomi communities that had endured insult and injury from the Americans.  After the 
fight with Stillman’s men, Black Hawk determined to seek sanctuary in the dense swamps at 
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the head of the Rock River.  As they passed the head of Kishwaukee Creek, the British Band 
encountered a band of Ho Chunks who were heartened by Black Hawk’s recent success.  
They offered to join him and guide his party to a safe haven.  First, however, Black Hawk 
sent out a number of war parties to cover the movement of his main body. 41 
Subsequently, Black Hawk enjoyed aid from the various Ho Chunk bands of the 
upper Rock River, which furnished guides, corn, and warriors.42  On 19 May, Ho Chunks 
killed a courier named William Durley and delivered his scalp to Black Hawk.  Five days 
later, a party of white messengers found Durley’s mutilated body, unaware that four of them 
would shortly meet the same fate.  Led by Sauk and Mesquakie agent Felix St. Vrain, the 
seven Americans encountered approximately nine mounted Ho Chunks near Kellogg’s 
Grove.   The parties neared to within a hundred yards, then the Ho Chunks gave chase, 
picking off four Americans—including St. Vrain—while the remaining three made good 
their escape.  Ultimately, as many as thirty Ho Chunks may have joined in the attack, which 
newspapers initially attributed to the Sauks.43  
Although no doubt significant to their victims, Ho Chunk contributions to Black 
Hawk’s war paled in comparison to those of the Potawatomis.  On Indian Creek lay a small 
Potawatomi village comprising about twenty lodges and seventy or eighty inhabitants who 
relied upon the fish of Indian Creek for sustenance.   In the spring of 1832, a white settler 
named William Davis built a dam across Indian Creek about six miles below the Indian 
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village.  In addition to providing power for his mill, the dam prevented spawning fish from 
reaching the village.  The principal chief of the village, Meau-eus, protested to Davis but was 
rudely rebuffed.  In early May, Davis caught a Potawatomi named Keewassee attempting to 
dismantle the dam and severely flogged him.  In the face of this indignity, Meau-eus’s village 
stood ready to retaliate, but Shaubena and fellow Potawatomi chief Wabaunsee counseled 
moderation.  Although Meau-eus heeded this advice, he and his people seethed quietly, 
awaiting their opportunity for revenge. 44 
Stillman’s Run provided just such an opportunity; it made Black Hawk look strong 
and the Illinois militia appear weak.  Eager to find justice, opportunity beckoned to Meau-eus 
and his people.  To Shaubena, who gauged their sentiments, it must have seemed as if 
Reynolds’s unwarranted proclamation had become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Realizing that 
he could not divert his aggrieved tribesmen from their intended course, he resolved to 
remove potential victims from its path.  After learning of the Battle of Stillman’s Run, 
Shaubena sent his son and nephew to the Fox River and Holderman’s Grove settlements to 
warn white settlers to evacuate the area.  Shaubena himself went first to the settlement on 
Bureau Creek, then to Indian Creek, where Davis lived.  While everyone on the Bureau 
heeded his warning, those at Indian Creek were not so wise. 45  According to one of the 
settlers, “Indian rumors were so common, and some of our neighbors did not sufficiently 
credit this old Indian.”46  
                                                 
 44 Matson, Memories of Shaubena, 147-48.; and Ellen M. Whitney, ed., The Black Hawk War, 1831-
1832, vol. 36-37, Collections of the Illinois States Historical Library (Springfield: Illinois State Historical 
Library, 1973-75), 1291n5. 
 
 45 Matson, Memories of Shaubena, 121-23. 
 
 46 Correspondence, Articles, Miscellany on Wisconsin Indians, US Mss 7E Folder 1, Wisconsin 
Historical Society, Madison, 1. 
 
 156
Initially, members of the Hall family followed Shaubena’s advice, packing their 
valuables and heading for the safety of Ottawa, Illinois.  During their journey, however, they 
encountered Davis, who convinced them that a mounted company from that town had ridden 
out to find the enemy and would provide ample warning if there was any danger.  The Halls 
stopped at Davis’s house, where they joined the Davis and Pettigrew families, a Mr. Howard 
and son, John H. Henderson, and two of Davis’s hired hands, Robert Morris and Henry 
George.  Complacently assuming their safety in numbers, most of the men were working in 
the fields when the Potawatomis struck. 47  On 20 May, as many as eighty of Meau-eus’s 
disaffected warriors fell upon the Davis homestead, leaving fifteen men, women, and 
children dead and mutilated. 48  The war party also took prisoner the teenage Hall girls, 
Sylvia and Rachel, and Davis’s seven-year old son, killing the latter shortly thereafter.”49 
Potawatomi participation in the “Indian Creek Massacre” was not immediately 
evident to the whites.  Shaubena, Caldwell, and others who had labored so hard to distance 
the tribe from Black Hawk, however, must have considered it an embarrassing failure in their 
multi-band policy.  The Potawatomi leadership now found itself at a critical crossroads.  
After the Indian victory at Stillman’s Run, young Potawatomi warriors, eager to prove their 
mettle in battle, agitated for participation in the conflict on Black Hawk’s behalf.  Nearly 
twenty years had passed since Potawatomi men were able to win reputations for themselves 
as warriors, stagnating social advancement for males not born into the hereditary offices of 
civil chiefs or shamans.  Young men, therefore, clamored for the opportunity to prove 
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themselves in battle—and elders often complained of their inability to restrain their young 
men.50  
Not surprisingly, talk of joining Black Hawk alarmed Caldwell and the architects of 
the Potawatomi peace policy, who convened another council at Chicago to resurrect their 
tattered resolutions.  Thomas J. V. Owen attended this conference, at which some chiefs 
vociferously protested past abuses at the hands of the whites and implied that an opportunity 
to seek justice now presented itself.  To this, Caldwell, Robinson, and Owen responded with 
impassioned oratories.  Their words now lost, these speeches succeeded in carrying the issue 
among the other chiefs, who afterward offered their hands to Owen and pledged their 
friendship.51 
With the public yet unaware of Potawatomi involvement in the “Indian Creek 
Massacre” and most local villagers voluntarily quarantined at Chicago, the Potawatomis 
could have tried to ride out the storm and hope for the best.  Caldwell was too shrewd, 
however, to assume that the whites would take Potawatomi loyalty for granted, even in the 
absence of further depredations.  After all, just a week earlier the Illinois governor 
proclaimed the Potawatomis to be enemies of the state, and even the shoddiest inquiry would 
eventually implicate Meau-eus’s village in the Indian Creek attack.  Indications, both real 
and imagined, of Potawatomi involvement began to surface on 21 May, when an army officer 
incorrectly reported that Big Foot’s band of southern Wisconsin Potawatomi had joined 
Black Hawk.52  Shortly thereafter, Governor Reynolds received a second-hand report that the 
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Potawatomis had held a war dance in preparation for joining Black Hawk.  On 26 May, 
Colonel Zachary Taylor discovered what he assumed to be scalps from the settlers on Indian 
Creek in what appeared to be Potawatomi villages.  The next day, Illinois militia officer 
Samuel Whiteside wrote Atkinson to assert the likelihood of Potawatomi cooperation with 
Black Hawk, citing the construction of a new wigwam village as evidence that the 
Potawatomis intended to shelter the British Band.  Among the citizens (and governor) of 
Illinois, paranoia prevailed, compelling one James Strode to write directly to the secretary of 
war and claim, “This Section of the State is invaded by powerful detachments of Indian 
Warriors of the Sac, Fox, Winebago & Potawatamie & part of the Kickapoo Nations.”  
Although the veracity of these reports was by no means assured, they had a cumulative 
effect, and by the end of the month William Clark reported the probability of Potawatomi 
involvement to the secretary of war.  It became increasingly imperative that the Potawatomis 
make a convincing demonstration of their loyalty to the United States or suffer the 
consequences. 53 
Critical to Potawatomi knowledge of calumny against them were their “intercultural 
brokers,” principally Billy Caldwell, without whom legitimate village leaders would have 
been unable to gauge popular sentiment.  While his understanding of Native society made 
him useful to the government, his standing in white society now made Caldwell an asset to 
the Potawatomis.  Through Caldwell and their agent, Thomas J. V. Owen, the Potawatomis 
attempted to clear their name.  Owen wrote to the superintendent of Indian affairs at Detroit 
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on 24 May to report: “I have had several Councils with my Chiefs and Headmen, and feel 
fully assured of their friendship and sincerity.”  But Potawatomi chiefs acted under their own 
auspices, too.  To dispose of the source of their agitation speedily, the band chief Big Foot 
sent a string of peace wampum to the British Band, requesting that they leave Potawatomi 
territory (to which the band replied that they would do so upon drying their meat and in the 
absence of white interference).  While most Illinois citizens evinced more than a little ill-will 
toward the Potawatomis even during happier days, the citizens of Chicago enjoyed good 
relations with the Potawatomis and offered the tribe a collective vote of confidence in a 
petition dated 29 May.  Petitions and the good word of agent Owen would prove insufficient 
to clear the Potawatomi name, however; the time had come to make a more profound avowal 
of the tribe’s disposition.  To cement their alliances with whites in the past, the Potawatomis 
had offered two marketable commodities to their European associates: furs and warriors—
and this was no time to set a trap line.54 
 Still, the offer of military service to the United States faced obstacles.  Before and 
after the Black Hawk War, the United States generally adhered to a policy maintaining the 
neutrality of Native American groups.  Although the colonial era provided ample precedent 
for Anglo-Indian military cooperation, it was usually the product of military weakness on the 
part of the colonists, who regarded their “allies” with some uneasiness.  In the years before 
King Philip’s War (1675-76), New England Puritans considered themselves sufficiently 
secure to dispense with reliance on Indians, excluding them from the colonial militia.  The 
unprecedented scale of this conflict, however, in which Indians destroyed a quarter of all 
New England villages and killed five percent of the colonial population, finally compelled 
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the employment of Indian troops.  Even then, public outcry compelled the discharge of 
Christian “Praying Indians” who had enlisted in the Puritan cause in July 1675.  Only the 
repeated defeat of white militia units rendered Indian aid acceptable, and Mohegans, Pequots, 
and Niantics soon swelled the Puritan ranks.  Afterward, the English colonists regarded their 
Indian allies with considerable distrust, imprisoning many of them on an exposed island 
where many died of exposure and privation.  By the end of the war, roughly forty percent of 
New England’s Indians were dead.55 
 Reluctance to enter and maintain interracial military alliances reflected more than 
simple racism on the part of the supplicants, although it certainly operated in European 
dealings with the Indians.  More rationally, this reluctance represented the recognition of a 
dilemma inherent in alliances with potential enemies.  While military weakness demanded a 
search for allies, the very search advertised this weakness, oftentimes to those most likely to 
exploit it.  Thus, solicitation of military aid suggested an inverse corollary to the cliché: if 
they want to join you, beat them.  Once established, interracial military alliances often 
remained fragile and tempered by mutual suspicion.  Even in victory, Indian and European 
allies regarded the conduct and methods of their allies with ambiguity.  During King Philip’s 
War, Indian auxiliaries present at the Great Swamp Fight were abhorred by the devastation 
and inhumanity wrought upon an Indian village.56  Here, precious few degrees of separation 
seemed to distinguish victims from allies.  To the colonists, conversely, Indian methods of 
warfare seemed to only confirm their savagery and ungodliness.   
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This view tempered the Americans’ enthusiasm for fielding Indian warriors during 
the Revolutionary War.  Although the Continental Congress authorized George Washington 
to recruit two thousand Indian auxiliaries in 1776, recruitment of Indians was as much a 
means of depriving the British of allies as it was an integrated part of American military 
policy.57  The dilemma of alliance figured prominently, and the Americans made it clear that 
alliance offered an opportunity for Indians to show where they stood, but that the Patriots did 
not need Indian aid to win.  Even before the conclusion of the American Revolution, George 
Washington began to turn away Indians willing to assist the Patriot cause.58  Similarly, 
George Rogers Clark refused the offer of Chief Young Tobacco to furnish about one hundred 
Kickapoos and Piankashaws because he wanted to demonstrate that the Americans did not 
require Indian assistance.59   
Following the Revolution, the United States slashed its defense establishment, and 
commanders charged with conquering the Ohio country in the early 1790s could not afford to 
be so particular.  Offering them an opportunity to strike their traditional enemies, the 
Americans induced Chickasaws and (later) Choctaws to accompany the commands of Arthur 
St. Clair and Anthony Wayne.60  Military weakness persisted into the War of 1812, during 
which American commanders—including Andrew Jackson—fielded Cherokee and allied 
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Creek warriors against enemy “Red Stick” Creeks.   With assistance from Native allies, 
Jackson broke Indian power in the South.  To ensure it would not recover, he punished his 
allies as harshly as his enemies at the Treaty of Fort Jackson.61   
Not surprisingly, few opportunities for interracial alliance arose in the years following 
the Treaty of Ghent.  As the states became more secure through the eighteenth century, a 
reluctance to employ Indians returned.  When military necessity—usually a lack of 
familiarity with terrain or a simple lack of strength—mandated, the Americans continued to 
solicit Indian allies, as in the First Seminole War in 1818 and the Arikara campaign of 1823, 
in which the Sioux participated.  In each of these instances, however, appeals to Indians for 
assistance represented the initiative of individual commanders vice a sanctioned military 
practice.62  The latter campaign, moreover, vindicated the worst fears of those wary of 
allying with the Indians.  Disgusted by Colonel Henry Leavenworth’s leniency against their 
common foes, the Sioux developed, according to historian Richard White, “a low estimation 
of the ability of white soldiers that would last for years.”63 
 Certainly this estimation lasted up to and beyond 1832, when political considerations 
further militated against the formation of American-Indian alliances.  For over a decade and a 
half, the government had labored to pacify and “civilize” the Native populations of the Old 
Northwest, and arming Indian groups to fight against one another seemed contrary to the 
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very foundation of federal Indian policy.  As the frontier white population grew, so too did 
popular aversion to permitting—let alone condoning—intertribal warfare, which threatened 
to disrupt commerce and engulf white settlements.  Despite the commander of the Western 
Department of the United States Army’s enthusiasm for training and fielding Indian soldiers, 
the associated political consequences were potentially severe. 
 The Battle of Stillman’s Run, however, had changed everything in two important 
ways.  First, Henry Atkinson was no longer a third party arbitrator trying to prevent a general 
Indian war; he was now a field commander trying to win an Indian war.  Second, the rout of 
Stillman’s battalion and subsequent attacks on civilian settlements had an unnerving effect on 
Reynolds’s militiamen, many of whom deserted or demanded discharge.64  Reynolds 
relented, retaining enough men only to form six companies of volunteers.  Atkinson deemed 
this force, combined with his three hundred regulars, insufficient for the task at hand, 
especially now that Black Hawk had demonstrated a determination to fight. 65  Although 
Atkinson called for reinforcements from Fort Leavenworth, the regulars lacked horses and 
stood little chance of overtaking the British Band. 66  Moreover, the performance of the 
militia to date was far from awe inspiring.  Capturing the common assessment of the regular 
officers, Colonel Zachary Taylor complained, “The more I see of the militia the less 
confidence I have in their effecting any thing of importance; & therefore tremble not only for 
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the safety of the frontiers, but for the reputation of those who command them.”67  His own 
reputation and the outcome of the war in the balance, Atkinson looked elsewhere for a 
solution.   
 By the end of May, Henry Atkinson had much in common with the Potawatomis and 
Ho Chunks of Illinois.  Victims of circumstance all, they were powerless to avert a war from 
which they stood little to gain and much to lose.  Cool minds among them sought a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis, but passionate elements within each society lobbied for war.  The 
Illinois militia’s defeat on 14 May placed both tribes and the American commander in very 
awkward situations.  Learning of Black Hawk’s victory, militant Ho Chunks and 
Potawatomis attacked isolated Americans along the frontier, confirming the suspicions of 
Illinois’ paranoid citizenry.  Assisted by capable métis counselors like Billy Caldwell, the 
Potawatomis realized that their neutrality policy had failed and grasped the likely 
consequences.  With Caldwell’s guidance, the Potawatomis moved decisively to control their 
own fate, offering military service to the United States.  Serendipitously for the Potawatomis, 
Henry Atkinson needed their help, as well as that of other Indians.  Demanding their 
discharge following the debacle at Stillman’s Run, the Illinois militiamen sapped Atkinson of 
combat power at a critical juncture.  Traditionally, the Americans turned to Indian allies only 
in moments of dire need.  Twelve days after the Battle of Stillman’s Run, Atkinson judged 
himself in such a situation. 
                                                 







CHAPTER 6.  WARPATH. 
 
  
 On 26 May 1832, Brigadier General Henry Atkinson requested the Menominees and 
Dakotas from the area of Prairie du Chien to fight “in conjunction with the troops against the 
Sac and Fox Indians.”1  The following day, Atkinson ordered more rations for his army in 
anticipation of swelling his ranks with three hundred to five hundred Indians, all “Very 
necessary in such a Warfare as I am engaged in.”2  Apparently, Atkinson arrived at the 
decision to employ Indian auxiliaries independently; he informed Commanding General 
Alexander Macomb of the decision after the fact, venturing, “I thought the state of things 
justified the measure and would receive your approbation.”3  Whatever Macomb thought of 
Atkinson’s decision, the Menominees were ecstatic.  Atkinson’s request reached them on 30 
May and, according to Joseph Street, the Menominees were “greatly rejoiced that they would 
be permitted to go to war.”4   
 The Menominees’ jubilance gave way to frustration in the following weeks.  
Compelled to accept the services of Indian allies by the aftermath of Stillman’s Run, Henry 
Atkinson did not plan carefully for their employment, and he condemned those most 
interested in the war to serve under the pretentious and unqualified son of Alexander 
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Hamilton.  Meanwhile, hundreds more warriors languished in Green Bay, awaiting a call to 
arms that came only once the war was almost over.  Ironically, the Indians afforded the most 
immediate and meaningful role in the conflict were those least concerned by its outcome.  
The Ho Chunks and Potawatomis had no desire to abet the Americans in the British Band’s 
demise, but they needed to make a convincing—albeit insincere—display of fidelity to their 
Great Father to avert their own destruction.  Hence, they guided and perhaps misguided 
Atkinson on Black Hawk’s trail, pledging allegiance without finding or engaging the 
“enemy” main force until 21 July.   If the first two month of U.S.-Indian collaboration left 
Atkinson wanting, they also indicated that his Indian allies cooperated for their own reasons 
and in their own ways. 
***** 
Upon receiving Atkinson’s request for Indian assistance, Joseph Street again called 
upon his former subagent, John Marsh, to travel up the Mississippi and extend the general’s 
invitation to the Dakotas.  Familiar with Marsh’s facility with the Sioux language and people, 
Atkinson specifically requested that Marsh accompany the Dakota warriors.  Relieved from 
his office because he had endeavored to foment the sort of war that Atkinson now endorsed, 
Marsh was the right man to effect an alliance with his Dakota in-laws. Unbeknownst to 
Atkinson or Street, Marsh—now a private trader—had already illicitly furnished his kinsman 
with arms and ammunition.5  On 30 May, Marsh left Prairie du Chien in the company of his 
replacement, Thomas P. Burnett, who knew nothing about Indians but was more accountable 
to his master.6     
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Better able to gauge Indian sentiments than most Americans in the region, Marsh 
exceeded the letter of his instructions and stopped by the Ho Chunk village at Prairie la 
Crosse while ascending the Mississippi.  Recognizing the latent animosity the Ho Chunks 
harbored toward the Americans, Marsh attempted to secure their allegiance to the American 
cause lest they instead join Black Hawk.7  The Ho Chunk chief Winneshiek was not 
interested.  The brother-in-law of Wabokieshiek (the “Winnebago Prophet”), Winneshiek had 
migrated to Prairie la Crosse from northern Illinois in the wake of the Winnebago War, and 
he judged his people best served by a strict policy of neutrality.8  Already he had twice 
rejected entreaties from Black Hawk, and he gave Marsh the same response.9  Others in the 
village were more sympathetic.  Owing largely to location, intermarriage between the Prairie 
la Crosse Ho Chunks and neighboring Dakotas and Menominees was common, providing a 
kinship-based antipathy for the Sauks and Mesquakies.10   Perhaps more importantly, Prairie 
la Crosse was home to One-Eyed Decorah, civil chief and brother to Waukon Decorah.11  If 
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the interests of the village dictated neutrality, the bonds of family militated against it; One-
Eyed Decorah and his followers pledged to join Marsh upon his return from the Dakota 
villages upstream.12  Winneshiek’s own family replicated the division of his tribe and village 
in microcosm.  One of his sons was at that very time a member of the British Band, while his 
other son rode with One-Eyed Decorah against that very same party.13 
On 1 June, Marsh and Burnett arrived at Prairie aux Ailes (present-day Winona, 
Minnesota), where Marsh presented his Dakota friends with red wampum in accordance with 
their own protocol for forming military alliances.14  Dakota headmen Wabasha and L’Arc 
enthusiastically agreed to join the expedition, claiming that they were already planning to go 
to war with or without American invitation.15  While independent action would have entailed 
chastisement by the U.S. government, Atkinson promised pay and provisions for Dakota 
warriors operating under American aegis.16  The 1823 Arikara War fiasco not withstanding, 
this invitation proved too good to refuse.  After two days of preparation, Wabasha, L’Arc, 
and eighty Dakota warriors descended the Mississippi to make war on their enemies.17 
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 During Marsh and Burnett’s recruiting drive, Waukon Decorah visited the Americans 
in Prairie du Chien and requested permission to assemble the Ho Chunks of Lake 
Winnebago, Green Bay, the Fox River, the Four Lakes, and Green Lakes to join the war 
against the British Band.  The Sauks and Foxes, he reminded Street, had killed his daughter 
at Red Cedar and he was yet eager for revenge.  Years later, Waukon recalled that his 
“soldier father” (probably Colonel Zachary Taylor) responded by presenting him an 
American flag and a military uniform and enjoining him and his people to “dig up the 
tomahawk, and use it against the Sacs, side by side with the white soldiers.”18  Thus 
commissioned, Waukon left Prairie du Chien on 4 June to assemble his warriors.19    
The following day, Marsh returned to Prairie du Chien in the company of Wabasha’s 
Dakotas and twenty to forty Ho Chunk warriors from Prairie la Crosse.20  Here, they joined 
forty-one Menominees of singular intent who had busied themselves by escorting fresh 
horses to American units in the field while awaiting Marsh’s return.21   On 6 June, Street 
reported that a composite force of about two hundred Indians had assembled and 
enthusiastically engaged in war dances “nearly all the time since their arrival.”  The force 
might have been considerably bigger if not for the delay occasioned  by Marsh’s recruiting 
mission.  During his absence, perhaps as many as 160 Dakotas waited impatiently for three 
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days, then returned to their villages disgusted by their inaction.22  Despite the enthusiasm of 
those remaining, over half of them lacked serviceable firearms, and Street purchased 126 
weapons from local traders at a cost of $1,792 to the government.23 
While Atkinson’s decision to equip and feed his Native allies worked to their mutual 
benefit, his decision to place William S. Hamilton in command of the Prairie du Chien Indian 
contingent virtually assured that only a handful of these guns would actually see service 
against Black Hawk.  Politician, lead miner, and son of Alexander Hamilton, the ambitious 
“Billy” Hamilton volunteered his services to Atkinson, who—perhaps because Hamilton had 
been a colonel during the War of 1812—granted him command of the Indians assembling at 
Prairie du Chien.24  One of Atkinson’s officers later recalled that Hamilton “was of much use 
to us from his knowledge of the Indian character and of the country,” but it seems likely that 
Hamilton overstated his expertise on both counts.25  For their own part, the Indians subjected 
to Hamilton’s “command” were thoroughly unimpressed by both his pedigree and his 
assumed qualifications.  Well-served by their own leaders, the Indians showed little 
disposition to subordinate themselves to a white miner with whom they were unfamiliar.  
This much may have become evident to Joseph Street, who referred to Hamilton as nothing 
more than a “messenger” when the force of 225 Indians departed by canoe for Galena, 
Illinois, at midday on 7 June.26  
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 While Street took measures to bring the Dakotas, Menominees, and Ho Chunks into 
the conflict, Fort Winnebago Subagent John Kinzie preferred that the Ho Chunks stay out of 
the fight altogether.  After learning that Atkinson had called upon the Dakotas and 
Menominees, Kinzie informed Michigan Territory Governor George Porter, “I hope he will 
not invite the Winnebagoes, as they are perfectly neutral, and have a desire to remain 
quiet.”27  In fact, Kinzie overstated the unanimity of the central Wisconsin Ho Chunks.  
Although convinced that their civil chiefs, women, and older men wished to stay out of the 
war, Kinzie was aware “that there existed in the breasts of too many of the young savages a 
desire to distinguish themselves by ‘taking some white scalps.’”28  To Kinzie’s wife, the 
sentiment was entirely justified. 
They did not love the Americans—why should they?  By them they had been 
gradually dispossessed of the broad and beautiful domains of their forefathers, and 
hunted from place to place, and the only equivalent they had received in exchange 
had been a few thousands annually in silver and presents, together with the pernicious 
example, the debasing influence, and the positive ill treatment of too many of the new 
settlers upon their lands.29 
 
Yet the Indians of whom Juliette Kinzie wrote did not regard the Americans monolithically.  
Although hopelessly outnumbered by avaricious miners and settlers, men like John Kinzie 
offered the Ho Chunks hope that they could preserve their land and lifestyle.  Consequently, 
fifty lodges of Ho Chunks from northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin relocated to the 
Portage following Black Hawk’s crossing.  In so doing, the Ho Chunks hoped not only to 
                                                                                                                                                       
 26 Memorandum of purchase of firearms for the Black Hawk War, 7 June 1832, Street Papers; Street to 
Atkinson, 6-7 June 1832, and Street to Clark, 7 June 1832, Black Hawk War 36, 537, 547.   Of the 225, Street 
identified eighty to ninety as Dakotas, forty as Menominees, and the remainder as Ho Chunks affiliated with 
Waukon Decorah.  Ibid., 547. 
 
 27 Kinzie to Porter, 31 May 1832, ibid., 495n.  
 
 28 Juliette Kinzie, Wau-bun: The Early Day in the North West (1873; reprint, Philadelphia: 
Bibliobazaar, 2006), 257. 
 
 29 Ibid. 
 172
distance themselves from the war but to seek refuge from an Indian agent who continued to 
treat the Ho Chunks as allies even as his countrymen called for their eradication.  The latter 
outcome was likely, Kinzie knew, were the young Ho Chunk warriors to join with Black 
Hawk.  Consequently, Kinzie joined the Ho Chunk civil chiefs in successfully imploring the 
warriors to set aside their personal ambitions for the good of their people.  With varying 
degrees of success, the Ho Chunks gathered at the Portage thereafter attempted to promulgate 
a tribal policy of neutrality. 
 On the same day Atkinson issued his call for Indian allies, the Ho Chunks of Four 
Lakes convened a council with Rock River Subagent Henry Gratiot and Henry Dodge, who 
now commanded a mounted militia battalion of miners from the lead country.  Here, Ho 
Chunk leaders, proclaiming their neutrality, requested that Gratiot furnish the Indians with a 
piece of paper testifying to their peaceful disposition as a guard against indiscriminant whites 
in search of Indians to kill.30  The Portage bands, meanwhile, sent two runners to Prairie du 
Chien to dissuade (unsuccessfully) the western Ho Chunks from joining the U.S.-allied party 
assembling there.31  With the assistance of Kinzie, the Portage Ho Chunks also drafted a 
letter to their Rock River kinsmen, pleading, “if you love your brother in this section of 
country, you will immediately leave the Sacs & Foxes, and come among us.  We wish to 
avoid giving suspicion to our friends the whites, or having any thing to do with either party.”  
They also communicated to the Rock River Ho Chunks their intent to kill any Sauks or 
Mesquakies who entered their part of the country.32 
                                                 
 30 Four Lakes Council, 26 May 1832, Black Hawk War 36, 455. 
 
 31 Street to Atkinson, 7 June, 1832, ibid., 537.  
 
 32 Winnebago Indian Talk, 7 June 1832, ibid., 543. 
 173
 Other Ho Chunks were not so committed to neutrality, however.  Two days after their 
council at Four Lakes, Henry Gratiot and Henry Dodge convened another council with Ho 
Chunk leaders from further down the Wisconsin River.  Allies to the Dakotas and 
Menominees, Ho Chunks in this quarter had become embroiled in the war against the Sauks 
and Mesquakies, whom the Ho Chunks suspected were responsible for the disappearance of 
two lodges that never returned from their winter hunt.  Although they had sent many of their 
people to the Portage to avoid the war, the men who remained in their villages on the lower 
Wisconsin were willing to abandon neutrality altogether.  “The tomahawk has been raised 
four times against us[;] seven of our people have been killed by the Sacks,” a Ho Chunk 
named Snake proclaimed.  “My tomahawk is not raised, But just say the word, and it will 
soon be raised.”33 
 While the Ho Chunks from the lower Wisconsin considered joining the Americans 
against the British Band, those on the upper Rock River weighed the consequences of overtly 
supporting Black Hawk.  Led by White Crow, who had previously traveled to Rock Island to 
avow his people’s neutrality to Henry Atkinson, the Rock River Ho Chunks were torn.  Only 
slightly removed from the heart of the lead mining country and aware that their own 
displacement could only be a matter of time, White Crow and his people viewed Black 
Hawk’s campaign with uneasy enthusiasm.  Nothing would have pleased them more than for 
Black Hawk to drive their mutual white enemies from the region, but White Crow recognized 
both the precariousness of the Ho Chunk situation and the likely outcome of the campaign.  
Realizing that any sign of Ho Chunk complicity could be disastrous to the fortunes of his 
people, White Crow decided that it would be imprudent to openly assist the Sauk leader.  At 
the same time, Ho Chunk sympathies and kinship ties would not permit an absolute breach 
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with the British Band, and White Crow resigned himself and his people to the dangerous path 
of duplicity.  Over the ensuing weeks, White Crow’s followers furnished Black Hawk guides 
and provisions while simultaneously providing the American demonstrations of fidelity. 
 In the latter venture, the Ho Chunks were abetted by the capture of the Hall girls by 
the Potawatomis and their subsequent delivery to the British Band.  Anxious to recover the 
women, Henry Gratiot “sent a runner to White Crow & Little Priest with a promise of the 
highest reward that should be offered if they would bring me those women unhurt.”34  
Offered both reward and an opportunity to evince good will toward the Americans, White 
Crow assented.  Accompanied by Little Priest, Whirling Thunder, and another companion, 
White Crow traveled to the Sauk camp and ransomed the captives on 28 May.  Following a 
three day journey to the Blue Mounds of southern Wisconsin, where settlers had erected a 
stockade, the harrowing ordeal of Rachel and Sylvia Hall finally reached its end.  Henry 
Gratiot was not present to proffer the promised reward, so the Ho Chunks reluctantly turned 
the girls over to Henry Dodge and his militiamen.  
Joined by at least two dozen Ho Chunks during their journey, White Crow and his 
followers eyed Dodge’s troopers warily.  Although both groups proclaimed loyalty to the 
Great Father, Dodge’s command consisted entirely of miners from the lead region, and the 
Ho Chunks had ample reason to regard them as enemies.  The militiamen shared similar 
sentiments and had, in fact, erected the blockhouse at the Blue Mounds for the express 
purpose of defending themselves against Ho Chunks.35  While the Americans bedded down 
for the evening, White Crow and his followers convened in the woods, where the chief 
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disparaged the fighting qualities of Americans in general and Dodge in particular.  Learning 
of the gathering and convinced that Dodge and his men would be massacred, a militia officer 
awoke Dodge, who arrested White Crow and nearly twenty others, including five principal 
chiefs.  In the morning, Dodge marched his prisoners to Morrison’s Grove, where they met 
Henry Gratiot.36  Gratiot did his best to salvage what was shaping up to be a disastrous 
situation.  He convinced Dodge to release fifteen of his hostages and to remand the other five 
to Gratiot’s custody.  In spite of his timely intervention, the detained chiefs could “scarcely 
brook the indignity with which they consider themselves treated.”  Over a week later, Gratiot 
was still attempting to assuage their humiliation “with presents and promises.” 37  Many of 
Dodge’s officers considered White Crow’s indignation feigned, however, and they remained 
convinced that the Ho Chunk chief had been plotting an attack on the Americans.38 
 On 3 June, White Crow opened a council with Dodge and Gratiot by enumerating the 
many ways in which he had demonstrated his loyalty to the Americans: withdrawing his 
people from Wabokieshiek’s village, ostensibly saving Henry Gratiot from death during his 
visit to the same, enjoining the British Band to leave the Ho Chunk country, and—most 
recently—the deliverance of the Hall girls.  White Crow, whom one of the militiamen 
regarded as “a Cicero among Indians for his powers of oratory and [e]loquence,” made an 
impressive case, and Dodge conceded that the chief had rendered outstanding service in 
liberating the Hall sisters.39  At the same time, Dodge chided the Indians for selling horses to 
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the Sauks and permitting them to encamp on Ho Chunk lands.  Perhaps sensing that Dodge 
remained unconvinced of the Ho Chunks’ allegiance, White Crow offered to betray the 
British Band to the Americans by offering them a sanctuary and then revealing its location to 
Dodge.  Dodge countered by encouraging the Ho Chunks to join with the allied Indians then 
assembling at Prairie du Chien and to “kill and plunder” the British Band “to remunirate 
yourselves for the losses you have sustained by the Sauks.”  Now quite convinced that 
circumstances demanded a more strident expression of Ho Chunk loyalty, White Crow met 
the challenge: “If you give liberty we will raise the Tomahawk and join the redskins and we 
think that the skins should attack them on one side & the Americans on the other & have the 
Sacks between us, & all strike at one time, & we will shew you whether we are soldiers or 
not.”40 
 Dodge’s troopers did not doubt Ho Chunk martial prowess, but they continued to 
entertain doubts as to the Indians’ true allegiance.  According to one of Dodge’s officers, “it 
was generally believed that all their able bodied and efficient young men were with the Sauks 
in both feeling and action.”41  Consequently, Dodge compelled Gratiot to retain four chiefs 
and a warrior as hostages to guarantee continued faithfulness.  Gratiot escorted Whirling 
Thunder, Spotted Arm, Big Man, and the sons of White Crow and Broken Arm to his mining 
camp, where they remained in custody until 14 June.  On that day, Henry Dodge arrived at 
Gratiot’s Grove and offered the Ho Chunks liberty in exchange for service as scouts.  The 
Indians assented, and Gratiot “gave them five horses five guns and other presents as a 
propitiation for their detention and to ensure their fidelity for the future.”42  Their fidelity 
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proved as uneven as the treatment afforded them by the Americans, but Ho Chunk allies 
accompanied American forces for the remainder of the war. 
Meanwhile, fear of some Americans likewise drove the Chicago-area Potawatomis to 
strengthen their bonds with others.  The Potawatomis of northeast Illinois continued to cower 
in the shadow of Fort Dearborn, forced to seek shelter under the big guns of their Great 
Father lest his other white children murder them in their villages.  Although his people were 
safe from harm here, Billy Caldwell realized that the Potawatomis could not sit passively 
while events transpired that would have a grave influence on the tribe’s future.  
On the morning of 31 May 1832, Billy Caldwell arrived at Atkinson’s headquarters and 
proclaimed that the Potawatomis were willing to take the field against the British Band on behalf 
of the United States.  Atkinson was delighted, proclaiming that “they could hardly do otherwise 
than take sides and it is altogether important we should Know which.”  Atkinson directed Owen 
to raise a force of Potawatomi warriors to be ready to rendezvous at Ottawa, Illinois, on or about 
15 June.  Valuing their extensive knowledge of the country, Atkinson intended to use the 
Potawatomis as scouts and guides, but he intimated to Zachary Taylor that his pact with the 
Potawatomis was more diplomatic than military.  He wanted their aid, he informed the future 
president, “not so much on account of their strength, but to make them a party in the war.”43  As 
compensation, Atkinson promised only to provision this force.44 
Unbeknown to Atkinson, provisions were high on the list of Potawatomi priorities.  After 
fleeing their villages and leaving crops in the field unattended, the Potawatomis found 
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themselves desperate for food, which Owen obligingly provided at government expense.  After a 
two-day council with the Potawatomi chiefs on 2 and 3 June, Owen depicted the tribe as fairly 
paralyzed by privation but reported, “About 20 young men headed by Mr Robinson…will be 
ready to engage in any service you may desire.”  Still, Owen remained skeptical that the 
Potawatomis would be able to muster much of a force.  “It is my opinion that you cannot with 
safety depend on more than 300 of these Indians, although the utmost reliance may be placed 
upon the sincerity of their friendly professions,” Owen notified Atkinson.  He explained that 
“many of them are not inclined to change their present mode of living in peace and quiet, for the 
toils and difficulties attending a war-like expedition.”45  Caldwell, at least, realized what Owen 
did not: that the Potawatomis’ present mode of living depended on submitting to such difficulties 
for its very existence.  Robinson seems to have impressed this fact on Atkinson, who promptly 
sent the métis leader back to Chicago to raise another eighty warriors.46 
By this time, Thomas J. V. Owen was already using the service of the Potawatomis to 
rebut claims—particularly Governor Reynolds’s proclamation of 15 May—that they were in 
league with the enemy.  In addition to chastising Reynolds for his loose tongue, Owen defended 
the tribe’s conduct during the crisis and assured the people of Illinois that the Potawatomis had 
“evinced the most ardent desire to join us against” the British Band.  As evidence, Owen pointed 
out that fifty Potawatomis had already taken the field as scouts and that Shabbona had offered a 
force of a hundred warriors at the outset of the conflict (although Illinois militia officers were 
reluctant to take him up on the offer).47  Atkinson considered the tribe redeemed to the extent 
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that they had nothing to fear from truculent militiamen, and he authorized the Potawatomis to 
return to their crops.  Just to be sure, however, Atkinson ordered the commander of nearby Fort 
Hennepin to keep a tight reign on his new levies to minimize the possibility of fratricide.48 
Atkinson was naïve to believe that public sentiment had substantially changed.  When 
the British Band attacked a militia blockhouse outside of Chicago on 16 June, killing one, the 
commander threatened to kill the first Indian his men saw, “whether friendly or otherwise.”49  
On 21 June, Owen informed Elbert Herring, Thomas McKenney’s replacement as 
superintendent of Indian affairs, that he countermanded Atkinson’s authorization for the 
Potawatomis to return to their villages: “Such is the prejudice of the whites against even the 
friendly Indians, that their safety requires that they should convene…[near] this place.”  
Because popular sentiment remained so inimical to the Potawatomis, “they have been 
compelled to abandon their villages, fields, & hunting grounds, for the present, and have no 
means of subsistence.”50  Owen also informed George B. Porter, his immediate superior in 
Detroit, that he made no disbursements of provisions between 1 and 21 June because the 
Indians had returned to their villages after the initial alarm died down, “but it was soon found 
necessary to recall them, owing to the threats and prejudices of the whites who, were 
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constantly exhibiting towards them feelings of a hostile character, particularly that portion of 
the militia from the interior unaccustomed to Indians.”51 
The residents of Galena may have considered themselves accustomed to Indians, but 
they were not a little alarmed by the large force of friendly Indians that descended on their 
town on 8 June, when the Prairie du Chien contingent of Menominees, Dakotas, and Ho 
Chunks arrived via canoe.  The sight of so many armed warriors unsettled the residents of the 
city, which by this time was perhaps the most anti-Indian settlement in the United States.  
Inclined to believe that all Indians were allied with Black Hawk and advocating Indian 
policies ranging from removal to genocide, the Galenians saw fit to impress their “allies” 
with a show of martial prowess.  Nearly one hundred militiamen of Galena marshaled for a 
parade, but the intended audience was unimpressed.  According to one white observer, the 
Indians laughed at the pitiful spectacle.52  That night, the Indians reciprocated the display 
with their own war dance, although they did so to gain the favor of the spirits rather than that 
of the Americans.53 
 From Galena, the warriors set out on foot for Dixon’s Ferry on the Rock River, where 
they were to have joined the regular forces under Colonel Zachary Taylor.  On 12 June, 
Hamilton rode into Taylor’s camp and received his orders.  The warriors were to cut off 
small parties of the British Band, “take a feamale prisoner if practicable, steal their horses, & 
distress them in every possible manner.”54 
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Auguring poorly for the campaign ahead, Hamilton’s first report from the field on 13 
June indicated that his command consisted of 170 Indians vice the 225 originally reported by 
Joseph Street.  He made no mention of any Indians leaving his force, and it is possible that an 
incorrect tally accounts for the discrepancy, but the first signs of dissention were already 
evident.  With considerable effort and at Atkinson’s urging, Street had persuaded John Marsh 
to accompany Hamilton’s contingent.  Marsh’s facility with the Indians may have unsettled 
Hamilton, who wrote to Atkinson and requested clarification of his command relationship 
with Marsh—a polite means of requesting permission to put the trader in his place.  Still, 
Hamilton seemed optimistic: “they are now generally armed and I think maybe relied on to 
annoy the enemy.”55  Unfortunately for the anxious members of the party, they narrowly 
missed their opportunity to do so. 
On 14 June, Henry Dodge’s militia troops killed seventeen warriors of the British 
Band on the Pecatonica River in one of the most pitched and celebrated engagements of the 
war.  The Prairie du Chien Indians arrived an hour after the fight and encountered a company 
of forty-nine Ho Chunk warriors who had followed Dodge’s mounted battalion on foot and 
had likewise missed the battle.  The Ho Chunks, who had tracked down wounded enemies 
and collected one or two scalps of their own, invited the Prairie du Chien contingent to share 
the honor.56  The Menominee warriors demurred, however, indicating that the scalps were 
not theirs to take.  Edward Beouchard, who accompanied Dodge’s Ho Chunk company, later 
observed “that they, the Menomonees, were too proud to appropriate and display scalps from 
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enemies whom they had not slain.”57  The Menominees were not too proud but rather too 
determined to cover the deaths of their own slain, and Indians killed by the Americans only 
served to cover the deaths of other Americans.  The Dakotas and Ho Chunks of Hamilton’s 
force had no such reservations, however, and they not only took scalps but also cut the 
corpses “literally to pieces.”58  Afterward, they celebrated by dancing around the scalps 
outside nearby Fort Hamilton (named for Billy, whose farmstead was nearby).  Tragically, a 
farmer named Spencer, who had barely survived an attack by the now deceased Sauks, was 
just at this time seeking shelter in the same stockade. As he neared it, a horrific spectacle 
greeted him: yelping Indian warriors dancing jubilantly around gory human scalps.  
Supposing the entire garrison to have been massacred, he fled to a homestead some six or 
seven miles distant.  There, he hid himself in a hog pen for ten days, after which he was 
discovered.  The poor man had lost his mind, however, and subsequently wandered off, never 
to be seen again.59  Conditioned to regard armed Indians as a mortal threat, Spencer’s mind 
could conceive of them in no other way.   
The day after the fight, Henry Gratiot and Henry Dodge spoke with Waukon 
Decorah, who had come to Hamilton’s Diggings at Dodge’s invitation.   There, in the 
presence of Gratiot, Hamilton, and Marsh, Dodge presented Decorah with a speech addressed 
to the Ho Chunk tribe that Atkinson had penned a week earlier in response to White Crow’s 
comments at the Porter’s Grove Council.  Neutrality, Atkinson maintained, was no longer an 
option for the Ho Chunks.  “You must take up the Hatchet and join us,” he enjoined their 
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leaders.  In an odd attempt to exert peer pressure, Atkinson also submitted that “The Sioux, 
Menomonies and Pottowattomies are our friends.  they will go with us against the Sacs.”  He 
advised them to stand fast for the present and await the instructions of Gratiot and Dodge.60  
As said gentlemen were in fact delivering the address, they directed Waukon Decorah to 
assemble his warriors.  Eager to avenge the death of his daughter, the chief assented.  He 
planned to return to his village on the Wisconsin to raise a large force of warriors while their 
women made them new moccasins and made other preparations for the warpath.  He 
informed Dodge that he and other Ho Chunk leaders would reconvene with Gratiot and 
Dodge at the latter’s house with a few days to complete their plans.   
Dodge was enthusiastic about the prospects of fielding such a considerable force of 
Indians.  With augmentation from Decorah’s band, the Indians would again number over two 
hundred “who will be urged under their Leaders to ranging the country so as to cover this 
portion as well as the fort at the [Blue] Mounds.”61  Although Dodge recognized that the 
Indians served under their own war chiefs and that they had to be “urged” rather than 
commanded, he was nonetheless disappointed by the course now selected by most of the 
Native leadership.  It soon became evident that the Ho Chunks from Prairie la Crosse 
intended to return to Waukon Decorah’s villages.  Upon hearing this, the Dakotas also 
resolved to return to their villages, vowing to raise more forces but also complaining that 
Marsh had hurried them from their homes and that they were being misused.62  The former 
complaint was probably exaggerated, as Marsh had allowed the Dakotas two days to prepare, 
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but this did not allow sufficient time for the manufacture of moccasins or other durable items 
that the Dakotas now found lacking.  There was more substance, however, to the allegation 
of misuse.  Each of the tribes present was practiced in their own brand of warfare, and it did 
not involve marching in a column of over two hundred men through American towns.  Nor 
did it involve subjecting venerated warriors such as Wabasha and L’Arc to the pretensions of 
a man like Billy Hamilton.  Over the ensuing week, more Indians abandoned him, and by 24 
June he reported that “The inactivity of our service has so disheartened the indians under my 
command that they have allmost all returned to their homes[;] there are at present only 
Tweenty five menommes remaining.”63  The most animated of the Sauk and Mesquakie 
enemies, the Menominees were willing to endure Hamilton’s supervision further if it 
promised an opportunity to strike their foes.   
To the Americans, the retirement of the Ho Chunks and Dakotas smacked of 
cowardice and a lack of resolve.  Indeed, twenty-six Indians who returned to Galena to 
collect their canoes were detained as deserters.64  But the Americans failed to understand 
Indian frustration or motivation.  Even the knowledgeable Marsh appears to have been 
ignorant of the connection between the Prairie la Crosse and Wisconsin River Ho Chunks, 
who were led by the brothers One-Eyed and Waukon Decorah, respectively.  Weary of 
Hamilton and his methods, the Ho Chunks were understandably enticed by the prospect of 
uniting their two bands under Native leadership.  Interpreting their retirement from the field 
as reluctance to “engage heartily in the War against the Sacs & Foxes,” Joseph Street 
subsequently told the Decorahs and the western Ho Chunks that “we did not want their 
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assistance” and enjoined them to move their families to Prairie du Chien and thence to Prairie 
la Crosse so as to stay clear of the war.65   As for the Dakotas, L’Arc expressed their 
sentiments when they returned through Prairie du Chien to be chastised by Street.  L’Arc 
responded that Hamilton was “a little man” and complained that “he did not use us well.”  
The Dakotas objected to both Hamilton’s pretension to “command” their forces and the 
methods he employed.  Walking over hardened wagon trails through abandoned towns, the 
Dakotas exhausted both their legs and their faith in the Americans, who appeared afraid to 
fight for themselves.66  Street later lamented to Atkinson that the Dakotas were placed into 
service beside the militia and attributed their retirement to “their not being taken where they 
could have seen a respectable force.”67  None of the Indians had abandoned the war—their 
war—but most who left Hamilton’s Diggings that day would not again fight in concert with 
the Americans.68   
Despite the disbandment of the Prairie du Chien force, Henry Dodge still needed 
Indian messengers, guides, and spies.  The two dozen Menominees who remained continued 
to seek a combat role and were not within their own country, compelling the Americans to 
seek assistance from White Crow’s Ho Chunks.  On 14 June, Henry Gratiot sent Whirling 
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Thunder, Spotted Arm, three warriors, and Oliver Emmell (a French trader with a métis 
spouse) to attempt to locate Black Hawk’s camp on the Rock River.69  On 27 June, the 
scouting party returned in the company of White Crow and made their report.  Emmell, 
whom the Ho Chunks had disguised as an Indian for his safety, reported that the British Band 
had encamped near Lake Koshkonong, a body of water surrounded by forbidding swamps 
and marshes in southern Wisconsin.  He also indicated that the scouting party had come 
across starving Ho Chunk families who, fearing that the Americans meant to obliterate their 
people, had abandoned their fields and taken to hiding in a swamp.  White Crow spoke, as 
well, recounting the sacrifices his people had made to obey Atkinson, Dodge, and Gratiot.  
They had left their crops untended, displaced repeatedly and—as a consequence—now 
suffered greatly.  In addition to requesting provisions, White Crow expressed the fear that 
Black Hawk would soon make open war against the Ho Chunks and implored the Americans 
to strike the British Band as soon as possible.70 
Despite White Crow’s adamant pledges of fidelity, the whites continued to doubt his 
loyalty and that of his people.  On 6 June, Indians had attacked the blockhouse at Blue 
Mounds, killing a man named William Aubrey.  A larger war party struck the same post two 
weeks later, killing militia officers George Force and Emerson Green.  Initially suspected 
only of conducting the first attack, Ho Chunks were actually responsible for both 
engagements.71  Whether White Crow was earnest when he urged the Americans to attack the 
British Band is subject to speculation.  In post-war testimony, a Mesquakie named Ma-kauk 
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identified White Crow as one of the British Band’s principal accomplices, and many of Black 
Hawk’s followers identified the Ho Chunk chief as a bellicose rabble rouser who urged Black 
Hawk to make war on the whites and counseled against a peaceful return to Iowa.72  
According to the Sauk chief Neapope, ten lodges of Ho Chunks supported the British Band 
and brought in American scalps on eight different occasions.  Perhaps more significantly, the 
Ho Chunks also sustained Black Hawk’s band by trading corn and potatoes for durable 
goods.   Unlike his tribesmen at the Portage, who made a legitimate attempt to distance 
themselves from the conflict to maintain neutrality, White Crow appears to have actively 
supported both parties while weighing their respective prospects for success.  “When the 
Winnebagoes discovered that the Sacs would be whipped,” Neapope later asserted, “they 
turned their faces and went back, and turned against the Sacs.”73  Precisely when White Crow 
reached this conclusion is a matter of conjecture, but he had not yet done so when he 
departed Gratiot’s Grove on 29 June to join Dodge’s command. 
The following day, White Crow and thirty of his warriors joined Dodge’s militia and 
the remaining Menominees at First or Kegonsa Lake of the Four Lakes region.74  Dodge 
accepted White Crow’s offer to guide the combined force to Black Hawk’s encampment, but 
found the Ho Chunk uncooperative when he asked that White Crow instead guide them to 
Atkinson’s camp.  Only through the use of “severe language” was Dodge able to convince 
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White Crow to serve as a guide to the new destination, and Dodge’s men grew suspicious 
that the Indians had intended to lead them into a trap.75 
As they prepared to leave Chicago to join Atkinson’s army, the Potawatomi scouts 
were likewise concerned for their safety.  Surrounded by Indian-haters and anxious 
militiamen—oftentimes in the same person—the Potawatomis were perhaps more afraid of 
their “allies” than of their supposed enemies.  To guard against fratricide, the Potawatomis 
wore white headbands when they sallied forth from Chicago to join their allies on 22 June 
1832.76  The absence of traditional war paint and garb may have been intended to minimize 
risk, but it also reflected the fact that this was not a traditional Potawatomi war.  No evidence 
suggests that the Potawatomis conducted a ceremonial war dance in preparation for their 
campaign or that young warriors participated with hopes of making names for themselves.  
Unlike the Dakotas, Menominees, and some Ho Chunk bands, the Potawatomis had no 
grievance with the Sauks and Mesquakies, and it was clear from their demeanor that their 
business was more diplomatic than military.  At their helm rode the men responsible for its 
design: the rolls of this company listed Billy Caldwell as principal chief, Alexander Robinson 
as “2nd. Chief,” and Wabaunsee and Shaw-we-nesse as “War Chief” and “2nd. War chief,” 
respectively.  Thirteen chiefs of various bands (including Shabbona) and seventy-eight of 
their warriors were also mustered into federal service.77  On 29 June, the company 
rendezvoused with Jacob Fry’s regiment of Illinois militia at the mouth of the Kishwaukee 
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River and began its collaboration with the American forces.78  Later that day, the rest of 
Atkinson’s composite force of regulars and militiamen overtook Fry and the Potawatomis, 
and one militiaman noted that “The Indians appeared to be highly pleased to think they were 
honored so far as to take a hand with us against the Sacs.”79   
Although the militiaman also observed that “They were well armed, with both guns 
and spears,” Potawatomi service proved brief and uneventful.80  Atkinson proclaimed himself 
“desirous…to employ the Pottowattomies who Know the Country occupied by the enemy,” a 
service “of very great importance.”81  On 1 July, the Americans believed that they were 
rapidly closing on Black Hawk’s camp and were therefore excited when the crack of 
Potawatomi rifles broke the calm of twilight.  Deer rather than Sauks drew the Indian fire, 
however, and the Potawatomis did not fire another shot during the war.82  Black Hawk stayed 
at least one step ahead of Atkinson, eventually leaving the Potawatomi country and 
diminishing the Potawatomi company’s usefulness as guides.   
 This became evident on 3 July, when the army reached the foot of Lake Koshkonong, 
the last reported location of Black Hawk’s camp.  Here, regular army Captain Henry Smith 
recalled, “we found ourselves in the neighborhood of the enemy, who … occupied an 
inaccessible position in a swamp a few miles from us.”  Now operating in unfamiliar terrain, 
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the Potawatomis were unable to discern the location of Black Hawk’s camp, compelling 
Captain Smith to conclude that his guides “were either ignorant or treacherous.” 83   
 To compound matters, Atkinson and his officers here discovered that their conduct 
was assailed in the press and within the War Department.  On 10 July, Atkinson learned that 
the secretary of war had dispatched Major General Winfield Scott, commander of the Eastern 
Department of the U.S. Army, and approximately one thousand of his soldiers to assume 
overall command of the campaign.84  The order, issued nearly a month earlier, represented a 
repudiation not only of Atkinson’s handling of the war but of the Western Department of the 
U.S. Army as a whole.  Given the theater of the war and the soldiers presently engaged in its 
execution, Edmund Gaines—Atkinson’s immediate superior—should have assumed 
command if the president or his secretary of war found Atkinson’s performance lacking.  But 
the president had grown weary of both Atkinson and Gaines, each of whom seemed overly 
sensitive to Indian interests and prone to negotiate rather than fight.85  The news deeply 
troubled Atkinson and his officers, who 
received other disagreeable and mortifying intelligence through the public prints, and 
from other sources—the censure conveyed in the insinuations and innuendoes by 
certain prints; the information from private letters, and perhaps the tone of official 
dispatches, all gave us too clearly to understand, that thus far for our toil, exposure, 
and exertions, made received nothing but censure—how unjustly, every individual of 
the army knew and felt.”86 
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After tarrying over three days in the vicinity of Lake Koshkonong, Atkinson’s army 
glumly and blindly resumed their march on 7 July.  That evening, Henry Dodge joined 
Atkinson’s force in the company of Hamilton’s remaining Menominees and a party of Ho 
Chunks under White Crow, who offered to guide the army thenceforth.  “His services were 
gladly accepted,” one of Atkinson’s officers recalled, and the general promptly discharged 
the bulk of his Potawatomi contingent. 87  Retaining only twenty-five members of the original 
force, Atkinson sent the remainder back to Chicago with the prospect of continued service 
under General Scott. 88  Atkinson wrote Scott, “You will have it in your power to bring with 
you a body of Pottowattomies, should you want them.”  “They will be faithful I have no 
doubt,” Atkinson opined, “but they eat highly, and will be of service only as guides, and 
probably to fight beside of you they will not go alone any distance ahead.”  Perhaps to take 
the edge off of this criticism, he added: “I speak, not however in disparagement of them.”89  
For most of the Potawatomis, however, the Black Hawk War was already over.  
Overwhelmed by cholera during their voyage through the Great Lakes, Scott and his soldiers 
were in no position to join the war when they arrived in Chicago on 10 July.  The twenty-five 
Potawatomis retained by Atkinson continued to search for Black Hawk’s trail, brought in a 
Sauk prisoner on 16 July, and correctly predicted that Black Hawk would attempt to avoid 
contact and flee across the Mississippi.  On 20 July, the nominal Potawatomi company 
conducted its final mission for the U.S. Army by scouting Black Hawk’s last known 
encampment.  The party found nothing, and the Potawatomi company disbanded on 22 July.  
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Atkinson retained Billy Caldwell, Wabaunsee, Shaubena, and Pierre LeClerc as couriers, 
discharging them in pairs as they carried expresses back to Chicago.90 
Now entrusting their direction to the Ho Chunk chief White Crow, the Americans 
were unenthusiastic about his initial guidance.  White Crow adamantly asserted that Black 
Hawk remained on an island in Lake Koshkonong and advised Atkinson to countermarch his 
army to its camp of the previous several days.91  The army spent the entirety of 8 July 
retracing their steps and recrossing the Whitewater Creek, much to the chagrin of the rank-
and-file, who immediately suspected White Crow of prevarication.  The next day, militia 
Captain Jacob Early’s company of scouts and the Prairie du Chien Menominees scoured the 
supposed location of Black Hawk’s camp but found that it had recently been abandoned.  
Without recourse, Atkinson continued to rely on White Crow’s services, but both regulars 
and militiamen now grumbled “that there was no dependence to be placed in those 
treacherous Winnebagoes.” 92  Atkinson had little choice, however.  He acknowledged that 
the strength and disposition of the British Band compelled most of the Indians in southern 
Wisconsin to adopt a policy of neutrality, but he remained dependent on the Ho Chunks to 
guide his army “over a difficult and almost impassable route.”93  Only after the war and an 
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examination of Sauk and Mesquakie prisoners did Atkinson seriously question White Crow’s 
loyalty. 
 Atkinson now found himself perilously short of options and provisions.  To furnish 
the former, he called on Agent George Boyd to organize two to three hundred Green Bay 
Menominees to join the war.  Disingenuously, Atkinson promised Hamilton, whom the 
general dispatched to Green Bay, command of the Green Bay Menominees while granting 
Boyd discretion in the appointment.94  If he had not yet entirely soured on Billy Hamilton, 
Atkinson appears to have, by this time, grasped that the Indians found him wanting as a 
liaison and intolerable as a commander.95  On 10 July, after a fruitless month of campaigning 
under Hamilton, the Prairie du Chien Menominees returned home, leaving only three of their 
number to serve as guides and messengers.96 
To alleviate the shortage of supplies, Atkinson dispatched two of the militia brigades 
and Dodge’s battalion to Fort Winnebago, where they were to draw provisions from the 
military stores.  Unable to feed them, Atkinson also discharged his recently arrived Ho 
Chunk allies, retaining only White Crow and his son to guide Dodge’s battalion to Fort 
Winnebago.97  In performing this duty, they took Dodge’s force on a very circuitous route of 
approximately sixty miles, claiming that the direct route was littered with swamps.  Dodge’s 
men grew more and more convinced that the Ho Chunk chief was deliberately misleading 
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them in order to facilitate Black Hawk’s flight, but they safely reached their destination on 12 
July.98   
The arrival of Atkinson’s provisioning parties struck John Kinzie and the sundry 
bands of Ho Chunks assembled at the Portage as inopportune.  Describing the refugee 
Indians as “in a state of demi-starvation,” Kinzie had been issuing the Ho Chunks provisions 
from Fort Winnebago to relieve their suffering—a practice brought to an immediate halt by 
Atkinson’s requisition.99  The militiamen were interested in more than food, however.  No 
longer willing to follow White Crow, they also sought new guides and reliable 
intelligence.100 
Pierre Paquette offered both.  The subject of considerable Wisconsin folklore, 
Paquette was born in 1800 to a Frenchman and a Ho Chunk woman.  Popular remembrances 
of the métis trader dwell on his size and strength.  In 1830, he stood six feet, two inches tall 
and weighed 240 pounds.  According to one early American resident of Wisconsin, “He was 
the strongest man I ever knew; he would pick up a barrel of pork and throw it into a wagon as 
easily as a man would a ten gallon keg.”101  Although illiterate, Paquette was fluent in the 
languages of each of his parents as well as English, which rendered his services 
indispensable to the Americans and Ho Chunks alike.  A man whose strength of character 
matched the strength of his back, Paquette was revered by both populations.  One American 
described him as “the best specimen of Nature’s noble-men I ever met,” largely because 
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Paquette possessed “as fine a sense of honor as any gentleman I ever knew; and all who 
knew him would take his word as soon as any man’s bond.” 102  Without racial qualification, 
another American averred that Paquette was “the very best specimen of a man.”103  The Ho 
Chunks shared this appraisal; Old Decorah’s son later recalled Paquette to be “a good man in 
every way,—very friendly to our people.”104 
Called upon to collect new guides for the army, Paquette sent Naheesanchonka (Man 
Who Thinks Himself of Importance) into the Ho Chunk camps surrounding the Portage.  He 
told his tribesmen that “if we would go into the war we would make a name for ourselves, 
and get presents; also win the good opinion of White Beaver, and the Big Father at 
Washington.” 105  Admonished to maintain strict neutrality by John Kinzie and their own 
chiefs, however, most Ho Chunks rejected Naheesanchonka’s pleas.  Many of them regarded 
the Sauks with pity and, although not inclined to fight on their behalf, disdained the idea of 
fighting against them.  Ultimately, only a handful of volunteers came forward, among them 
Naheesanchonka, Pa-nee-wak-sa-ka (White Pawnee or Pania Blanc), Notsookega (Bear that 
Breaks up the Brush), Ahmegunka, Tahnichseeka (The Smoker), and Rascal Decorah.106  
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Although their services as guides were no longer welcome, White Crow and his son (also 
named White Pawnee) joined Paquette’s force—the diplomatic consequences of withdrawing 
at this juncture were too severe to permit otherwise. 
From the Indians at the Portage, Dodge learned that the British Band was then 
encamped on the Rock River at Hustis’ Rapids.107  Armed with this intelligence, Dodge 
convinced militia brigade commander James Henry that they should pursue Black Hawk 
immediately rather than return to Atkinson’s camp with provisions.  Departing the Portage on 
15 July under Pierre Paquette’s guidance, Dodge and Henry reached the rapids three days 
later.  Once again, they discovered Black Hawk’s camp abandoned, but one of the Ho 
Chunks discovered the fresh trail of the British Band as he attempted to deliver a letter to 
Atkinson.108  With the Portage Ho Chunks leading the way, the chase was on. 
After three days of pursuit over nearly eighty miles of trackless terrain, Dodge’s and 
Henry’s commands approached the Wisconsin River and began to encounter stragglers from 
the British Band on 21 July.  Uninterested in taking prisoners, the militiamen dispatched the 
unfortunate Indians where they found them.109  The militiamen correctly interpreted the 
abandonment of invalids as a sign that Black Hawk was desperately trying to make good his 
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escape across the Wisconsin River.  Accordingly, Dodge’s and Henry’s commands surged 
forward like bloodhounds on a fresh trail.   
Detecting the movements of the militiamen, Black Hawk raced to remove his women, 
children, and elderly to the west side of the Wisconsin.  Covering their escape, he deployed 
the bulk of his warriors along a ridgeline to the east of the river to confront the onrushing 
militiamen.  In the only conventional fight of the war, Dodge’s and Henry’s troopers 
dismounted, formed lines, and drove the Indians from their position.  Most of the Ho Chunks 
had no desire to fight the Sauks, let alone to do so in open terrain using European tactics.  
Hoping merely to catch a glimpse of the action, they took shelter in sinkholes or behind trees.  
They may have been startled to observe three of their own number fighting beside the 
Americans.  Pierre Paquette, Pa-nee-wak-sa-ka (Pania Blanc or White Pawnee), and White 
Crow’s son had joined Dodge’s ranks and “fought uncovered like white men.”110  Together, 
the Americans and the Ho Chunks killed sixty-eight of Black Hawk’s warriors at a cost of 
only one killed and seven wounded militiamen.111 
Although White Crow’s son may have been eager to establish himself as a warrior in 
his own right, it is unlikely that he would have so actively and decidedly cast his lot against 
Black Hawk without his father’s approval.  By the Battle of Wisconsin Heights, it seems, the 
outcome of the war was finally clear to White Crow, and he no longer deemed it necessary to 
hedge his bets.  Although Ho Chunks had helped guide the British Band across the 
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Wisconsin River during the engagement, Black Hawk was stunned by this betrayal.112  He 
later confided to an American that he was surprised “that the Americans could, in so brief a 
period, have assembled so large a force, and still more surprised to find some Indians among 
them.”113   
 The Indians did not remain long.  Immediately after the battle, they returned to the 
Portage bearing eleven scalps—grisly testimony to the violation of the Portage band’s 
neutrality policy.114  “We feared that Black Hawk, thinking us now to be his enemies, would 
turn up the river and attack us at Portage,” the principal chief’s son recalled.  “Our 
sympathies were strongly with the whites.  Our trading interests were with them, and we 
were bound to them by treaties.  Yet we did not like to be fighting old neighbors like the 
Sacs.” 115  Ho Chunk leaders now divided, some advocating a withdrawal from the area until 
the trouble had passed and others favoring an armed defense against Sauk encroachment.  
Harrowed by the militia and running for their lives, however, Black Hawk’s Indians posed no 
threat to the Ho Chunks.  The night after the Battle of Wisconsin Heights, Black Hawk 
himself had scaled a tree and called out to the Americans’ Indian allies, asking them to tell 
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the whites that he was not for war and hoped to leave Wisconsin in peace.116  He did not get 
that chance.   
 Nearly two months after Henry Atkinson had called for their services, the United 
States’ Indian allies had accomplished very little.  For the Rock River Ho Chunks and 
perhaps the Potawatomis, this was partly by design.  Sympathetic to Black Hawk but 
determined to distance themselves from his “hostile” band, these tribes offered symbolic 
service and avoided direct confrontations with the Sauks and Mesquakies.  Meanwhile, the 
Menominees, Dakotas, and western Ho Chunks sought combat with the British Band but 
encountered only frustration.  Imprudently, Atkinson entrusted them to the incapable Billy 
Hamilton, who squandered the services of over two hundred Indian allies.  Only belatedly did 
Atkinson avail himself of the three hundred Green Bay Menominee warriors who had waited 
nearly a year for this opportunity.  Hence, by Atkinson’s mismanagement of his allies and the 
nature of Ho Chunk and Potawatomi commitment, the Indians contributed little to Atkinson’s 
campaign through the Battle of Wisconsin Heights.  The Menominees, Dakota, and western 
Ho Chunks were not prepared to surrender their war to the Americans, however.  If denied a 
meaningful role in its initial phases, they struck its final blows. 
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CHAPTER 7.  FINAL BLOWS. 
 
 Their lackluster performance notwithstanding, Henry Atkinson remained dependant 
on his Indian allies following the Battle of Wisconsin Heights.  Suspecting that Black Hawk 
would lead his followers to either British Canada or back to Iowa, the general could call only 
on Indian forces to interdict their movements.  Still desirous of striking their foes, the 
Menominees, Dakotas, and western Ho Chunks remained receptive to Atkinson’s appeals for 
help but insisted on waging war on their own terms.  Numbering over three hundred warriors, 
the Green Bay contingent of Menominees and northeastern Ho Chunks rejected Billy 
Hamilton as their leader and selected their own white liaisons from their trading partners.  
Even these exerted little influence on the campaign trail, where Menominee war chiefs and 
spiritual leaders wielded traditional authority—even when it unsettled the accompanying 
whites.  Acknowledging that the Indians’ stake in the war was greater than their own, 
however, the white liaisons did not interfere. 
 Unfortunately, Atkinson had called on the Green Bay Menominees too late in the 
contest.  Once it became apparent that Black Hawk intended to recross the Mississippi rather 
than seek refuge in Canada, the Green Bay contingent raced to participate in the fight while 
their fellow Indian allies around Prairie du Chien helped intercept their fleeing foes.  On 2 
August, the American army finally caught up with Black Hawk at the “Battle of Bad Axe,” 
which effectively eliminated the British Band as a viable military force but incorporated 
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neither the Dakotas nor the Green Bay Menominees, who sought their own dénouement to a 
conflict they considered their own.  In the days after this supposedly “final” battle of the war, 
the Dakotas and Menominees hunted down and harrowed remnants of the British Band in 
forlorn corners of Wisconsin and Iowa.  Theirs from the outset, the Black Hawk War was the 
Dakotas’ and Menominees’ to end. 
 While Black Hawk and Dodge traded blows at Wisconsin Heights, the Menominees 
of Green Bay bided their time.  A year had passed since they had lobbied their Great Father 
for permission to raise the hatchet against their enemies, which he continued to deny even as 
Black Hawk recrossed the Mississippi and Henry Atkinson enlisted the aid of Indians from 
Prairie du Chien and Chicago.  Frustrated, the Menominees of Green Bay busied themselves 
with more meager contributions.  In early June, 230 Menominees gathered at the Green Bay 
Agency after being called in for “the protection of the settlement.”  Under Samuel 
Stambaugh’s direction, these warriors relieved the local militia of their responsibility for the 
security of Green Bay (ostensibly so that the militiamen could tend to their crops).  The 
Menominees received provisions, officers agreeable to them, and “assurance . . . that our 
exertions shall not be wanting in procuring for them a reasonable compensation for their 
services while in this Employ.”  More interested in revenge than wages, this body of 
Menominee warriors no doubt hoped that Black Hawk would be foolish enough to lead his 
band into the heart of Menominee country.  Although this force did little more than drain the 
stores of Fort Howard while it remained in Green Bay, it also provided the core of the largest 
Indian contingent to participate in the war.1 
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 Samuel Stambaugh shared the Menominees’ frustration concerning their inactivity.  
On 3 June, he surrendered his post to his successor, George Boyd.2  Having recently 
consolidated the Sault Ste. Marie and Michilimackinac Agencies under Henry Schoolcraft, 
the War Department reassigned Boyd, who had worked at the latter, to Green Bay, 
effectively relieving Stambaugh.3  Unfettered by the constraints of office, Stambaugh 
expressed his true feelings to Michigan Governor George B. Porter on 7 June:   
My orders from the government, you are aware, were to keep the Indians quiet & on 
no account suffer them to attempt to redress their own wrongs.  These instructions I 
implicitly obeyed, althoug I felt convinced, in the progress of affairs this Spring, of 
what was plain to every one here, that a contrary course would have saved thousands 
of dollars to the govement.  I have no hesitation in saying that the Menominees, if 
armed and backed by the government sanction would, with the auxiliary force ready 
to join them from other friendly Indian tribes, have ended the war long before this 
time, by the total annihilation of the hostile bands now harrassing and murdering our 
frontier settlers.  The Menominees have always evinced a strong disposition to join in 
the War, and it requird the full exercise of the influence which I have had over them 
that enabled me to restrain them.4 
 
Evidently, Stambaugh’s influence over the tribe was considerable.  Though he placed 
government interests first and foremost, Stambaugh became something of a champion of the 
Menominees during a decade-long struggle between the Menominees, the U.S. Government, 
and various tribes of New York State.  In about 1820, a congeries of speculators, evangelists, 
and others produced a plan to relocate Iroquois, Brotherton, Munsee, and Stockbridge 
Indians from New York State to northeastern Wisconsin.  A pair of fraudulent land “sales” in 
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1821 and 1822 exchanged millions of acres of Menominee land for goods valued at a few 
thousand dollars.  The government, which endorsed the sales, spent the next ten years 
attempting to untangle the mess they helped create.  During his tenure as acting agent, 
Stambaugh vigorously defended the Menominee claim, denounced the government’s past 
actions, and even employed subterfuge to obtain justice for his Menominee charges.5 
 Stambaugh’s efforts did not go unnoticed by the Menominees.  When Boyd arrived to 
assume office, Grizzly Bear made a formal appeal that Stambaugh be allowed “to remain 
with them until their difficulty with the Sac & Fox Indians be settled.”   Were Atkinson to 
summon the Green Bay Menominees to join the fight, Grizzly Bear further requested that 
Stambaugh accompany them in the field.6  Boyd conceded to these requests. 
 On 22 June, Grizzly Bear pled once more for permission to strike his enemy.  He 
asked not only for leave to do so, but arms as well: “We have no guns, no arms, or scarcely 
any implements of War.  I wish to go and fight them, at least for a short heat, or two days.”7  
Once again, the Menominees exhibited a strong desire to choose their own officers—men 
who would permit the Menominees to wage their own war.  “I have another favor to ask,” 
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Grizzly Bear continued.  “Here is our friend Colo. Stambaugh—who has been kind to us—
and we wish him to stay with us while these troubles last, and head us.  Colo. S. who will 
state to you all our wishes.  He knows our wants.”8  Although Boyd had already granted 
Grizzly Bear’s wish regarding Stambaugh, he withheld permission to join the fray.  Grizzly 
Bear replied that the Menominees would return to their crops, but he testily added: “Our 
enemies have taken the head of our men women & children—carried them to their lodges 
and danced the war dance over them.  We ask revenge.”9 
 Boyd communicated this request to Henry Atkinson by informing the general that two 
hundred Menominee warriors stood ready “to repair to your Standard without a moment’s 
unnecessary delay.”10  On 12 July, Atkinson finally delivered the long-awaited call to arms to 
the Menominees of Green Bay.  Perhaps recalling the logistical strain imposed by his 
Potawatomi and Ho Chunk guides, Atkinson stipulated that “I do not wish them to join me, 
but to act against the Sacs in front. parties sent out to annoy the enemy in front, and Pick off 
their horses would have a salutary effect.”11  Atkinson wanted two to three hundred 
Menominee warriors in the field as soon as possible, and he ordered the commander of Fort 
Howard to provide the necessary provisions.   
 Boyd, receiving these instructions on 18 July, responded promptly by “the usual 
mode of communicating with the Indians”—sending Indian or métis runners to the 
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Menominee villages.12  A rough-and-tumble American named Ebenezer Childs claimed that 
Stambaugh also sent him recruiting: “I collected about three hundred, and brought them to 
the Bay.  We encamped near the Agency; I took charge of them and was appointed 
commissary.  I kept out a scouting party for ten days.”13  Likely much more effective than 
Childs’s pleas were the recruiting efforts of the Menominees themselves.  In adherence with 
traditional diplomatic convention, village headmen invited others to join the warpath by 
circulating tobacco and red-painted wampum.14   The bonds of Menominee kinship also 
served to fill the ranks.  According to anthropologist Alanson Skinner, “If a man goes to war 
his nephew, on either side, or his brother-in-law, must follow him regardless of any 
hindrance.”  The nephew’s obligation did not end with enlistment: “If the uncle is killed his 
nephew must get a scalp from the enemy in revenge, or never come home alive.”15  For the 
Menominees, warfare was a family affair.  
 By 20 July, Boyd was able to report that “arrangements are making with all possible 
expedition to forward to your aid the services of two hundred Menomonies—with a view to 
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arrest the progress of the Enemy towards the Milwalkie Country.”16  Efforts to raise an 
auxiliary force of New York Indians met only frustration, perhaps because they deemed the 
enemies of the Menominees to be their friends.17  This was not the case among the lower Fox 
River Ho Chunks, however.  According to oral traditions, they had always been allies to the 
Menominees, and they remained allies now.  Numbering only twelve warriors, the Ho Chunk 
party that joined the Menominees in Green Bay was less impressive for its size than for the 
enduring attachment it represented.  
 On their way to Green Bay, the Ho Chunks visited a missionary to the Stockbridges, 
who observed: 
one having a large spear, t[he] blade perhaps a foot & a half long, and the handle 
covered with red baize, another carried t[he] colors among other things with which it 
was ornamented was a piece of a Sac Indns. scalp.  Some of them were painted red 
and had horses tales so adjusted upon their heads that the hair all hung down upon 
their shoulders, and upon the crown of the head was a plume, and another still carried 
a sort of drum wh[ich] t[he] natives make use of in dancing.18 
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Whether he realized it or not, the accouterments that drew the reverend’s attention reveal 
much about the party’s motives.  Intermarried with the Green Bay Menominees and no 
friends of the Sauks or Mesquakies, these Ho Chunks did not share their southern relatives’ 
reservations about making war against the British Band.  Like the Chicago Potawatomis, the 
Ho Chunks who guided Dodge and Atkinson were distinguished only by white headbands 
worn as guards against fratricide.19  While the lack of traditional paraphernalia bespoke the 
limited objectives of the southern Ho Chunks and Potawatomis, the red face paint, 
headdresses, and war drums of the Lake Winnebago Ho Chunks testified to the earnestness 
of their endeavor.   
 Arriving in Green Bay, the Ho Chunks discovered that they had been preceded by 
Billy Hamilton, who had arrived on 18 July bearing Atkinson’s call to arms.  Fully 
expecting—again—to assume command of the Indians, Hamilton was disappointed by Boyd, 
who kept his word to Grizzly Bear and named Samuel Stambaugh as the contingent’s 
nominal head.  “The feelings of the Menomonees,” Boyd explained, “as well as of the 
citizens generally at this place (and most of them allied to this nation of Indians by blood) 
were so hostile to the pretensions of Colo. Hamilton to command them” that the choice of 
Stambaugh was unavoidable.20  Boyd offered the position of second-in-command to Billy 
Hamilton, but, to the relief of all involved, the prideful son of Alexander Hamilton refused.21   
 The Menominees influenced the selection of their other officers, as well.  “They have 
been selected,” Boyd reported to Governor Porter, “to meet the wishes of the Indians, as to 
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conciliate public sentiment.”  By public sentiment, Boyd referred to the aspirations of 
influential Americans in Green Bay.  Thus, roughly half of the officers were métis traders the 
Menominees respected, while Americans with political aspirations comprised the other half.  
Augustin Grignon, Sr., and George Johnson served as company commanders immediately 
beneath Stambaugh.   Johnson had been the first sheriff of Brown County and represented 
white interests.  Grignon, conversely, was a métis trader of considerable standing with the 
Menominees.  According to one American observer, “The natives held him in the utmost 
reverence,” largely because he adhered to the principle of reciprocity that governed Indian 
trade relationships.  “Spending much of his time in the Indian country, and speaking but little 
of the English language, he had but slight connection with civil life, held few public offices; 
but he was regarded with much respect, as well by his own people, as the Americans and 
gentlemen of the army.”22  Grignon’s wife, Nancy McRea, was a métis woman related to the 
famous Menominee chiefs Oshkosh, Tomah, and I-om-e-tah.23  Grignon himself was the 
grandson of the famous French-Ottawa soldier Charles Langlade, who had sired métis 
children at a young age and earned a considerable reputation among the Green Bay Indians.24  
For Grignon, leading Indian auxiliaries was something of a family tradition; Langlade 
commanded Indian auxiliaries throughout the French and Indian War, most famously in 
Braddock’s defeat.25  Grignon’s son, Charles, and nephew, Robert, served as lieutenants in 
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his company.  Another member of the Grignon family, George, served as a volunteer in the 
ranks. 26   
 In Johnson’s company, Agent Boyd’s son, James, and William Powell filled 
lieutenant’s billets.  Powell, who became Robert Grignon’s trading partner after the war, was 
another métis trader who spoke Menominee; his mother was half Menominee and related to 
the chief Oshkosh.27  Frustrated in his aspirations of leading a force of New York Indian 
auxiliaries, Alexander J. Irwin served as commissary, quartermaster, and adjutant for 
Stambaugh. 
 The Menominees regarded these métis and white officers more favorably than they 
did Hamilton, but they still considered them liaisons rather than battlefield leaders.  Native 
leadership was well-represented in the Menominee contingent.  In addition to the hereditary 
chief of the Menominees, Oshkosh, and the tribe’s principal orator, I-om-e-tah, band chiefs 
and war leaders from throughout the Green Bay area assembled with their warriors.  War 
captains of stature, such as Poegonah (Big Soldier), Souligny, and Grizzly Bear, provided all 
the leadership that the Menominees required.   Other notable Menominees included Wau-
Nau-Ko, Pe-Wau-Te-Not, Osh-Ka-He-Naw-Naw-Niew (the Young Man), La Mott, and 
Carson.  Augustin Grignon later recalled, “indeed all the principal men of the Menomonees, 
were of the party.” 28 
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 The provisioning of the Menominee contingent, like the selection of its white officers, 
required sensitivity to the wants of the Menominees and the inhabitants of Green Bay.  
Although the Americans eventually assimilated or squeezed out the métis traders of this 
region, they remained an important interest group in 1832.  Boyd assured Governor Porter, 
“Your Exc’y may feel assured that in equipping this Indian force for the field, every 
œconomy will be used, consistent with the honor and interest of the Country,” but he was 
careful to spread his patronage evenly among his own cronies and influential Menominee 
relatives.29  Boyd purchased firearms at government expense from six separate suppliers, 
including his own son-in-law, Findlay Fisher Hamilton.30 
 For this opportunity to dispense federal largesse, Boyd could thank the deplorable 
state of Menominee arms, already described by Grizzly Bear.   “The Menomonees are most 
wretchedly armed, or rather not armed at all,” Boyd reported, “and I am afraid that with 
every effort & exertion, not more than 150 of this nation will be able to march efficiently 
armed.”  Dismissively, Boyd also observed that the Menominees were constructing spears for 
the campaign.31  
 The construction of spears did not necessarily indicate a lack of military preparedness 
on the part of the Menominees.  It may have signaled a ritual preparation for warfare.  
Hunting was still crucial to the Menominee economy, and the tribesmen surely had the 
implements of bloodshed available.  Certain materials, however, were sacred to the 
Menominees and were proscribed for non-martial uses.  Menominees constructed arrowheads 
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of turtle claws for use only in battle—they called upon the magic power of the turtle and 
could be used for no other purpose.  Likewise, the Menominees considered copper 
arrowheads semi-sacred and appropriate only for war.32 
 Menominee preparation for war was not limited to the construction of spears and 
arrows.  Individual warriors carried a wide range of amulets, often miniatures of war clubs, 
bows, arrows, or lacrosse sticks in a small packet.33  Each talisman conveyed spiritual power 
that either protected its bearer or bequeathed certain skills.  George Pamoh’s grandfather, for 
example, wore a rattlesnake belt during the Black Hawk War.  A “shade” gave it to him on 
the fourth day of his vision quest, indicating that it would protect him from harm.34  Another 
veteran of the campaign dreamed of eight thunder beings led by a chief dressed in dark blue 
or black who gave the dreamer a miniature lacrosse stick, a full-sized ball decorated with 
beads and feathers, a minute bow and arrows, and a “thunderbolt” in the form of a round 
stone.  All but the last were painted black.  The chief of the thunder beings said to the 
dreamer, “Grandson, I give these to you.  Whenever you go to war, carry them with you and 
you will never be hurt.”  He never was.35  Other warriors wore bear claw necklaces to render 
them invisible, and their women embroidered black panthers on their moccasins to symbolize 
their ferocity.36  Snakeskin bestowed “the serpent's power of stealthy approach,” while the 
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skin of the swallow “rendered the bearer as difficult to hit as it is that bird in flight.”  A 
miniature war club granted its bearer “the ability to strike with the force of the Thunderer.”37 
 The most significant of the spiritual accouterments carried to battle was the war 
bundle or wapanakian (“white mat”), one of four sacred bundles known to the 
Menominees.38  In Menominee cosmology, the thunderbirds control war, and it was they 
(together with the morningstar) who presented the first war bundle to the Menominees.39  
The chief thunderer, upon bequeathing it to a warrior named Watakwûna, gave him many 
instructions.  Included were directions to fight at night and strike enemies in their sleep; to 
feast and sacrifice to the bundle before taking the warpath; to have each warrior carry with 
him the image of one of the medicine birds and wear a single quill feather in his hair; to 
smudge with and chew some of the roots within for purification; to lick blood from scalps as 
a sign of devouring the enemy on behalf of the thunderers; and to hold a ceremony and dance 
following victory.40 
 Menominee warfare adhered to these instructions during the Black Hawk War and 
afterward.41  Similarly, the Menominees who assembled at Green Bay presented an 
impressive spectacle: faces painted, hair worn in a broad scalp lock and roach, and knives 
suspended from the neck by a short cord in a leather sheath beautifully ornamented with dyed 
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porcupine quills.42  On 27 July, the Stockbridge missionary Cutting Marsh recorded in his 
journal this description of the Menominee warriors: 
Their painted faces, ornaments, drums, whistles, war clubs, spears &c.  &c.  made 
them appeared indeed savage and warlike.  Their songs uttered from t[he] throat, 
consisting in deep gutteral sounds and very loud without distinction in sounds seemed 
most like the singing of frogs, and t[he] occasional whoop was calculated to make 
one feel that darkness and moral death still broods over this region, removed at a very 
considerable distance from t[he] peaceful abodes of civilization, and peace.43   
 
 By the time the Menominee contingent left Green Bay on 26 July, it was evident that 
Black Hawk was not attempting to escape eastward to Canada, so they set a course for Fort 
Winnebago.44  In accordance with traditional Menominee practice, the principal war chief or 
mikäo may have led the procession singing, “The warrior of the sacred bundle now starts.  As 
he walks he is seeking for the enemy.”45  Perhaps unwittingly, Lieutenant Powell recorded 
the identity of the mikäo for this particular campaign: “among the Menominee chiefs was 
Ahkamotte . . . selected by the Indians on this expedition as their prophet, and he held 
powwows every night to determine where the enemy were.”46 
 On 1 August, the Menominees obliged Stambaugh to halt so that they could conduct 
further spiritual preparation. 47  This ceremony likely entailed the opening of the war bundle, 
the passing of the pipe, invocation of the thunderbirds, offerings of meat and tobacco, and a 
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war dance performed with musical accompaniment by tambourine or water drum.48  
Although Stambaugh found these ceremonies “fatigueing and sometimes not a little 
annoying,” he did not interfere.49  Their salutary effect on Menominee morale was sufficient 
cause for toleration, and Stambaugh observed with satisfaction that the warriors were “in 
excellent Spirits—ready to endure any hardships that service may require.”50 
 The first “hardship” to assail the Green Bay contingent came from an unexpected 
quarter.  As the Menominees and their Ho Chunk allies ascended the Fox River, they 
encountered neutralist Ho Chunks from the Portage area who “attempted at every point we 
met them, on our route from Green Bay to the Prairie [du Chien], to prevent the Menominees 
going to war against the Sacs.”  Dissuaded by John Kinzie from participating in the war and 
still worried that the British Band would retaliate for the Paquette party’s role in the Battle of 
Wisconsin Heights, some Portage Ho Chunks even asserted that “the americans were 
enemies of all red-skins, and that the Sacs would yet be victorious.”51  Samuel Stambaugh 
took such threats as evidence that the Portage bands were active accomplices of Black Hawk, 
but the Menominees and Ho Chunks he accompanied—resolute in their purpose—were 
undeterred. 
 Unfortunately for these Indians and their ambitions, the opportunity to meet their 
enemies in battle was fading fast.  After the Battle of Wisconsin Heights, the British Band 
hurried to recross the Mississippi and avoid further confrontation.  Furnished canoes by 
sympathetic Ho Chunks, Black Hawk sent as many women, children, and elders as possible 
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down the Wisconsin River.  Although aware that the soldiers of Fort Crawford guarded the 
river’s mouth, the Indians hoped that the Americans would allow these inoffensive Indians to 
pass unmolested.  Lacking ample watercraft, most of the British Band’s noncombatants 
remained with the main body as it made its way overland to a Mississippi River crossing site.  
Ultimately, neither group escaped their enemies’ wrath. 
 On 27 July, Henry Atkinson sent a Menominee messenger to Prairie du Chien bearing 
the news of Wisconsin Heights.  Discerning Black Hawk’s intentions, Atkinson requested 
that Menominee and Dakota warriors—the same who had suffered under Billy Hamilton—
deploy along the eastern shore of the Mississippi to intercept the British Band.52  At Prairie 
du Chien, Indian Agent Joseph Street and Fort Howard commander Captain Gustavus 
Loomis anticipated the general’s wishes, dispatching a Menominee screening force on 26 
July.  To deny the British Band easy passage of the Mississippi, Loomis and Street also 
ordered Ho Chunks up the Mississippi to bring their canoes to Prairie du Chien (or suffer 
their confiscation).53  After assembling at the agency, many of the Ho Chunks—including 
Waukon Decorah—joined the Menominees in the search for the British Band.54 
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 The first contact occurred on 29 July at the mouth of the Wisconsin River.  At 
approximately 2:00 a.m., four canoes attempted to slip past a detachment of regulars and Ho 
Chunks guarding the waterway.  At close range, the Americans and their allies poured two 
volleys into the canoes, which carried principally women and children.  Red Wing, a Ho 
Chunk warrior, later claimed to have killed four men in this engagement, and official reports 
placed the enemy’s losses at fifteen killed, but the true number is impossible to know.  Many 
of the fugitives remained in their canoes after the fusillade, lying low and relying on the 
river’s current to carry them to freedom.55  Pursuing Ho Chunks dashed these hopes, 
delivering fourteen prisoners to Joseph Street over the next several days.  Street, who had 
offered amnesty to the British Band’s women and children through the Ho Chunk chief 
Carymaunee, described his prisoners as “the most miserable looking poor creatures you can 
imagine.”56   
 In the four days following the Wisconsin River engagement, the Menominees and Ho 
Chunks around Prairie du Chien captured twenty additional prisoners and collected nine 
scalps at the cost of only one killed.57  On 2 August, White Pawnee, the Ho Chunk warrior 
notable for his conspicuous participation in the Battle of Wisconsin Heights, fell into a Sauk 
ambush while tracking two warriors who had eluded the guards at the mouth of the 
Wisconsin.  Referring to White Pawnee as a “fine warrior,” Joseph Street reported his death 
                                                 
 55 Joseph Ritner to Gustavus Loomis, 29 July, Black Hawk War 37, 903; Henry Atkinson to Winfield 
Scott, 5 August 1832, ibid, 936; Reuben G. Thwaites, "The Black Hawk War," in How George Rogers Clark 
Won the Northwest and Other Essays in Western History (1903; reprint, Williamstown, Mass.: Corner House 
Publishers, 1978), 180-81; Mauchhewemahnigo, "Narrative of Walking Cloud," 464. 
 
 56 Street to Atkinson, 31 July 1832, Black Hawk War 37, 908; Street to William Clark, 1 August 1832, 
ibid., 913. 
 
 57 Joseph M. Street: Report of Prisoners and Casualties, 2 August 1832, ibid., 918-19. 
 
 217
to William Clark, but White Pawnee’s passing drew little notice otherwise.58  Concurrent 
with his demise and sixty miles up the Mississippi, the Americans and the bulk of the British 
Band waged the decisive “battle” of the war. 
 Two days earlier, Captain Gustavus Loomis had dispatched the steamboat Warrior up 
the Mississippi to alert Wabasha’s Dakotas of the British Band’s movements.  Eager to rejoin 
their fight, 150 Dakota warriors departed almost immediately while the Warrior’s crew 
lingered at their village.  The following day, on 1 August, the Warrior embarked for Prairie 
du Chien, overtaking the warriors by afternoon.  The British Band, the Dakotas reported, 
were encamped only ten miles below near the mouth of the Bad Axe River.  After cutting 
more firewood in preparation for action, the Warrior’s crew continued down the 
Mississippi.59 
 At approximately 4:00 p.m., they confirmed the Dakotas’ information.  Near the 
mouth of the Bad Axe, the ship’s crew detected a number of Sauks on the eastern shore, one 
lofting a white flag of truce.  Believing the flag to be part of a ruse, Captain Joseph 
Throckmorton ordered his crew to commence firing.60  After the Warrior fired three bursts of 
canister into the Indians, the soldiers on board laid down small arms fire until the approach of 
nightfall and the exhaustion of the ship’s fuel compelled a return to Prairie du Chien.  There, 
the boat took on not only the needed fire wood but a substantial number of Menominee 
warriors.  Early the next day, the Warrior returned to the mouth of the Bad Axe, emerging 
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from the morning fog to find the panicked remnants of the British Band attempting to cross 
the Mississippi under intense fire from the bluffs above.   
 After months of frustration and censure, Henry Atkinson had finally brought the bulk 
of his combat power to bear on an elusive enemy.  For much of the campaign, his officers 
damned the Ho Chunks for misleading the army and abetting Black Hawk, but Atkinson 
could thank Ho Chunk guides for this opportunity.  After reuniting the various brigades of his 
army at Helena, Wisconsin, on 27 July, Atkinson winnowed from his force unnecessary 
baggage, infirm regulars, and disconsolate volunteers, preparing for a pursuit “over the most 
difficult country imaginable.”61  To navigate his army through a trackless wilderness of thorn 
bushes and bluffs, Atkinson accepted the services of Nahreechsecochkeshica (Lame Ankle) 
and Mahheenibahka (Double Knife), two Ho Chunks of the Portage band.62  Like Atkinson’s 
earlier Potawatomi guides, these Ho Chunks “wore white bands about their heads, to 
distinguish them from other Indians.”63  The next six days’ journey exhausted horses and 
demoralized men, but, on the morning of 2 August, Atkinson’s army reached the Mississippi 
River.  Finally in the presence of the enemy, Atkinson arrayed his regulars and militiamen in 
line on the high ground, and the arrival of the Warrior put Black Hawk’s followers between a 
rock and a very hard place.   
 Interdicting their escape route, the Menominees and soldiers aboard the steamboat 
strafed the helpless Indians attempting to swim or paddle to the western shore.  Observing 
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their fate, other Indians sought refuge in the shallows along the eastern shore, lying still 
beneath its surface with only noses exposed to draw breath.  The crew of the Warrior noticed 
the artifice, however, and drew close to the shore so that its Menominee passengers could 
pour fire into their unfortunate, vulnerable enemies.64  Soon, the Menominees and their 
American allies, out of targets along the bank, turned their attention to clearing nearby 
islands of survivors.  Philip St. George Cooke observed the Warrior’s passengers disgorging 
on the largest island, his attention drawn to a Menominee warrior named Askaiah, who “ran 
forward, tomahawk upraised, to obtain the Indian honor of first striking the dead.”  The next 
time Cooke saw Askaiah, he lay dead—“shot in the back by a militia friend.”65  Whether this 
“friend” expressed any remorse is unknown, but Henry Atkinson personally offered the 
Menominee chiefs his condolences for their loss, and his soldiers buried the warrior beside 
their own five killed.66 
 To the Menominees, however, the sacrifice of a single slain warrior was well worth 
the reward.  In this single engagement, the British band suffered approximately 150 killed 
and ceased to exist as a coherent force.67  When Atkinson’s army entered Prairie du Chien on 
5 August, it discovered that the triumphant spirits of the Menominees exceeded their own.  
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Exalting over the scalps of their fallen foes, the Menominee men and women celebrated in 
song and dance.  Special honors were reserved for the Menominee women who had lost 
relatives in the Sauk and Mesquakie attack of the previous summer.  They stood at the center 
of the dance ring surrounded by their dancing kinfolk.  Hoisting their enemies’ scalps aloft 
with long poles, the women compelled their hirsute trophies to join the dance—rising and 
falling to celebrate the demise of the bodies they had formerly adorned.68 
 Not all Menominees had reason to celebrate.  Having learned of the events at Bad 
Axe, the Green Bay contingent of Menominees continued toward Prairie du Chien with the 
thin hope that they might yet participate in the war.  On 8 August, they crossed paths with 
homeward-bound Illinois militia brigades and narrowly survived the chance encounter.  
Marching cross-country to Dixon’s Ferry to be mustered out of federal service, the militia 
nearly opened fire on the Indians when Samuel Stambaugh, the Green Bay contingent’s 
principal white liaison, rode forward to avert tragedy.69  Each party allied to the U.S. 
government if not each other, the two forces continued on their separate ways.   
 The same day, the Green Bay Menominees received disheartening orders from 
General Atkinson, who no longer deemed their service necessary.  “He therefore directs,” 
wrote Atkinson’s aide-de-camp, “that those brave and faithful Allies of the U States shall be 
marched back to their own country, and permitted to return to their homes.”70  The Green 
Bay Menominees would not, however, abandon their task so easily.  Stambaugh realized that 
the warriors would not respond well to such orders, having “arrived almost within hearing 
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the Warhoop of their antient enemy.”71  Consequently, Stambaugh detached twenty-five 
warriors under Irwin and Powell to move to the front and “receive ocular proof that our 
government had redeemed it’s promises that their grievances should be redressed.”  Upon 
arriving in Prairie du Chien, Powell lobbied General Winfield Scott—finally arrived at the 
scene of the war—for a Menominee combat mission.  The sympathetic Scott consented, 
much to the gratification of the Menominees, who were beginning to fear that they had 
missed their war.72  The army had discovered a trail toward Cassville, Wisconsin, evidently 
left by fifty to one hundred stragglers of the British Band.  Through Powell, Scott passed the 
order to give pursuit.  Aware that time was of the essence, Stambaugh left the old men and 
those hobbled by the lack of moccasins at Brunet’s Ferry (six miles above the mouth of the 
Wisconsin) and, on 9 August, drew three days’ rations for the fittest portion of his command.  
Significantly, not one of the chiefs remained behind.73  The following morning, a leaner 
Menominee contingent, 106 strong, sallied forth. 74 
 At 11:00 a.m. on 10 August, the Menominees picked up the Sauk trail, exciting the 
warriors and accelerating their movement so that “the Officers could scarcely keep pace with 
them, on horseback.”75  At 6:00 p.m. that evening, Stambaugh’s scouts reported that the Sauk 
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party had encamped in a ravine a mere half mile ahead.76  The contingent divided into four 
parties, and Stambaugh enjoined the Indians to take prisoners rather than scalps.77 
At this critical juncture, the Menominee leadership asserted itself.  Through an 
interpreter, Grizzly Bear responded: “the Great Spirit saw proper to put a switch into the 
hands of our Sauk and Fox enemies to chastise us last year, which they did at Prairie du 
Chien, killing a good many of our people.  Now he has seen proper to put that same switch 
into our hands to-day, which I cannot prevent my young warriors from using.”  He continued, 
“since we left Green Bay we have been obedient children to all his commands; but in this 
matter about not taking scalps, we must be excused if we fail to regard it.”78  Harboring no 
illusions about the nature of his office, Stambaugh realized he could only resort to hope.  
Under the guidance of the mikäo, Ahkamotte, “The Menomonies prepared themselves for 
War in their own way, by stripping all the clothes from the body, and greasing & painting the 
skin.”79  Their preparation probably also entailed the passing of the pipe.  Just before the 
assault, the mikäo may have sung another sacred war song to the accompaniment of deer 
hoof rattles to make the enemy sleep more soundly.  At this point, the war bundle may have 
been opened again and the medicines within distributed to individual warriors who bound 
them to head or body.80 
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Even so, the attack fizzled.  Ten to fifteen miles north of Cassville, the Menominees 
overtook their foes.  The “enemy” comprised no more than ten Indians in a “helpless” 
condition.  Only two of the party were armed, adult, warriors.  Still, the Menominees made 
the most of the situation.  Ahkamotte commenced the attack with a shrill whistle blow.81  
Poegonah, “Big Soldier,” “did not discharge his gun, but rushed among the combatants to 
show his fearlessness.”82  According to Augustin Grignon, other warriors “fired a volley at 
the two Sauks, and when they fell, they were riddled with bullets by those coming up, who 
wished to share in the honor of having participated in the fight.”83  These honors likely 
included the incantation of a death blow song.  For the Sauks, the Menominees reserved a 
special song: “Skinned and cut up, and sliced to finish!”84  Another honor was a large 
wampum belt, offered by Ahkamotte as a reward to the first Menominee to take an enemy 
scalp.  Saunapow (Ribbon) collected this prize.85 
Much to Stambaugh’s relief, the Menominees reserved this grim fate for the two adult 
warriors; the remaining women and children became prisoners.86  Tragically, one of the Sauk 
children was struck by an errant piece of buckshot and died the next morning.  Lieutenant 
Robert Grignon, moreover, imprudently ran in front of friendly fire and got himself 
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wounded.87  After the fight, Colonel Stambaugh offered congratulatory handshakes to the 
chiefs.  Familiar with the handshake only as a form of greeting or farewell, Grizzly Bear 
inquired why, since they had seen each other only a few minutes ago, Stambaugh wanted to 
shake his hand.88  On a Menominee battlefield in a Menominee war, it seemed an alien 
gesture. 
After the fight, Lieutenant Powell prepared to escort the prisoners to Prairie du Chien.  
Women of the Menominee band near that town learned of these plans, though, and 
intercepted the prisoners at Brunet’s Ferry.  For the Menominees, as for many Native 
peoples, fighting was a man’s business, but warfare was the concern of the entire tribe.  
Having lost beloved family members at the hands of the Sauks and Mesquakies the previous 
summer, the western Menominee women desired vengeance not only as Menominees but, 
more viscerally, as mothers and wives.  About twenty Menominee women assembled on the 
road near Brunet’s Ferry, some armed with tomahawks and knives.  Once compelled, they 
relinquished their arms, but the Menominee women reaped symbolic vengeance by 
humiliating their enemies as they passed.  Some simply touched the Sauks, others grasped 
them and shook their bodies.89  In the Menominee war against the Sauks and Mesquakies, 
those who bore its greatest burden inflicted its final blows.   
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With the Menominees and Waukon Decorah’s Ho Chunks now satisfied that they had 
obtained their revenge, only the Dakotas retained an unsettled blood vendetta against the 
British Band—but they, too, were soon satisfied.  Although deprived of the leadership of 
Black Hawk and Wabokieshiek, who remained fugitives east of the Mississippi, the survivors 
of the British Band who reached the western shore of the Mississippi could not have realized 
the fleeting nature of the relief they felt.  Indeed, many of them had just survived the most 
harrowing event of their lives.  One Sauk woman saved herself and her infant by wrapping 
her child in a blanket, clenching it in her teeth, and grabbing fast to a horse’s tail; at least two 
other women effected similar escapes.90  Overwrought by the mixed emotions of euphoria 
and grief over loved ones less lucky, the survivors of the British Band were unaware that 
they had crossed from the American frying pan and into the Dakota fire. 
Following the Battle of Bad Axe, between one and three hundred Dakota warriors—
“stripped and painted for war”—presented themselves to Henry Atkinson and requested 
leave to pursue the survivors. 91  Aware that the request was a diplomatic gesture and that 
withholding permission might fray U.S.-Dakota relations, Atkinson assented.  In only two 
days, the Dakota warriors covered nearly 120 miles and overtook their prey near the Red 
Cedar River trading post in Iowa. 
On the morning of their seventh day in Iowa, the roughly two hundred remaining 
members of the British Band awoke to the war whoop of the Dakotas.   Exhausted, starving, 
and burdened by women and children, they stood no chance against their attackers.  After 
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two hours of sanguinary work, during which the Dakotas suffered only two killed and seven 
wounded, they left the last encampment of the British Band bearing no fewer than sixty-eight 
scalps, twenty-two prisoners, and thirty-five captured horses.92   
Afterward, two of the warriors brought news of the “battle” and the scalps to Joseph 
Street.  The Indian agent responded by disingenuously asserting that the Americans had 
waged this war on behalf of the Dakotas and the Menominees and that the Dakotas were thus 
obligated to turn their prisoners over to the Americans.93  Still, Street considered the Dakotas 
redeemed in the eyes of their Great Father: “You have proved that you are warriors, and I am 
pleased with the activity and bravery you have displayed against our common enemies the 
Sacs & Foxes.”94  Not surprisingly, Black Hawk did not share this assessment.  “The whites 
ought not to have permitted such conduct,” he argued after the war, “and none but cowards 
would ever have been guilty of such cruelty—which has always been practiced on our nation 
by the Sioux.”95  Indeed, even this most recent bloodletting failed to end the feud between the 
Dakotas and Sauks and Mesquakies, and both parties continued to trade blows throughout the 
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coming decade.  For the moment, however, the Dakota attack near the Red Cedar signaled 
the end of combat operations in the Black Hawk War.  All that remained was to capture 
remnants of the British Band who remained in hiding on the eastern shore of the 
Mississippi—principal among them Black Hawk and Wabokieshiek. 
 In seeking refuge in the Ho Chunk country, these leaders of the British Band provided 
the Menominees, Potawatomis, and Ho Chunks a final opportunity to demonstrate their 
fidelity to their powerful ally.  Having already satisfied their most important war objectives, 
Menominee participation in the search for Black Hawk represented tactful diplomacy on the 
part of their headmen.  With their war concluded, the imbroglio with the New York Indians 
assumed renewed importance, and the search for Black Hawk enabled the Menominees to 
bolster their standing before their Great Father.  On 14 August, the Green Bay contingent left 
Prairie du Chien for Fort Winnebago in two parties.  Based on information from a captive 
Sauk woman, who charged the Ho Chunks with sheltering the British Band, Stambaugh 
entertained the idea of scouring the Ho Chunk villages around the Four Lakes.  A dearth of 
provisions, however, limited the Menominees to searching a single village, which they found 
abandoned.  Stambaugh did interrogate some Ho Chunks near the Portage and found them 
“exceedingly anxious to obtain information respecting the reward offered for the 
apprehension of Black Hawk,” further suggesting that the Ho Chunks were aware of the 
fugitives’ whereabouts.96  Out of supplies but having accomplished their war aims and 
having placed themselves in good stead with the federal government, the Green Bay Indians 
abandoned their search and headed home.  On 21 August, they reached Butte des Mortes, 
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where Samuel Stambaugh disbanded the force.97  The Menominees’ long war with the Sauks 
and Mesquakies was at last at an end. 
 Unlike the Menominees, the Ho Chunks and Potawatomis could not rest on their 
laurels.  Having joined this war with the express purpose of earning the good will of their 
Great Father, the Potawatomis’ contributions to this point were modest to say the least.  Their 
uneventful service as guides and couriers seemed insufficient to put them in an advantageous 
position once land negotiations resumed—especially in light of the “Indian Creek Massacre” 
and persistent rumors that the Potawatomis had been in league with Black Hawk throughout 
the conflict.  Hence, the Potawatomis were eager to respond when the army again called on 
their services. 
 Army officers believed that the fugitives would try to make their way to Canada and 
directed the commander of Fort Dearborn, Major William Whistler, to raise a Potawatomi 
screening force to patrol the area between Milwaukee and Green Bay.  Accordingly, Whistler 
and Agent Thomas J. V. Owen sent Subagent Gholson Kercheval and a Mr. Lafrombose to 
Milwaukee, still a predominantly Indian settlement, to recruit this force.  Once again, the 
Potawatomis exhibited eagerness to serve the government, and once again their contributions 
were of negligible significance.   Unaware that Black Hawk had never left the banks of the 
Mississippi, the Potawatomis searched in vain.  By 4 September, Kercheval was back in 
Chicago to report that the operation had yielded no trace of the “Winnebago Prophet” or his 
disillusioned disciple. Other than rounding up and delivering some belligerent Kickapoos 
who had broken ranks with the British Band, the Potawatomis had concluded their service to 
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the United States during the Black Hawk War.98  Despite their meager contributions, the 
Potawatomis had grasped every opportunity to demonstrate their allegiance.  Returning to 
their homes, they could only hope that it would be enough to distance themselves from the 
British Band and the actions of some of their disaffected brethren. 
 The Ho Chunks, too, had ample motive to make symbolic gestures, but the actions of 
their various bands put them in a perilous position.  From the overt support of the Rock River 
Ho Chunks to the simmering enmity of the Decorah family, Black Hawk had elicited the 
broadest range of Ho Chunk sentiments.  Now desperate fugitives, Black Hawk and 
Wabokieshiek—accompanied by approximately twenty women and children—fled toward 
Prairie la Crosse, a microcosm of Ho Chunk ambiguity.  The two principal chiefs of the 
village, Winneshiek and One-Eyed Decorah, were, respectively, the brother-in-law of Black 
Hawk’s most trusted advisor and the brother of his sworn enemy, Waukon Decorah.  
Warriors from the village had both actively supported Black Hawk and borne arms against 
him. 
 Whether Black Hawk had planned on continued flight or, as he later claimed, to turn 
himself over to the Ho Chunks, it soon became evident that surrender was his only option.  
Upon arriving at Prairie la Crosse, Black Hawk discovered that Joseph Street had anticipated 
this move and ordered the Prairie la Cross Ho Chunks to relocate their canoes to Prairie du 
Chien, thus denying the Sauk leader and his entourage passage of the Mississippi at this 
point.99  Resigned to fate, Black Hawk and his remaining followers submitted themselves to 
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One-Eyed Decorah.   After detaining the party several days, the Ho Chunk chief dispatched 
two subordinates to escort both Wabokieshiek and the Sauk war captain to Prairie du Chien, 
where the Ho Chunks delivered their prisoners to Joseph Street on 27 August.100  
 Accordingly, the Ho Chunks hoped that “there would never more a black cloud hang 
over your Winnebeagoes” and that the gesture would quiet the “bad birds” who circulated 
rumors that the Great Father intended to punish his Ho Chunk children.101  Yet even in 
turning Black Hawk and Wabokieshiek over to the Americans, the Ho Chunks continued to 
exhibit signs of support for their captives.  When presented to Street, the captives wore newly 
manufactured vestments of white deer skin, which Ho Chunk women had sewn to convey the 
innocence of the wearers.102 
With this symbolic gesture, both the Black Hawk War and active cooperation 
between the United States and its Indian allies came to a close.  Whatever their operational 
significance, the final maneuvers of the Menominees, Dakotas, Potawatomi, and Ho Chunks 
fully illustrate the disparity of their motives in terms of both ends and intensity.  Fighting 
their own wars first and cooperating with the Americans second, the Menominees and 
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Dakotas took exceptional and sometime exceptionable measures to realize their war 
objectives.  In contrast, the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks desired only to demonstrate 
allegiance to their Great Father and exhibited little eagerness to shed the blood of fellow 
Indians.  Consequently, their contributions remained limited and their loyalty suspect.  It 
remained to be seen whether their service was sufficient to offset the manifest evidence that 














 As stability returned to the Upper Mississippi following the capture of Black Hawk, it 
remained unclear whether Potawatomi and Ho Chunk participation in the war had achieved 
its desired effects.  The Indians’ objectives were meager: they wished only to retain the land 
they yet possessed and to avoid the uncompensated removal that awaited the Sauks and 
Mesquakies.  Still, the Potawatomi and Ho Chunk campaigns were hardly the stuff of 
legends, and some Americans persisted in the belief that their Indian allies were “either 
ignorant or treacherous.” 1  Both tribes had to contend with allegations of complicity—both 
warranted and unwarranted—with the British Band.  Some charges, such as Potawatomi 
involvement in the “Indian Creek Massacre,” were irrefutable, while others were fictions 
designed to expedite removal.   Ultimately, Potawatomi and Ho Chunk cooperation with the 
United States succeeded in securing the loyalty of the Indian agents and army officers with 
whom the Indians worked most closely, but it failed to sway the popular opinion of frontier 
whites, who continued to regard all Indians as a threat.  Although Indian agents and some 
army officers steadfastly defended the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks, the Indians discovered 
that they had allied not with the Great Father but with lower-level government functionaries 
who were powerless to keep their promises. 
                                                 
 1 Henry Smith, "Indian Campaign of 1832," in Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin 
For the Years of 1883, 1884, and 1885, vol. 10, ed. Lyman C. Draper (Madison: Democrat Printing Company, 
State Printer, 1888), 160. 
 
 Following the conflict, the Dakotas and Menominees generally avoided such 
concerns.  Although Billy Hamilton’s mismanagement of the Prairie du Chien contingent had 
strained Dakota-U.S. relations, neither the Dakotas nor the Menominees had to contend with 
anti-American sentiments among their people, let alone violence against whites.  
Unthreatened by imminent removal, the Menominees and Dakotas pursued objectives 
conducive to U.S. policy and thereby earned the unqualified approbation of their Great 
Father and his agents.  Not surprisingly, Samuel Stambaugh was effusive: “The Menomonie 
Chiefs and Warriors cannot be too highly extolled for their good conduct,” he wrote George 
Boyd.  “I have no doubt of the bravery & fidelity of these people, and I most respectfully and 
earnestly recommend them to the attention of our Government as faithful & useful allies of 
the U States.”2  Concurring, Winfield Scott exclaimed, “I wish to say to the Menominees that 
I am highly pleased with the zeal and promptitude with which they marched against the 
common enemy, & that I shall report their good conduct to the government.”3  Neither did 
citizens of Green Bay fail to appreciate the conduct of the Menominees.  One citizen later 
recalled that, “In the Black Hawk war, they assembled en masse, and showed themselves 
efficient allies of the whites.”4  At the Red Cedar River, the Dakotas demonstrated their own 
“efficiency” as white allies, compelling Joseph Street to retract his earlier critique of Dakota 
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resolve. “You have proved that you are warriors,” he declared, “and I am pleased with the 
activity and bravery you have displayed against our common enemies the Sacs & Foxes.”5
 Because of their spotty wartime record, the Potawatomis were not assured of similar 
judgments, but they had reason for hope.  Under Billy Caldwell’s adroit guidance and with 
Thomas J. V. Owen’s assistance, they had waged an effective public relations campaign to 
mollify white fears and publicize Potawatomi military contributions.  Perhaps more 
importantly, Caldwell and the Potawatomi chiefs had been able to promulgate a relatively 
cohesive, multi-band policy of modest but visible support for the Americans.  Although 
much of the tribe sympathized with Black Hawk, Potawatomi elders distanced their people 
from the conflict and convinced the vast majority of their young men to stay out of the fight.  
Consequently, interrogation of Sauk and Mesquakie prisoners after the war largely 
exonerated the Potawatomis of charges of cooperating with the British Band.6   A gratified 
Winfield Scott informed Thomas J. V. Owen “that all investigation results in a perfect 
acquittal of the Pottowatamies, of any participation in the recent hostilities against us, and he 
directs this to be communicated to those Indians through the Agent at Chicago, with the 
assurance that he has so advised the War Department.”7
 This testimony, combined with the Potawatomis’ campaign service, distanced the 
tribe from the “well established fact that the Pottawattimes were concerned in the murders on 
Indian Creek.”8  Because the Potawatomis had demonstrated themselves to be faithful allies 
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to their Great Father, the government tried the perpetrators of this attack as individuals and 
made no claim against Potawatomi possessions as war reparations.  The Potawatomi policy, 
it seemed, had succeeded. 
The Ho Chunks had less reason for optimism.  Decentralized and geographically 
dispersed, the bulk of the tribe congregated at the Portage and attempted to enforce a tribal 
policy of neutrality but encountered limited success.  On opposite ends of the Fox-Wisconsin 
waterway, elements of the Lake Winnebago and Prairie du Chien bands chose alliance with 
the Americans or, at least, the Americans’ Menominee allies.  Wabokieshiek and the people 
of his village, meanwhile, had openly assisted the British Band and bore some responsibility 
in Black Hawk’s decision to reenter Illinois in 1832.  Finally, White Crow’s upper Rock 
River Ho Chunks adhered to a policy of studied duplicity, keeping all options open until the 
outcome of the war was clear.  For a moment, it seemed as though the Ho Chunks might 
replicate the diplomatic success of the Potawatomis.  Intermittent military contributions by 
various parties and White Crow’s “rescue” of the Hall sisters, they hoped, would suffice to 
overcome the Ho Chunks’ active and passive support of the British Band.  As the Americans 
began to interrogate Sauk and Mesquakie prisoners, however, it became evident that the 
militia’s suspicions about Ho Chunk loyalty had been more than warranted.   
Early evidence of Ho Chunk collaboration with the enemy came from an elderly Sauk 
woman captured by the Green Bay Menominees.  In addition to identifying the Ho Chunks 
involved in the attacks at Blue Mounds, this woman confirmed that Ho Chunks had provided 
both guides and sanctuary to the British Band, part of which continued to hide among the Ho 
Chunks in the vicinity of the Four Lakes.9  Although the Green Bay contingent’s subsequent 
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search of this area turned up nothing, the resident Ho Chunks appeared anxious to learn 
whether the government intended to offer a reward for the capture of Black Hawk.  Certain 
of Ho Chunk perfidy, Samuel Stambaugh opined that the Ho Chunks would bring the 
fugitive Sauk chief in for a bounty of thirty horses and $100, but for no other reason: “Their 
good feeling toward our Govrt would never prompt them to do so.”10   These and similar 
reports reached Winfield Scott, who concluded “with great regret, that many Winnebagos 
have been engaged in this lawless war against the Americans,” and he enjoined the Ho 
Chunks to convene in council with him on 10 September 1832.11
In the meantime, the government interrogated survivors of the British Band, who 
uniformly testified that the Ho Chunks had not only assisted Black Hawk but also borne arms 
against the Americans.  A Mesquakie named Ma-kauk identified Wabokieshiek and White 
Crow as their principal accomplices, and many prisoners depicted White Crow as a bellicose 
rabble rouser who counseled against a peaceful return to Iowa.12  According to Neapope, the 
principal civil chief of the British Band, ten lodges of Ho Chunks had provided active 
support to the Sauks and Mesquakies, furnishing corn and potatoes in exchange for durable 
goods and—more ominously—bringing in American scalps on eight different occasions.13  
Scott considered this evidence “conclusive as to certain acts of hostility committed by the 
Winnebagoes.”14  No longer desiring merely to speak with the Ho Chunk leaders in 
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September, Scott now demanded that they also surrender all individuals guilty of acts of 
violence against whites.15 
In the interregnum, Joseph Street’s self-interests converged with those of the Ho 
Chunks of his agency, who he defended vociferously.  A very prideful man, Street was 
especially sensitive to any allegation that Indians assigned to his agency had allied with the 
British Band, which he interpreted as an indictment of his performance.  Thus, Street 
continued to proclaim the innocence of “his” Ho Chunks, pointing out that they had turned 
over dozens of prisoners and killed fifty or sixty Sauks and Mesquakies.16  Indeed, following 
the Battle of Bad Axe, the Ho Chunks had abandoned their imperfect neutrality policy 
altogether by offering General Atkinson the service of ranging parties, which scoured 
western Wisconsin in search of Sauk and Mesquakie stragglers.17  In this final demonstration 
of loyalty to their Great Father, the Ho Chunks encountered considerable success, and they 
daily delivered prisoners and scalps to their agent in Prairie du Chien.18   Street now pointed 
to these actions as proof that the Prairie du Chien Ho Chunks had behaved loyally during the 
war.  Although Street admitted that Winneshiek and his family had supported Black Hawk, 
the agent attributed all other instances of Ho Chunk disloyalty to bands from south of the 
Wisconsin River—and hence beyond the range of his administrative responsibility.19  Denied 
any defense by Street, the implicated Ho Chunks turned inward for deliverance.  The task of 
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extricating the upper Rock River Ho Chunks from their precarious position now fell to the 
man who was ultimately responsible for their predicament. 
 Although every Ho Chunk band from south of the Portage was present when Scott 
finally convened his council on 12 September at Rock Island, White Crow dominated the 
discourse.  Drawing on his considerable rhetorical skills, White Crow admitted the irrefutable 
but otherwise manipulated the facts to his advantage.  He protested his own innocence and 
good conduct, but he admitted “many of our foolish boys have raised the hatchet against the 
United States; and as I said before I am ashamed, on this account, to look the whites in the 
face.”20  Despite the overwhelming evidence against him, he was able to cite an equal 
amount of evidence in his favor: his deliverance of Henry Gratiot, his rescue of the Hall girls, 
and his military service beside the Americans.  In an impressive display of oratorical 
legerdemain, White Crow eventually won over Scott, and the general even bestowed a medal 
upon White Crow, “who served gallantly with General Dodge in the late campaign.”21  
Indeed, Scott thanked many of the Ho Chunks for their service.  According to Waukon 
Decorah, “he drew his sword and put it back into its scabberd, saying he had no use for it; his 
red brethren had made it of no use.”22
 Scott had hardly convened the council merely to congratulate his “red brethren,” 
however.  “This unfortunate war seems to say that no peace can last between the 
Winnebagoes and the whites,” Scott argued, and he proposed to compensate the Indians for 
all of their lands south of the Wisconsin and Fox Rivers—minus a “small portion” the 
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Americans would extract as reparations for the conduct of Wabokieshiek and his band.23  
Incredibly, Scott did not demand similar concessions from White Crow’s band.  As with the 
Potawatomis involved at Indian Creek, individuals would bear responsibility for their actions 
without any disadvantage to their communities.  The Ho Chunks agreed to sell off their 
southern lands to distance themselves from the whites, but they requested that Henry Dodge, 
Joseph Street, and John Kinzie advise them whether or not they were being offered fair 
terms.24   
  Whether the terms were, in fact, fair is subject to debate.  In exchange for a smaller 
and inferior tract of land west of the Mississippi, the Ho Chunks ceded their remaining lands 
south of the Wisconsin River—approximately 2.5 million acres—to the United States.  Scott 
recognized that “the country hereby ceded by the Winnebago nation is more extensive and 
valuable than that given by the United States in exchange,” and the final treaty also granted 
the Ho Chunks an annuity of $10,000 for a term of twenty-seven years.25  Not having entirely 
abandoned hope of acculturating the Indians, the government further agreed to construct a 
school for Ho Chunk children near Prairie du Chien and provide their parents with the 
services of agriculturalists and blacksmiths.26  These terms were generally agreeable to the 
Ho Chunks, but they expressed concern regarding the home the Americans intended for them 
on the western shore of the Mississippi—a forty-mile wide strip of land that would place the 
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Ho Chunks between the still-warring Dakotas and the Sauks and Mesquakies.  Anticipating 
Ho Chunk concerns, Scott averred that “we will keep over you a watchful eye, and extend a 
strong arm for your protection.”27  Too familiar with the Americans’ mediocrity as 
peacekeepers, Carymaunee submitted, “We wish very much that you would remove the Sacs 
further off.  The Mississippi is a good line [to separate the Ho Chunks and the whites], but 
that between the Sacs and us not so good.”28   
 Good or not, the Americans’ offer was better than the Ho Chunks had reason to 
expect.  Although their cooperation with the British Band had been more widespread and 
systematic than that of the Potawatomis, the Ho Chunks were similarly able to parlay limited 
military cooperation into political capital.  For an alternative fate, they had to look only to the 
Sauks and Mesquakies.  Although the majority of these tribes had disavowed the actions of 
the British Band and maintained regular diplomatic relations with the United States, they 
were presented terms “on the blended grounds of conquest & contract.”  Consequently, they 
relinquished six million acres valued at $7 million, receiving only $660,000 in compensation.  
By comparison, at least, the Ho Chunk treaty appeared reasonable.  Indeed, Winfield Scott 
anticipated that his superiors would consider the treaty unduly advantageous to the Ho 
Chunks.  If the treaty commissioners had “agreed to just & equitable provisions in favor of 
the Winnebagos,” he explained, “it was because conscience required that they should be 
treated with justice & liberality.”29
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 This outcome was hardly expected or desired by the region’s settlers and politicians.  
For many, the Black Hawk War represented an opportunity to terminate immediately all 
Indian claims east of the Mississippi.  While the campaign was still underway, the citizens of 
Shelbyville, Illinois, addressed a letter directly to Secretary of War Lewis Cass, calling on 
the government to extinguish all Indian claims around Lake Michigan.  Citing the Indian 
Creek attack, they railed against the “two handed game played on us by the putawotomies & 
Wininbagoes” and assured Cass, “we should be very much pleased to see the Putawatomies 
and winnebagoes removed to the Arkansas river.”  In a sentence that speaks volumes, the 
authors added, “there is no time so suitable to remove those Indians as when you are 
secretary of war, and General Jackson President.”30   The frontiersmen’s hopes were not 
misplaced.   
Cass, Jackson, and Governor Reynolds were among the foremost advocates of Indian 
removal before Black Hawk’s intransigence, and the war only strengthened their convictions.  
Cass dedicated a lengthy essay to the subject in 1828, while Jackson’s historical legacy is 
substantially marred by his Indian removal policy.31  Governor John Reynolds was perhaps 
the most ardent champion of removal from the Illinois country. He was never fond of 
Indians, but he began to push strongly for removal on 15 August 1831.  He warned Jackson 
of impending violence if measures were not taken to remove Indians offensive to the white 
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population: “It is to be feared; if this is delayed much longer; that the people who feel the 
annoyance can not be restrained from adopting some very harsh measures of redress.”32  To 
Cass and kindred spirits, the Black Hawk War provided an opportunity to divest the Old 
Northwest of Indians once and for all.  So much was evident when he ordered Winfield Scott 
to assume overall command of the war in June 1832.  “It is very desirable,” he informed the 
general, “that the whole country between Lake Michigan & the Mississippi, & south of the 
Ouisconsin, should be freed from the Indians.”  “With this view,” he continued, “you will 
endeavor to prevail upon the friendly or neutral Chiefs of those tribes . . . to cede their 
claims, & to remove west of the Mississippi.”33  No mention of tribes that were neither 
friendly nor neutral was warranted; their removal was a forgone conclusion.  Yet the friendly 
and neutral Indians refused to accept the same fate, much to the chagrin of the chief 
executives of the United States and Illinois.  Frustrated that the Potawatomis could not be 
compelled to cede their land as war reparations, Gov. Reynolds informed Cass that “removal 
of . . . the Pottawatomie Indians is very interesting to the people of this State.”  So much so 
that he was willing to “do all in my power to effect so desirable an object.”34
 As Reynolds wrote Cass, the federal government was doing its part to realize the 
Illinois governor’s vision.  On 20 October 1832, treaty commissioners Jonathan Jennings, 
John W. Davis, and Marks Crume began negotiations with select bands of Potawatomis at 
Camp Tippecanoe, Indiana.  Although present, Thomas J. V. Owen protested the timing, 
location, and organization of the proceedings.  The purpose of the treaty was to purchase 
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from the Potawatomis their remaining lands in Indiana and Illinois—lands held in common 
by the entire tribe—but the commissioners invited only Potawatomis from south of the Grand 
River in Michigan and east of the Illinois and Des Plaines rivers in Illinois.  Moreover, the 
commissioners scheduled the treaty away from Chicago and at a time conflicting with the 
issuance of annuities, complicating attendance for those most interested in the outcome of the 
negotiations.35  Although the government agreed to pay the Potawatomis annuities totaling 
$50,000 over terms of twelve or twenty years, irregularities marred the negotiations.36  The 
commissioners—all from Indiana—ensured that the interests of their state and supposed 
Potawatomi creditors were well attended to, but they paid little heed to Potawatomi concerns.  
Ignoring Owen’s advice, the commissioners neither invited all elements of the Potawatomi 
tribe nor ensured that every band would receive the annuities to which they were entitled.  At 
this point a champion of justice toward the Indians, Michigan Territory Governor George 
Porter had been completely and intentionally excluded from the proceedings.37  Believing 
that the government was “much indebted to them for their good conduct, immediately 
previous to and during the late Indian disturbances,” Porter was now disgusted by that same 
government’s treatment of the Potawatomis.38  “I am convinced,” a surly Porter wrote Elbert 
Herring, “that as a Nation great injustice has been done them.” 39  
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Ironically, the citizens of Illinois were not satisfied with the extent of the injustice.  
By the terms of Scott’s treaty with the Ho Chunks, these Indians were not required to 
relocate until 1 June 1833.  The Potawatomis, meanwhile, were free to use their ceded lands 
until the government released them for private sale.  Impatient to realize their supposed 
dividends from the Black Hawk War, Illinoisans considered these delays intolerable.40  Many 
of them sought redress by manufacturing fictional Indian “outrages” to press for their 
immediate removal.  In November 1832, a veteran of Dodge’s battalion passed to Governor 
Porter “a report in circulation” that the Ho Chunks were dissatisfied with their treaty of 
September and were sending war wampum as far as Missouri.41  In the same month, 
complaints against the Potawatomis began to emanate from Peoria.  Reynolds forwarded the 
complaints to William Clark and Lewis Cass, demanding action.  Atkinson learned of the 
complaints and, although incredulous, sent a minion to admonish the Potawatomis for their 
own sake and requested Owen to initiate his own investigation of the disturbances, which 
included hunting on ceded lands (which they were allowed to do), stealing horses, firing the 
prairie, destroying fences, and burning a bridge.42
Although Owen dismissed the allegations as “vague and uncertain rumors,” 
allegations against the Potawatomis continued to roll in, and Reynolds continued to advocate 
total removal on account of their “outrages” and “forming combinations to resist the 
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Government.”43 Most of the complaints ranged from exaggeration to total fabrication.  An 
inquiry by Billy Caldwell and Alexander Robinson convinced Owen of the Potawatomis’ 
innocence and led him to denounce “the reports of certain Commissioners of the Executive of 
this State” as apocryphal.44  In his report, Caldwell demonstrated his adroit ability to 
manipulate the Potawatomi image—and the white perception of that image—to further the 
ends of the tribe.  Perhaps recognizing that a simple rebuttal of the allegations would be 
dismissed because of Caldwell’s inherent bias, he attempted to exploit the paternal obligation 
of the Great Father to care for his indigent and loyal children.  Caldwell pleaded that his 
people “would immediately retire, as they would rather encounter the fear of starvation, and 
forego the benefits of commerce” than to cause the slightest apprehension to their white 
brethren.  Simultaneously catering to his audience and revealing a good deal of his own 
mind, Caldwell added that the Potawatomis “know in a contest with the whites, they have 
every thing to lose, and nothing to gain.”45  Regardless, Caldwell’s and Robinson’s findings 
were those of “half breed” Indians and, hence, suspect in the first place.  They proved wholly 
insufficient to allay the paranoia of the white inhabitants of Illinois the following spring, 
when Native communities returned from their winter hunting grounds to resume residency in 
their summer villages along the Rock River. 
During the winter of 1832-1833, rumors of Indian conniving blossomed into articles 
of faith among the white settlements of northern Illinois.  Consequently, the large-scale 
return of entire Indian communities to their villages in the spring of 1833 incited a panic as 
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settlers interpreted a routine, annual migration as another Indian “invasion.”46  A ludicrous 
report that Keokuk, leader of the Sauk Peace Party, had sent war wampum to the 
Potawatomis surfaced in Cook County, and another maintained that the Potawatomis were 
circulating war wampum among the Rock River Ho Chunks.47  Tall tales grew taller yet 
when, in April 1833, Reynolds received reports from “respectable and unsuspected channels” 
and “sources greatly respected” that the Potawatomis, Winnebagos, Sauks, Mesquakies, and 
possibly Ojibwas were marshalling for war.  “The most moderate accounts” placed the 
number of warriors at four thousand.48  Another rumor maintained that two thousand Indians 
were advancing on Galena.49  Such stories gained wide circulation in the pages of the 
Galenian and other regional newspapers, which ran spectacular (albeit specious) stories 
about the impending Indian war.50
 True to form, junior officials responsible for the administration of federal Indian 
policy were quick to defend the Indians.  Oftentimes conflating the reputations of their 
assigned tribes with their own professional reputations, agents did not brook unsubstantiated 
allegations regarding the behavior of “their” Indians.  During the war, Joseph Street served 
his own interests at least as much as the Ho Chunks’ when he assured William Clark “that 
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the Winnebagoes of my Agency will remain quiet” due “to my untiring zeal in the duties of 
my office.”51  Because the agents invested considerable pride in the extent to which their 
charges remained loyal to the government, they sometimes denigrated the behavior of bands 
or tribes assigned to other agencies—and even their fellow agents.52  Other times, however, 
agents developed loyalties for their assigned tribes that transcended any regard for career; 
Thomas Forsyth and John Marsh lost their posts at least in part because of their advocacy for 
the Sauks and Dakotas, respectively.  Regardless of their motivations, the agents steadfastly 
defended the conduct of the Indians and attempted—albeit unsuccessfully—to turn the tide of 
public opinion in favor of the Indians.  
 Henry Gratiot began lobbying on behalf of the Rock River Ho Chunks before the war 
was even over; he rode through the lead country offering assurances of their fidelity in the 
hopes of alleviating paranoia.53  He continued to do so after the conflict, investigating rumors 
of Indian belligerence in the company of the Ho Chunk chief Whirling Thunder.  Finding the 
reports to be either baseless or greatly exaggerated, Gratiot informed Porter that the Indians 
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“were as much alarmed as the white people.” 54  Visiting Turtle Village, the supposed staging 
area for thousands of hostile warriors, Gratiot found only a “thinly attended” “‘Medicine 
Feast,’ the object of which was to ‘Smoke to the Great Spirit,’ and consult with one another 
on their future prospects, such as planting corn, exploring their new country, the removal 
permanent location etc.”  White Crow dispelled the rumor that the Potawatomis had 
circulated war wampum when he showed Gratiot the actual belt, which was tied with green 
ribbon—a sign of peace.  The Potawatomis, it turned out, were privy to white rumors of Ho 
Chunk war plans and had sent the wampum to dissuade their neighbors from going to war 
with the whites.55  The Potawatomis had nothing to fear, however; Gratiot found “All of the 
Rock River Indians … destitute of ammunition and provisions” and incapable of waging war 
had they so desired.56
To the north, John Kinzie, whose wife referred to the Ho Chunks of their agency as 
“our own people,” told a similar story.57  He lambasted the authors of newspaper articles 
“Calculated to prejudice the minds of the Whites against those Indians, if not, to create new 
disturbances.”58  Having just himself traveled from Chicago to Fort Winnebago, Kinzie 
testified “that there is not the least ground for suspicion or alarm—that the Indians have 
never manifested a greater desire to remain at peace, and to cultivate good feelings, than at 
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the present time.”59  Commenting on rampant rumors about a supposedly imminent Indian 
war, Kinzie assured Governor Porter that he had “never seen less to fear on that score than at 
present.  All the principal men of the Winnebago nation, with whom I have conversed, are 
very anxious and desirous of remaining at peace.”60  From Chicago, Potawatomi Agent 
Thomas J. V. Owen similarly submitted, “The Indians are so perfectly acquainted with the 
Power and facilities of the Government & are so well aware of their own weakness and 
imbecility, that no further difficulties need be apprehended from them, for the present.”61  If 
Owen’s appraisal was less then complimentary, it helped complete a very clear picture of 
Indian relations in the Old Northwest—one devoid of hostilities initiated by the Indians. 
Hostilities initiated by the whites, however, were an entirely different matter.  
Worried that John Reynolds’s imprudent characterization of the Potawatomis would incite 
the Illinoisans to violence, George Porter warned Elbert Herring of the probable 
consequences.  Empathetically, he forwarded to the commisioner the admonishment of a 
Potawatomi chief in Chicago: 
If we are to be treated as enemies, behave as we may, who can blame us for joining in 
with our brethren of the forest.  But remember we are suspected unjustly, and if any 
thing is done by our young men, it is not our fault—we are driven into it, and the 
whites must blame themselves.62  
 
The chief’s concern was not unwarranted; in February 1833 Henry Gratiot warned the 
secretary of war, “I have great difficulty in pacifying the white people, and preventing them 
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from commencing hostilities on the Indians.”63  The U.S. Army, which had shown itself only 
modestly successful in preventing hostilities between Indian peoples, remained Gratiot’s only 
option for preventing such a calamity; he asked Cass to furnish a military force to preserve 
the peace in the coming spring.64  From Prairie du Chien, Joseph Street concurred.  In the 
absence of a robust, permanent force of peacekeepers, he opined, “there will in my opinion 
be little prospect of peace” and “the first favourable moment will be seized to do mischief.”65  
Unfortunately for the Indians, White Beaver had returned to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, 
and the Indian agents’ pleas for help fell on deaf ears in Washington.  The citizens of Illinois, 
conversely, listened to what the agents had to say, and they did not like what they were 
hearing. 
 Although the Indians enjoyed the support of the agents, it was becoming increasingly 
evident that they operated in isolation from the Jackson administration and in opposition to 
white interests on the frontier.    Even before the Black Hawk War, relationships between 
federal officials and the ever-growing white population of the Old Northwest were often 
tense or even antagonistic, but a quasi-state of martial law had helped subordinate the unruly 
frontiersmen to federal regulation.  Enfranchised in the defense of the frontier by Reynolds’s 
militia call-up, the residents of Illinois now questioned the priorities of Indian agents who 
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seemed to regard the “savages” above their own countrymen.  During the war, a Galena 
resident complained directly to President Jackson about the supposed malfeasance of Henry 
Gratiot, who “will get angry when the people say his Indians are not friendly” and jealously 
upheld Indian claims to the lead mining region.   Also complaining that the “Indian Agents 
act in cog. with the Indian traders”—principally Franco-Indian métis—the complainant 
charged, “There ought to be a change in the Indian Department . . . there is something 
radically wrong in it.”66
 Disinclined to heed the concerns of pro-Indian bureaucrats, frontier whites were far 
more receptive to recommendations of Henry Dodge—a roughneck frontiersman and true 
“man of the people” who emerged from the Black Hawk War as one of its few heroes.67   
Although he shared the agents’ sentiment that trouble was imminent, Dodge offered a 
solution more in line with local (and hence his own) interests: “I think it is important to the 
peace of the country that the Winnebagoes should be forced to leave the country ceded to the 
U States, & that there should be an entire separation between the Potawatomies & 
Winnebagoes.”  Dodge went on to accurately gauge “the dislike of the people of this frontier 
to these two nations of Indians” as well as the common (albeit exaggerated) impression “that 
they participated in the late war with the Sacs & Foxes.”68  
Dodge’s conclusion, however, that “their present location will produce war between 
them & the U.S. troops, unless they are all removed” represented a potentially self-fulfilling 
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prophesy.69  Unlike Gratiot and others who saw the U.S. Army as a buffer between Indians 
and the frontier white population, Dodge maintained the Jacksonian view that the U.S. Army 
and the tribes of northern Illinois were intrinsically antagonistic.  Interestingly, the U.S. 
Congress made Dodge’s provisional “Battalion of Mounted Rangers” a regular unit in the 
U.S. Army, renaming it the 1st Regiment of U.S. Dragoons and appointing Dodge 
commander on 5 March 1833.  Although the appointment of regular army officers such as 
Stephen Watts Kearny, Jefferson Davis, and Philip St. George Cooke to subordinate posts 
infused the unit with some of the discipline and regimentation of the U.S. Army, the 1st 
Dragoons retained the character of the Rangers, which is to say that it was a unit manned by 
frontier miners who wished to expel Indians from the region.70  Dodge’s prediction of 
imminent hostilities between the Indians and the U.S. Army is therefore not surprising—nor 
is the fact that the Ho Chunks of Kinzie’s subagency grew convinced that Dodge’s new 
regiment had “been organized purposely for their extermination.”71  In reality, Congress 
established the dragoons to free the War Department from the vagaries of relying on 
volunteer cavalrymen during times of war.72  Still, the Ho Chunks breathed easier when 
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Dodge’s troopers rode off to their winter quarters in Arkansas in October in 1833, thereby 
eliminating the supposedly imminent clash of arms between Indians and federal troops.   
In spite of Dodge’s biased perspective, he correctly informed his superiors that 
“Whether the white inhabitants are in danger or not, they appear confident of the hostile 
dispositions of the Indians.”73  Having now endured two Indian wars in the span of five 
years, the white inhabitants of the region eyed their Native neighbors with fear and loathing.   
Every movement proved cause for alarm, and every affront provided the pretext for 
retribution.  Unfortunately, the Indians who returned to their summer villages along the Rock 
River in the spring of 1833 were desperate and starving, a circumstance that could not help 
but produce friction between the two peoples. 
Economic hardship for the Indians of the region began with the Black Hawk War 
itself, which shattered the fragile sustenance economies of communities along the campaign 
trail.  Seeking refuge at their respective agency houses to avoid being confused with the 
“hostiles” of the British Band, Ho Chunks and Potawatomis of northern Illinois and southern 
Wisconsin relied on the beneficence of the Great Father to fill their stomachs in the summer 
of 1832.  Recognizing the dimensions of the crisis, Indian agents routinely spent beyond their 
authorization and requested additional funds. 74 
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Once the crisis had passed, these Indians returned to their villages only to find that 
their untended crops had failed.75  To make matters worse, cholera appeared among some 
communities around Chicago.  Thomas J. V. Owen sent medical assistance but 
acknowledged its minimal help in the absence of “the necessary diet and attention.”76  
Autumn brought no improvement.  The growing season already past and their larders empty, 
Indian leaders again appealed to their agents for aid.  Although agents were uniformly 
empathetic, they had to request additional funds to cover the unforecasted expenditures, 
which produced intolerable delays.77  By the time supplies arrived, most Indian communities 
had dispersed to their winter hunting camps.  Ironically, a mild winter actually compounded 
the problem; minimal snowfall hampered the winter hunts, making deer more difficult to 
track and their movements more unpredictable.78  By March 1833, John Kinzie reported that 
“All of the Indians in this section of the country are actually in a state of starvation.” 79  
Deprived of venison, the Indians resorted to the staple of the deer and rooted acorns from the 
forest floor. 
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Hence, the Indians who reoccupied their summer villages in the spring of 1833 were 
in a pitiful state.  In locations close to white settlements, their return seemed an ominous 
harbinger of another Indian “uprising.”  Recognizing their precarious standing in public 
opinion, head men implored their young men to be on their best behavior.  Inevitably, 
however, some Ho Chunks and Potawatomis pilfered crops, livestock, and even lead ore to 
fill their stomachs or provide the means to do so in spite of their elders’ pleas.80  But when 
they did , the whites made the perpetrators pay.  Governor Reynolds’s loyal subordinate 
Isaiah Stillman informed the governor “that the Whites had caught several of them & 
whipped them in a most inhuman manner.”81  Grasping the opportunity to use these 
“depredations” to further his case for immediate removal, Reynolds dispatched his own 
investigator to the scene.  He was no doubt embarrassed, however, by S. C. Christy’s 28 
April report, which found stories of Indian transgressions greatly exaggerated.  Indeed, all of 
the Indians he encountered professed friendship and convinced Christy that they had 
committed no depredations.82  Although no doubt inclined to bury Christy’s report, Reynolds 
had little reason to despair.  His own views on the subject of Indian removal aligned neatly 
with those in Washington, and the destitute condition of the Illinois Indians provided the 
Jackson Administration with all the leverage needed to see them gone. 
Eager to improve their condition, Indians across the region planted their summer 
crops at the first opportunity.  For the various Ho Chunk bands, this undertaking posed a 
problem.  By the treaty of 15 September 1832, they had agreed to migrate either to the north 
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side of the Wisconsin River or west of the Mississippi by 1 June 1833, and none of their 
crops would be ready for harvesting at that time.  Consequently, Ho Chunk leaders appealed 
to their agents for permission to cultivate crops over the summer to prepare for the move and 
the ensuing winter.83  They pointed out that they had already sown their fields and—
assuming too much charity on the part of their white neighbors—that these lands could not 
possibly be of any use to the settlers until the following year.  Acknowledging their good 
behavior and dire need, Kinzie forwarded the request to Governor Porter, who endorsed it 
before sending it on to the Indian Office.  Conditioned to consider these men faithful 
representatives of the Great Father, who promised to look after and protect his “red children,” 
the Ho Chunks were no doubt pleased with the initial response to their entreaty.  They did not 
understand, however, the proscribed authority of their agents and territorial superintendents.  
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Elbert Herring’s response to the Ho Chunk request dispelled 
at once any hope that these Indians would retain their lands through the summer.  More 
importantly, it suggested the agents of the Indian Office—who exhibited too much empathy 
for their Indian charges—were not true representatives of the Great Father, after all. 
Despite the miserable state of the Ho Chunks, the reasonableness of their request, and 
the endorsement of government officials most familiar with the tribe, Herring informed 
Governor Porter that an extension of Ho Chunk occupancy was out of the question.  
Moreover, Herring directed Porter to make every exertion to urge the Ho Chunks westward 
beyond the Mississippi rather than north of the Wisconsin, as permitted by the treaty.84  Just 
two weeks earlier, however, Herring had informed Porter that “It is not in the contemplation 
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of the Government to press the removal of the Winnebagos West of the Mississippi….  The 
choice of their future abode in either region is left entirely to their own free will.”85  Not 
surprisingly, then, Porter was astonished by Herring’s precipitous change in tune, especially 
since it contrasted with his own judgments on the subject.  Porter submitted a scathing 
critique of a policy he deemed of no advantage to the U.S. and detrimental to the Indians.  “I 
cannot,” he protested to Herring, “while holding the responsible office of Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs [for Michigan Territory], suffer any arrangement to be made with regard to the 
Indians under my care, which I disapprove, without remonstrating against it.”  The Ho 
Chunks had never accepted Street’s plan whereby they would provide a buffer between the 
warring Dakotas, Sauks, and Mesquakies.  Consequently, they informed Porter that they had 
no intention of migrating westward of the Mississippi, preferring instead to migrate to their 
own lands north of the Wisconsin.  Although Porter pledged not to “interfere with what is 
adopted as the policy of the Government,” this same policy left him befuddled and angry.86
Having forged diplomatic bonds and even military alliances with the tribes of the 
region, Porter and the agents under him (as well as those under Clark) maintained 
relationships with the Indians that were now threatened by the policies of Washington.  In 
response to Porter’s tirade, Herring made it very clear that “this object is in conformity with 
what I am authorized to say, is the view of the President.”  And, while the Indian Office 
could not direct agents to violate the conditions of ratified treaties with Indian nations, 
Herring reminded Porter that it was the duty of officers of the Indian Office to take into 
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account the views of the President.87  Put simply, Herring put Porter and his agents on notice 
that, should they place loyalty to the Indians above loyalty to their president, they should be 
prepared for the consequences.  These required no articulation. 
Although they were not yet entirely aware of it, the Indians of the Old Northwest had 
formed alliances with individuals rather than the United States.  While the agents of the 
Indian Office and officers of the U.S. Army pretended to wield plenipotentiary powers when 
dealing with Native people, their authority as ambassadors was actually quite limited.  The 
practice of falsely claiming absolute power was a product of the militarization of Indian 
relations in the formative years of U.S. Indian policy.  Aimed primarily at preventing Indian 
hostilities on the frontier, this policy operated on the principal of deterrence: the projection of 
might (whether real or imagined) to cow the Indians into passivity.  Conducting council 
meetings in the presence of military force and addressing the Indians in grandiloquent 
fashion, agents and officers made it very clear that they spoke not for themselves but for the 
Great Father in Washington.  Among the Indians addressed, there was little reason to 
question the veracity of this claim.  The proceedings adhered to a familiar form, and many 
Indian societies similarly delegated responsibility for diplomacy to gifted orators while 
hereditary headman either sat passively or remained at home.  It was entirely understandable, 
then, that the Indians would believe that they engaged in formal diplomatic talks between 
sovereigns.   
In reality, however, the Indians of Jacksonian America dealt with a congeries of mid-
level bureaucrats from the Indian Office and tactical commanders from the U.S. Army, each 
interested in securing the allegiance of the various tribes of the Old Northwest, but none of 
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them capable of influencing U.S. Indian policy to guarantee reciprocity.  Now that the war 
was over, Indians who had offered military assistance or taken pains to ensure neutrality 
expected the Great Father to treat them like the loyal “children” they were.  Having labored 
to foster good relations with the tribes they represented and consistently averring that the 
Great Father always looked after their interests, their agents expected the same.  Both parties 
now found their expectations disappointed.  Accustomed to gaining the loyalty of Indians 
with the “carrot and stick” approach, the agents of the Indian Office discovered that the 
Jackson Administration was keen to wield the stick but parsimonious otherwise. 
 In the case of the Ho Chunks, Elbert Herring’s Indian Office found a way to use the 
supposed benevolence of the Great Father to its advantage.  In exchange for their lands south 
of the Wisconsin and east of the Mississippi Rivers, the Ho Chunks received—in addition to 
their annuity and typical compensation package of “civilizing” influences—sixty thousand 
rations to offset any hardship endured by the migration.88  Already starving when they signed 
the treaty, the Ho Chunks earned the empathy of Winfield Scott, who issued a third of these 
rations on the spot to ease their suffering.  In the remaining rations and other treaty 
incentives, Herring saw an opportunity to adhere to the letter of the treaty—which promised 
the Ho Chunks the choice of their abode—while violating its spirit.  Although only one sixth 
of the Ho Chunks reported to the Prairie du Chien Agency at this time, Herring directed that 
Joseph Street receive half of their annuity payment for disbursement at this place.89  As a 
consequence of this decision, Ho Chunks deciding to remain in Wisconsin would receive 
only a paltry fraction of their share of the annuity.  Worse yet, Herring sent all remaining 
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treaty incentives—to include the remaining rations—to Prairie du Chien, as well.90  Despite 
Herring’s earlier insistence that “The choice of their future abode in either region is left 
entirely to their own free will,” the Ho Chunks essentially had to choose between westward 
migration and starvation.91
Porter was disgusted with Herring’s adopted course of action and openly challenged 
the fairness of a policy that left the choice of residence to free will but says “that if you go to 
one place you shall have rations—but if to the other you shall have none.”92  Predicting that 
this policy would produce starvation, Porter intoned that ensuing loss of life would weigh on 
Herring’s conscience, not his own.  Still, Porter realized what he was up against, and he knew 
that a terrible alternative existed.  Resigning himself to the injustice and inevitability of Ho 
Chunk removal, Porter sought a single concession from the Indian Office: a prohibition 
against the use of force.  Although his advice had carried little weight to date, Porter 
submitted that the use of force for removal was unnecessary, that it should not be 
contemplated, and that any such consideration ought to be kept from the Indians.93
Officials in Washington did not share Porter’s reservations.  On 9 May 1833, 
Commanding General of the U.S. Army Alexander Macomb ordered Henry Atkinson to 
enforce the 1 June deadline.  Although Atkinson displayed little enthusiasm for the edict, 
Colonel Henry Dodge compensated for his commander’s lack of zeal.  Less than a month 
earlier, Dodge had written directly to the War Department to protest the possibility of the Ho 
Chunks remaining on their lands through the summer: “This arrangement will not suit the 
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people of the frontier.  Nothing but the removal of the Rock River Indians will restore peace 
to the people of the mineral country.”94  From the mineral country himself, Dodge wasted no 
time in implementing Macomb’s instructions.  By mid-July, he had driven the Ho Chunks 
from their former lands south of the Wisconsin River.95  In Prairie du Chien, one Ho Chunk 
chief explained to Joseph Street, “Genl. Dodge has hunted us from Lake to Lake like Deer—
we could not hide from him—we wanted to remain where we were.”96
 So, too, did the Potawatomis, but Billy Caldwell was realistic about their prospects.  
When John Kinzie inquired about the Potawatomis’ willingness to cede their remaining lands 
on the western shore of Lake Michigan, Caldwell resignedly requested that they be permitted 
to send a delegation to Iowa to inspect their new home and to make peace with the Sauks and 
Mesquakies.  Aware that the Sauks and Mesquakies might not reciprocate his willingness to 
make amends, Caldwell also requested an army escort to ensure his party’s safety.97  Not all 
Potawatomis accepted this fate, however, and several surly chiefs demanded to know why 
the government summoned them to Chicago in September 1833.  Although often critical of 
his president’s Indian policy, treaty commissioner George Porter loyally responded to the 
Indians with “a forcible Jacksonian discourse” regarding the necessity of separating the 
Natives from the whites.98   Conducting diplomacy as part of the Three Fires, the 
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Potawatomis selected Ap-te-ke-zhick, an Ojibwa, as their spokesperson.  When the council 
began in earnest on 16 September, the Indians made explicit their unwillingness to sell any 
additional land.  “If we have to sell all our lands and go where you advise us, some great evil 
might happen to us,” Ap-te-ke-zhick explained.  Having enjoyed mutually beneficial 
relations with the French and métis of the region, the Indians did not accept Porter’s assertion 
that they could no longer remain: “Here the Great Spirit allows us to live in peace amongst 
ourselves, with the white man and all.  We are happy here.” 99  Porter did not abandon his 
mission so easily.  After browbeating the Potawatomis for over two weeks, Porter finally 
compelled the Indians to sign a treaty.100  According to one resident of Chicago, “It should 
have been conducted upon the principals of truth and justice; but the whole thing was a farce, 
acted by those in office in our Government.”101  Harangued by Elbert Herring to mind his 
president more than his conscience, George Porter obeyed.  Even as an individual, he was no 
longer an ally of the Potawatomis. 
 Despite their treaties, the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks remained reluctant to migrate 
westward.  They had allied with their Great Father to influence their own fate and found their 
future almost entirely beyond their control.  Both tribes, moreover, harbored considerable 
anxiety regarding their new home.  Aware that the Sauks and Mesquakies considered them 
treacherous for their role in the recent conflict, the Ho Chunks were unenthusiastic about 
sidling in as neighbors.   Worse yet, Black Hawk’s defeat had done nothing to stem the 
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Dakotas’ war with the Sauks and Mesquakies, and the Ho Chunks’ new home lay between 
the warring tribes.  Unimpressed by Joseph Street’s buffer plan in 1827, the Ho Chunks had 
not changed their minds since.102
 Their reservations were well-founded.  In late November 1833, a Mesquakie war 
party attacked three Dakota lodges on the Root River.  The initial raid turned into a day-long 
running engagement in which the Dakotas lost nine killed.103  Two of L’Arc’s sons—
including Enchankeeanazie (Red Pine), who was to have succeeded his father as chief— 
were among those killed.104  Both sides protested their innocence to the Americans while 
simultaneously mobilizing for war in the spring.105  Adhering to protocol, the Indians 
promised to stay their hands while they awaited their Great Father’s justice, but everyone 
involved knew better.  The Indians continued to trade blows in January and February 1834, 
and Fort Snelling’s commander informed General Macomb, “Among the Indians I regret I 
perceive a distrust of the promptness and energy of the Americans.”106
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 The Ho Chunks shared this lack of faith, and those who had migrated westward fled 
their new home for the familiar safety of Wisconsin.107  A Sauk and Mesquakie war party 
added urgency to the exodus by attacking a party of Ho Chunks and their Menominee 
companions in late January.108  Soon afterward, a disgusted Whirling Thunder protested to 
Lewis Cass, “We are tired of having no home—We are scattered all over the country like 
wild beasts, and whish to unite in the spring, and build a village and plant corn.”109  Refugee 
Ho Chunks overpopulated the area between the Mississippi and Wisconsin rivers, overtaxing 
the region’s resources and compounding the Indians’ hardship.  Lacking options, many of 
them returned to their ancient homeland around Lake Winnebago.110
 Disturbed by the direction of Ho Chunk migration—eastward vice westward—the 
government had more pressing problems with which to contend.  Intertribal warfare again 
threatened to consume the frontier, and the government struggled to uphold its obligations to 
the warring tribes while simultaneously keeping the peace.  Under the leadership of their 
respective “peace parties,” the Sauks and Mesquakies appealed to the Americans for 
unfettered permission to wage war against the Dakotas.  Throughout the Black Hawk War, 
these tribes’ leaders had adhered to the government’s every direction and, to their minds, 
demonstrated unflinching loyalty to their Great Father.  “All we ask,” a Sauk-Mesquakie 
shaman explained “is to let us gow to war with our Ennemies.”  Anticipating the usual 
response, the religious leader asked his agent to forward this request to “the red Head” in St. 
                                                 
 107 Burnett to William Clark, 19 January 1833, ibid. 
 
 108 Gratiot to Cass, 2 February 1834; Bliss to Macomb, 27 February 1834, ibid. 
 
 109 Henry Gratiot to Cass, 2 February 1834, ibid. 
 
 110 Burnett to Clark, 20 February 1834; Robert McCabe to Porter, 25 March 1834, ibid. 
 
 264
Louis, William Clark.111  The Sauks and Mesquakies misplaced their faith in their territorial 
superintendent.  Elbert Herring rejected the request as “totally inadmissible,” which closed 
the issue for William Clark.112  Unlike Porter, who grappled with irreconcilable questions of 
duty and justice, Clark was always a consistent and reliable steward of federal Indian 
policy—whatever direction it might take.113   
 Lacking allies in the Indian Office since Thomas Forsyth’s dismissal four years 
earlier, the Sauks and Mesquakies turned to Henry Atkinson for succor.  On 27 March, 
leaders from both tribes met with the general at this command post in Missouri and alleged, 
“It is your fault you hold us so fast, and the Sioux’s know that you will hold us.”  Keokuk 
added, “And we hope that the President will release us from the treaty—and let the Sioux’s 
and our nation settle our difficulties in our own way—as we used to do.”114  Formerly an 
advocate of using the army to maintain peace among the Indians, Atkinson now recognized 
that the practice created more problems than it solved.115   Despite his empathy, Atkinson 
was powerless to grant the Indians’ wish.  
 Sauk and Mesquakie disappointment, however, paled in comparison to the Dakotas’ 
frustration.  Speaking to Lawrence Taliaferro in June, L’Arc was incredulous that the 
Americans remained incapable of enforcing the 1830 treaty line that established a boundary 
between his people and their enemies—and yet more astonished that the United States would 
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treat its Dakota allies no better than these enemies. “I know not what to say my heart is 
getting so full now that I feel as a man that is getting drunk—for I see no signs of redress.”  
Averring that the recent Mesquakie attacks were a direct consequence of Dakota participation 
in the Black Hawk War, L’Arc implied that the Americans were not upholding their 
obligations as allies.  Unless they began to do so, another speaker warned Taliaferro, the 
Dakotas would build new alliances that did not include the Long Knives.  “Messages have 
been sent to the Seven fires” of every Sioux tribe, Wah-koo-ta advised his agent.  If the 
Americans did not act quickly, “there will be cutting of each other up worse than ever.”116
 Perhaps predictably, the Americans did not act fast enough, and the cutting continued.  
On 5 November 1834, a Mesquakie war party crossed the Mississippi five or six miles above 
Prairie du Chien and attacked a Ho Chunk band at daybreak.  The band belonged to Waukon 
Decorah, who had fought with the Americans to avenge the death of his daughter in 1829.  
The Mesquakies responsible claimed that this assault was a mistake—that they had intended 
to strike Dakotas or Menominees—but Waukon regarded the attack as revenge for helping 
the Americans during the Black Hawk War.  In allying with them, Waukon had, indeed, 
avenged his daughter’s death, but now ten women and children from his family—among 
them his wife—lay dead.117   The cost of alliance with the Great Father was considerable and 
manifest; the dividends, however, were hard to discern. 
***** 
 Always perceptible in some degree, the differences between the Great Father and his 
French and British forerunners became stark in the months and years following the Black 
                                                 
 116 Talk of L’Arc, Sioux Chief, 4 June 1834, Transcripts from Indian Office Files, Box 65. 
 
 117 Street to Clark, 25 October 1834; Ethan Allan Hitchcock to William Clark, 5 November 1834; 
Street to Clark, 18 November 1834, ibid.; "The Winnebagoes and Black Hawk War," 308. 
 
 266
Hawk War.  Under these earlier regimes, military and economic alliance between the Natives 
and their European patrons had helped to create a world conducive to their mutual benefit.  
The fur trade, while it altered Indian economies and regional ecology, depended on the 
preservation of the Indians’ way of life and continued ownership of their land.   French and 
British military dependence on the Indians and the presence of other European suitors, 
moreover, compelled these regimes to treat the Indians fairly and even generously.   For 
sixteen years following the War of 1812, American officials had labored to replicate this 
milieu.  The Indians’ dependence on a European trading partner helped offset the 
awkwardness of the Americans, who deliberately (if imperfectly) imitated the diplomatic 
forms of their predecessors and achieved a modicum of success in the first decade of their 
suzerainty over the Old Northwest.  This success proved short-lived, however, as white 
miners flooded the region in the mid-1820s and lay bare the limits of America’s loyalty to its 
Indian allies.  Unlike earlier European interlopers, American miners and settlers were not 
subject to interdependency with the Indians.  The only thing they required of the Natives was 
for them to be gone.    
 For the most part, the stewards of alliance—Indian agents and some army officers—
faithfully defended Indian rights against white encroachment and abuse.    Following the 
Winnebago War of 1827 and Andrew Jackson’s ascendancy to the presidency in 1829, 
however, these men engaged in a quixotic campaign destined only to earn the enmity of 
frontier political leaders and thereby marginalize the Indian agents’ importance.  By the eve 
of the Black Hawk War, it was evident to most Americans and men like Billy Caldwell that 
the Natives could not possibly preserve both their lands and their lifestyle any longer.  Other 
Indians clung to the forlorn hope that, if Black Hawk could not restore Indian tribal 
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sovereignty in the region, the Great Father would at least protect them from further assault by 
frontier whites.  It was this hope that compelled the Ho Chunks and Potawatomis to suppress 
their sympathies and to offer military aid to the Americans, and it was this hope that was 
dashed by the treaties of 1832 and 1833.  Disgusted and sometimes outraged by 
government’s abandonment of the Indians, their remaining white friends were powerless to 
intercede.  Some, like Michigan Territory Governor George Porter, resigned themselves to 
complicity.  At long last, the United States’ allies reached the inescapable conclusion: “We 
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CHAPTER 9.  AN INDIAN WAR. 
 
 
 When Dakota messengers notified Joseph Street of the final destruction of the British 
Band, the Indian agent asserted that “Your G.F. had no war of his own with the Sacs & 
Foxes—This [was] a war commenced for the sake of the Sioux & Menomines.” 1  Although 
Street took considerable liberty with the truth, the Dakotas did not object.  From the very 
beginning, the Dakotas, together with the Menominees, had considered this their war—an 
Indian war in which the Americans opted to interfere.  In fact, every Native group that 
participated in the conflict did so with the design of realizing their own objectives and 
serving the interests of their people.  In several instances, these designs compelled 
cooperation with the United States—but always with the goal of accomplishing their own 
objectives.  Broadly defined, these objectives fell into four categories: the opportunity to reap 
material gain, to exert political leverage, to settle intertribal scores, and to fulfill male gender 
roles.  Paradoxically, fulfillment of the last two of these objectives convinced many frontier 
whites of the Indians’ savagery while at the same time restoring peace to the region.   Taking 
advantage of the new stability, white settlers surged into the region and demanded the final 
removal of the “red demons” who had, ironically, helped restore order.   
 Americans regarded the contributions of the Dakotas, Menominees, Potawatomis, and 
Ho Chunks as negligible to the outcome of the war.  Following “Stillman’s Run” and the 
disbandment of the first Illinois militia army, Henry Atkinson requested Indian assistance in 
                                                 
 1 Speech to Wabashaw's Band of Sioux, 21 August 1832, Joseph Montfort Street Papers, Iowa 
Department of Archives and History, Des Moines.  
a moment of desperation, but his tardy invitation to war and decision to place Billy Hamilton 
in command doomed the Prairie du Chien contingent of Menominees, Dakotas, and Ho 
Chunks to irrelevance.  Receiving their summons a month later yet, the Menominees and Ho 
Chunks of Green Bay met a similar fate.  Although Atkinson was grateful to accept the 
services of Caldwell’s Potawatomis, the general rarely incorporated them into his plans or 
reports and later admitted, “I found it necessary to urge the Potawatomies to take sides not 
that I wanted their strength, but, to Know where to find them.”2  Similar considerations led 
Atkinson to employ Ho Chunk scouts, but he later concluded that “they told me lies—they 
deceived me when they told me where to find the Sacs.”3  Although Atkinson and Winfield 
Scott subsequently heaped praise on all of their Indian allies, their campaign conduct 
warranted only passing mention in the generals’ official reports.  Some officers remained 
open-minded or optimistic about the military potential of Indian allies or auxiliaries, but 
senior officials appeared circumspect.  Alexander Macomb appears to have left no 
commentary on the topic, while Secretary of War Lewis Cass offered only that, rather than 
turning to the Indians, Atkinson should have relied on “a considerable force of regulars” 
from the Eastern Department, regional militia, and “mounted men authorized to be raised by 
a late act of Congress.”4  
 If the War Department damned the military utility of Indians through faint praise, 
others within the Indian Office were more vocal in their disapproval of Native participation 
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in the war.  Indeed, only Samuel Stambaugh seems to have advocated the policy.5  Most 
agents disagreed with Atkinson’s decision because it ran against the government’s 
longstanding efforts to quell intertribal violence.  Writing Stambaugh’s replacement in Green 
Bay, George Porter admitted, “I cannot well see how you could have prevented the 
Menominies from marching, after all that had been done to bring it about:—although my 
decided opinion would have been against the measure.”6  A champion of “civilization,” 
Prairie du Chien Agent Joseph Street similarly disapproved on the grounds that endorsing 
Indian warfare retarded their transformation into yeoman farmers.  From St. Louis, a jaded 
Thomas Forsyth saw hypocrisy in the government’s admonishment to the Indians to not 
make war on one another—except when condoned by the army.  Forsyth found Atkinson’s 
use of the Dakotas to pursue the Battle of Bad Axe survivors particularly loathsome: “was 
there not a sufficiency of Militia in the State of Illinois to fight and defeat the Black Hawk 
and party, without employing Indians to butcher the women and Children of the Sauk & Fox 
Indians”?7  Forsyth was almost certainly the author of an anonymous editorial in the 21 May 
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1833 St. Louis Times, in which “F” railed against Atkinson’s role in the massacre and 
demanded a government inquiry.8
 Other agents objected to Atkinson’s employment of Indians on more pragmatic 
grounds.  Devoid of experience if not opinions, neophyte Subagent Thomas Burnett protested 
that Indian alliances were not worth the trouble: “I have always considered Indians to be the 
most troublesome and expensive of all allies, at the same time that their services can be least 
relied upon.  The result of this expedition is an additional evidence to support the opinion.”9  
John Kinzie’s opinion on the matter, conversely, was the product of decades of experience 
among the Indians as a fur trader.  Officially, Kinzie deemed “the measure impolitic and 
contrary to treaty stipulations and to the views and wishes of Government,” but Kinzie rarely 
held these views and wishes in high regard.10  More likely, Kinzie objected because warfare 
disrupted the fur trade and brought economic hardship to both the Indians and his family.  
Personal motive aside, Kinzie sincerely believed that the Indians were best served by a policy 
of neutrality—a conviction many Ho Chunks shared after the war.11   
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 Outside of the fur traders, most frontier civilians were suspicious or even fearful of 
the “friendly” Indians.  William Campbell, who observed the Prairie du Chien contingent on 
its way through Galena, feared that an appeal to Indian aid simply convinced the Indians 
“that we were not able to fight our own battles with the Sacs & Foxes.”  “We will have these 
same Indians in arms against us before the fall of the leaf,” he predicted to President 
Jackson.12  Although incorrect, Campbell’s prognostication was not baseless.  Unimpressed 
by their American allies during the Arikara War, the Dakotas had little reason to reappraise 
the Long Knives’ martial ability after the Black Hawk War.  Campbell’s prophesy was, 
however, thirty years premature.  During the Sioux War of 1862, Dakota warriors interpreted 
the army’s recruitment of métis militiamen as evidence of military weakness and went to war 
with their former allies.13  Campbell’s opposition to Indian alliances was not based entirely 
on the fear that it publicized American military weakness, however.  Although singularly 
unsympathetic for the Indians, Campbell shared with them a conception of alliance that 
involved reciprocal loyalty.  The Indians, no mere auxiliaries, fought as independent people, 
and if they made concessions to their Great Father they expected something in return.  “I do 
not believe in laying ourselves under any obligations to Indians,” Campbell informed the 
president, who—to the collective fortune of Campbell’s fellow Galenians—held similar 
convictions.14
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 Although disappointed by their Great Father, America’s Indian allies were not the 
mercenaries, fools, or pawns depicted by some scholars.15  Conditioned by over a century of 
alliances with powerful European partners, the Indians of the Old Northwest had learned the 
necessity of accommodation with the whites.  Such unions had delivered the Menominees 
and Ho Chunks from the brink of extinction and had enabled the western Algonquians to roll 
back the tide of Iroquois expansion.  As the Fox Wars of the eighteenth century and the 
Winnebago War of the nineteenth attested, Indian groups who rejected a patron-client 
relationship with a European or American power did so at their peril.  Following the War of 
1812, the Indians lost the luxury of choosing between a pair of competing suitors for their 
allegiance.  Hence, although the Indians discerned and protested American deviations from 
the French and British precedent—especially the refusal to provide an acceptable outlet for 
martial ambition—they generally lacked recourse.  Thanks to Henry Atkinson’s willingness 
to field Indian allies, the Black Hawk War offered the Indians an opportunity to at once 
resurrect an older, more favorable conception of alliance and to realize their ambitions. 
 Certainly the least important of these ambitions was the acquisition of material 
wealth.  The Potawatomis, for instance, derived almost no material benefit from the war 
whatsoever.  Aside from taking ownership of the army’s stockade at Lake Koshkonong, they 
received only “a small pittance of flour & pork to prevent them from suffering”—and that 
sometimes drawn from the “damaged” portion of the army’s stocks.16  Certainly some 
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tribes—notably the Menominees and Ho Chunks—parlayed their service into material 
advantage, but no evidence suggests that their participation was predicated on a quest for 
profit.  Instead, these Indians merely expected the Americans to uphold the obligations of a 
wealthy partner in alliance according to the practices of the French and British.   
 Clearly, the Menominees and Dakotas did not join the Americans because Atkinson 
promised them provisions and arms, but the withholding of such presents would have 
communicated to the Indians a miserliness unbecoming a Great Father.17  If rifles and 
ammunition were inducement enough to draw individual warriors into the government’s 
service, they did little to win the endorsement of the broader communities whence these 
warriors came.   Accordingly, many of the provisions issued to the Indians were of a 
distinctly non-military character.  In addition to six hundred pounds of lead and 250 pounds 
of powder, George Boyd issued the Green Bay Menominees three hundred needles, fifty 
yards of colored muslin, twenty yards of blue ribbon, two tea kettles, and sundry other 
goods.18  The domestic nature of these items indicated that the agent was not simply buying 
warriors but cementing a pact with the Menominee people collectively.  In so doing, George 
Boyd acknowledged the voice of Menominee women in the decision for war and adhered to 
the Indians’ expectations of alliance.  Perhaps more so than their contemporaries, Boyd and 
Samuel Stambaugh understood these expectations and urged the government to uphold them.  
According to Stambaugh, “Justice as well as sound policy will recommend that the Inds who 
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marched at the call of the Govt, should be paid and well paid for every day they were in 
service.  In future times the salutary effects of such a course will be experienced.”19  George 
Porter endorsed Stambaugh’s recommendation, and the Menominees received land bounty 
warrants (which they subsequently sold) for their service.20   
 Stambaugh was less convinced of the propriety of rewarding the Ho Chunks.  Their 
motivation to capture Black Hawk and Wabokieshiek, he was sure, was sheerly financial; 
“Their good feeling towards our Govrt would never prompt them to do so.”21  Indeed, the Ho 
Chunks were perhaps the most opportunistic of the Americans’ Indian allies, and they 
unashamedly—but not always successfully—attempted to parlay their service into material 
gain.  Although White Crow’s band earned the handsome sum of $2,000 for “rescuing” the 
Hall sisters, the Prairie la Crosse Ho Chunks were disappointed in their remuneration for 
capturing the fugitive leaders of the British Band.22  Promised forty good horses and $100, 
Black Hawk’s and Wabokieshiek’s captors complained that they received only twenty 
mounts “so poor that we can’t get them along.”23  After the war, the Ho Chunks attempted to 
obtain bounty land on account of their service (like the Menominees), but here, too, they 
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were disappointed because no muster rolls existed to verify their claims.24  Fundamentally, 
however, the Ho Chunks had not participated in the war for profit.  Indeed, the conflict was 
ruinous to their fragile economy, and the meager rewards the Ho Chunks milked from the 
Americans only began to offset the damage.  Opportunists rather than mercenaries, the Ho 
Chunks simply attempted to make the best of an awkward situation. 
 The principal motivation of the Ho Chunks and Potawatomis alike was not to accrue 
wealth but to retain that which they already had: their remaining lands and continued 
existence as an independent people.  Since the early 1820s, members of both tribes had seen 
their sovereignty erode under a steady tide of white immigration.  The Winnebago War of 
1827 convinced most Indians in the region that the Americans were too numerous and 
powerful to contest by force of arms, but some retained the hope that a pan-tribal alliance 
could punish white transgressions and establish a more favorable balance of power.  To these 
Indians, Black Hawk seemed to offer the promise of a better future.  Those more familiar 
with the extent of American power, however, sensed that their situation was already tenuous 
and that Black Hawk’s banner, while alluring, could only lead to ruin.   
 Ultimately, most Potawatomis and Ho Chunks followed an uneasy policy of 
neutrality, which disaffected elements of both tribes violated—usually discreetly but 
sometimes with spectacular violence.  At Indian Creek, Kellogg’s Grove, Blue Mounds, and 
elsewhere, Potawatomis and Ho Chunks exacted their revenge for a catalog of abuses that 
stretched back over a decade.  More calculating than their passionate warriors, leaders from 
both tribes realized that such sanguinary outbursts, although conducted by individuals, 
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implicated their entire tribes.  Already their hold on northern Illinois was shaky, and these 
incidents provided the Americans ample justification to promptly and permanently pry the 
Indians from their lands.   
 The Potawatomis responded first and most decisively to this challenge.  By virtue of 
history, geography, and kinship, the Potawatomis were better postured to understand the 
magnitude of the problem confronting them—and to respond to it.  Under the better days of 
the French regime, the Potawatomis had parlayed their occupancy of Green Bay into a 
privileged position within the French-Algonquian alliance.  Perhaps more readily than other 
tribes, the Potawatomis adapted their conceptions of leadership to meet French expectations, 
thereby giving rise to the “alliance chief.”  Although authority in Potawatomi society 
remained decentralized and non-coercive, the emergence of alliance or “principal” chiefs 
permitted the formulation and (to a lesser extent) enforcement of multi-band or even tribal 
policies that were previously infeasible.25  Selected jointly by the Indians and their European 
allies, the alliance chiefs were men capable of fulfilling the expectations of both groups.  By 
the early nineteenth century, such men were most commonly found among clever or educated 
métis who opportunistically embraced the role of middle-man between the tribes and the 
government.26
 In 1832 Chicago, Billy Caldwell was this man.  A métis related to the Potawatomis 
only by marriage, Caldwell wielded unusual influence among both his adopted people and 
the government.  Prevalent interpretations of such middlemen variously consider them 
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“imposters” or “masters at accommodation.”27  The most ardent critic of the intercultural 
brokers in general, and Billy Caldwell in particular, has been James Clifton, who has 
described them as “men who pursued their own ambitions by accepting the role of an alien-
sponsored manager of tribal society.”28  Particularly offensive to Clifton was the attachment 
of the title “chief” to men who considered themselves white-skinned entrepreneurs.  Clifton 
acknowledged that Caldwell eventually came to identify with the Potawatomis and sought to 
further their best interests, but Clifton saw this shift beginning with the Chicago Treaty of 
1833.  Caldwell’s conduct during the Black Hawk War, however, suggests that his 
“conversion” predated this conflict.29  
 Indeed, Caldwell seems to have been the principal architect of the Potawatomi policy 
of neutrality and, later, alliance.  Recognizing that the Potawatomis’ days in Illinois were 
numbered, Caldwell’s goal was not to avert removal altogether but, rather, to ensure that the 
government compensated the Indians for their lands.  Caldwell knew that Potawatomi 
collaboration with Black Hawk would furnish the government with a pretext for seizing 
Potawatomi lands as war reparations, and he moved to preempt the possibility.  In council at 
Chicago and in his rides among remote villages, Caldwell—often assisted by Alexander 
Robinson and Shaubena—cobbled together a multi-band policy of neutrality.  Through the 
influence of village chiefs like Waubunsee and Big Foot, the Potawatomis were able to 
subdue the martial aspirations of most of their young men, many of whom desired to join 
Black Hawk.  With the help of their assigned agents, the Potawatomis publicly proclaimed 
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their innocence and evacuated their villages from the campaign trail to avoid the wrath of the 
militia and to distance the tribe, physically and figuratively, from the hostile Indians. 
 These measures proved modestly successful through 19 May, but the “Indian Creek 
Massacre” represented a massive failure in Potawatomi policy.  Realizing that the entire tribe 
would be held accountable for the actions of a single, disaffected band, the Potawatomis had 
to make a more convincing demonstration of their distance from the British Band.  They 
consequently offered a traditional pledge of allegiance, military service, to an unlikely ally, 
the United States.  Whereas in the past, however, the Potawatomis embraced a French or 
British Great Father for profit and security, they now affiliated themselves with the army of 
Andrew Jackson to simply hold on to what they had left.  
 Facing a nearly identical problem, the Ho Chunks ultimately arrived at the same 
solution—albeit by a more convoluted path.  Like the Potawatomis, the formulation of Ho 
Chunk policy during the war was, at least in part, the product of history, geography, and 
kinship.  Yet while these factors facilitated a relatively unified response among the 
Potawatomis, they virtually assured that the Ho Chunk would pursue divided and sometimes 
contradictory courses.  Occupying the interior of Wisconsin throughout their known history, 
the Ho Chunks never enjoyed the privileged status of other Great Lakes tribes in the Western 
fur trade.  Considered “warlike” by the Europeans, with whom the Ho Chunks were reluctant 
to intermarry, these Indians were never fully enfranchised by the French, British, or 
American regimes.  In a region of peoples to whom centralized, coercive leadership was 
anathema, the Ho Chunks were perhaps the most decentralized of all tribes—a characteristic 
that intensified as bands spread down the Wisconsin and Rock River Valleys during the 
relative security of the eighteenth century.  The dispersion of bands also ensured that the Ho 
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Chunks entertained no single opinion of the Americans.  In the relative isolation of 
Wisconsin, the Ho Chunks encountered few Americans outside of Prairie du Chien and the 
Portage.  But those who settled in northwestern Illinois did not know such bliss.  Abused and 
dispossessed by white miners, these Ho Chunks withdrew from their Great Father, whose 
inability to control his white children or uphold his promises called into question his 
presumption of greatness. 
 Estranged from their agents and lacking the counsel of men like Billy Caldwell, the 
northern Illinois Ho Chunks brooded until Black Hawk’s crossing of the Mississippi seemed 
to offer an opportunity for revenge in the spring of 1832.  Like the Sauks and Mesquakies, 
however, the Ho Chunks may have been startled by the alacrity and intensity of the 
Illinoisans’ response.  Although his young men yearned to join Black Hawk, White Crow 
foreswore open alliance until it was apparent whether Black Hawk was another Tecumseh or 
merely another Red Bird, who died in prison following the failure of his 1827 “Winnebago 
War.”  By the time White Crow concluded the latter, overwhelming evidence indicted the 
chief and his followers of aiding the enemy and even slaying Americans.  Whilst the 
Potawatomis offered military services to distance themselves from renegade bands, White 
Crow’s Ho Chunks now rendered military aid in the hopes of expunging their own conduct.  
Incredibly, White Crow’s gambit succeeded, and his visible but modest contributions to the 
American effort proved sufficient to overshadow his earlier duplicity. 
 In truth, the contributions of both tribes were almost entirely symbolic.  Unlike the 
Menominees and Dakotas, no evidence suggests that the Potawatomis and Rock River Ho 
Chunks engaged in the songs, dances, or other preparations indicative of traditional warfare.  
Rather than painting themselves for war, moreover, the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks merely 
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donned white headbands to avoid falling prey to indiscriminant militiamen.  Perhaps the most 
telling indicator of the proscribed nature of these tribes’ involvement was their palpable 
reluctance to engage the Sauks and Mesquakies in combat.  Although many young men in 
both tribes desired the opportunity to make names for themselves in war, they wished to do 
so beside rather than against Black Hawk.  From both forces, only White Crow’s son actually 
exchanged blows with the British Band.  Willing to go to war with the Americans to realize 
their political objectives, the Rock River Ho Chunks and Potawatomis were less inclined to 
make war on fellow Indians with whom they sympathized.30
 Ultimately, the alliance policies of the Rock River Ho Chunks and Potawatomis 
served each tribe admirably.  As Billy Caldwell recognized and Winfield Scott’s deployment 
orders reveal, removal of all Indians from Illinois was inevitable by 1832, but the Indians 
retained the ability to influence to terms of their migration.  Black Hawk’s crossing of the 
Mississippi and ensuing rumors of Ho Chunk and Potawatomi collaboration with the enemy 
threatened to deprive the Indians of this prerogative, however.  As evidence mounted that 
elements of both tribes were in league with Black Hawk, it appeared that all Ho Chunks and 
Potawatomis were destined to forfeit their land without compensation—the pitiful fate of 
“hostile” Indians.  Timely and visible gestures of faithfulness permitted both tribes avoid this 
fate without requiring a betrayal of their loyalties.  If their post-war treaties left much to be 
desired, they represented the best conceivable denouement to an impossible situation. 
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 If the Green Bay Menominees also parlayed their wartime contributions into political 
leverage, their situation differed markedly from those of the Potawatomis and Ho Chunks.  A 
small and vulnerable people, the Menominees grasped the benefits of close alliance with 
European powers during the Great Displacement of the mid-seventeenth century.  Because 
their survival and prosperity depended on it, the Menominees became masters of alliance 
politics who achieved their own ends while ostensibly accommodating to the expectations of 
the prevailing regime.  Accordingly, the French and British regimes regarded the 
Menominees as the most steadfast and loyal of all Native peoples—a perception shared by 
the Americans following their occupation of Green Bay in 1816.  Ensconced in Wisconsin’s 
northwoods, the Menominees were perhaps less disrupted by the arrival of the Americans 
than any other tribe in the Old Northwest.  Climate and latitude helped isolate the 
Menominees from the doleful influences of white miners and settlers, and Indians and métis 
continued to dominate Green Bay’s fur trade economy into the 1830s.  Here, perhaps more 
than anywhere else in the years after the War of 1812, the Menominees and the United States 
successfully created an alliance based on trade, security, and reciprocity. 
 To the minds of Menominee leaders, then, the United States was in no position to 
make demands after the Black Hawk War.  The Green Bay Menominee had wanted to 
participate in the war from the very beginning, it was true, but they had also gone out of their 
way to accommodate the wishes of their Great Father—staying their hand until it was too late 
to play a meaningful role in a war they considered their own.  Hence, the Menominees were 
not in a compromising mood when George Porter submitted for their approval a treaty to 
resolve a dispute with the New York Indians who occupied Menominee lands.  For nearly a 
decade, the Menominees had labored to escape from the fraudulent land sales of 1821 and 
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1822, believing that they had reached favorable resolution in the “Stambaugh Treaty” of 
1831.  The U.S. Senate modified this treaty before ratification, however, and Porter assumed 
that the government’s liberal handling of the Menominees during the recent conflict would 
ensure their acquiescence.  Grizzly Bear promptly disabused the governor of this notion.  The 
chief confirmed his people’s commitment to their American allies but proclaimed that they 
would do nothing for the New York Indians, whom the Menominees regarded as 
trespassers.31  To ward off any remonstrance from the governor, Grizzly Bear reminded 
Porter of the Menominees’ service and sacrifices in the recent conflict: “We have done so 
much to please you under the hope that it will be satisfactory to our Great Father and the 
Senate.”32  The chief’s statement was largely disingenuous, as Porter may well have 
recognized.  Fundamentally, self-interest motivated the Menominees, but they were wise 
enough to alliance politics to grasp diplomatic leverage afforded by their participation.   
Ultimately, the Menominees forced a favorable compromise that the New York Indians 
accepted only begrudgingly.33  
 Yet, Menominee participation in the Black Hawk War had far less to do with New 
York Indians than with the Sauks and Mesquakies.  If there is a single, overriding 
explanation for Menominee campaign participation, it is that this was their war.  Long before 
the United States existed, the Menominees harbored deep animosity for the Sauks and 
Mesquakies as separate tribes.  In accordance with a code of blood vengeance common to 
“primitive law,” the Sauks, Mesquakies, and Menominees had visited violence upon one 
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another for over a hundred years, each trying to avenge the most recent wrong, none agreeing 
as to when the balance sheet of blood was correctly adjusted.34
 Historian David Beck has recently acknowledged that “Menominee involvement in 
the war was not so much related to the Americans as to a long-standing dispute with the 
Mesquakies, whom they identified with the Sac and Fox,” but he underestimates the extent of 
Menominee animosity specifically toward the Sauks.35  According to Alanson Skinner, “the 
word ‘enemy’ at once connotes ‘Sauk’ to the mind of the Wild Rice People.”36  Oral 
traditions that postdate the Black Hawk War seem to support this contention.  One fable 
relates the finding of a Sauk girl by the Menominee warriors during the Black Hawk War.   
 “Who are you?” they asked.  
 The girl responded, “I am Black Hawk’s daughter.”   
 “Where is he?”   
 “He fled because he was hungry.”   
 At this the Menominee warriors broke into laughter and sang this derisive song: “Oh 
Black Hawk, why did you not await us?  We would have fed you!  With our bows and 
arrows, we would have fed you.”37
 The Menominees also believed they had recovered Black Hawk’s breechcloth and 
composed a sarcastic song to commemorate the event, calling the Sauk war captain a 
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cowardly dog for failing to come back for it.38  By their ceremonial conduct during the 
campaign and their subsequent recording of the war’s events in oral legend, the Menominees 
clearly demonstrated that this was no mere mercenary endeavor.39  From its outset through its 
conclusion—and in Menominee collective memory—the Black Hawk War was a Menominee 
war. 
 The primary motivations for the Dakotas and Waukon Decorah’s band of Ho Chunks 
were much the same.  Sauk and Mesquakie migration during the seventeenth century placed 
them in economic competition with these Indians at a time when the European fur trade was 
already taxing the Upper Mississippi beyond its sustainable limits.  During the 1820s, by 
which time the Indians had exhausted much of the region’s peltry, this competition reached a 
sanguinary head in the Des Moines River Valley.  The contest for furs resurrected a latent, 
historical animosity between the Mesquakies and Dakotas, which expanded to involve the 
Sauks as well as western bands of Ho Chunks and Menominees.  American efforts to broker 
a peace were unsuccessful, and the Black Hawk War was in large measure the most 
spectacular failure of many.  Atkinson left Jefferson Barracks in April 1832 not to chastise 
Black Hawk but to prevent another episode in this western war.  The debacle at Stillman’s 
Run changed the general’s mission and thereby presented an opportunity to the Dakotas and 
Waukon’s Ho Chunks.  Accepting Atkinson’s permission to join the war while rejecting the 
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man he sent to lead them, both Indian groups realized the objectives that, ironically, Atkinson 
had meant to deprive them. 
 Although not always the most culturally sensitive observer, Samuel Stambaugh 
understood the consequences of denying the Indians the right to wage their own wars better 
than most.  “An Indian knows of no other way to acquire fame but by his feats in War,” he 
explained.  Further, if the government persisted in denying an Indian warrior this 
opportunity, “he would be unable to acquire any, except by fighting on the side of the enemy 
against the U States.”40  A generation of warriors had availed themselves of such an 
opportunity during the War of 1812, but opportunities for martial glory diminished 
significantly as the Great Father extended his control over the Old Northwest and forbade 
intertribal warfare altogether (albeit unsuccessfully).  Hence, an anxious generation of Indian 
warriors saw in the Black Hawk War a chance to realize their ambitions—a powerful motive 
in itself.41  Traditional foes of the Sauks and Mesquakies, the Dakotas, Menominees, and 
western Ho Chunks had no qualms about striking Black Hawk’s followers, whom the 
warriors regarded as hated enemies rather than fellow Indians. 
 In the end, the Black Hawk War provided few opportunities for Indians to distinguish 
themselves in battle, but they contented themselves with those available.  Although the aptly-
named Big Soldier, a venerated Menominee war leader, boasted that the Black Hawk War 
was “child’s play,” he acknowledged its importance in giving his young warriors vital 
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experience.42  He might not have realized it at the time, but opportunities for martial glory 
were fleeting, and his “child’s play” represented a defining moment for a generation of 
Menominee warriors.   While Dakota men continued to hone their skills and reputations 
against their trans-Mississippi enemies, the Menominees had helped to expunge their domain 
of foes and, by extension, occasions for war.  A generation later, Menominee warriors 
journeyed far in search of enemies, again donning their red and black paint to fight renegade 
Long Knives wearing gray.43  Their Civil War participation notwithstanding, the Black Hawk 
War was the last genuinely Menominee war, and it signaled the end of an era in the Old 
Northwest.  Nor would the Potawatomis or Ho Chunks again distinguish themselves in battle 
as a sovereign people.  Although untraditional, their participation in the Black Hawk War 
proved to be the final chapter in their respective histories as martial peoples.   
Once mighty warriors and vital components of a powerful Franco-Indian alliance, the 
Ho Chunks and Potawatomis now submitted to removal to Iowa and economic dependence 
on annuity payments.  While their loyalty garnered respect and gratitude from Indian agents 
and some army officers, it did little to placate the fears of white settlers and politicians.  
Citing “the many outrages these hell-hounds committed on our frontier settlements” during 
the conflict, Black Hawk War veteran John Wakefield saw no room for Indians in post-war 
Illinois.44  By bearing arms against the British Band, the Indians had confirmed their 
“savagery” in the eyes of some whites, demonstrating that they were a potential threat, 
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uncomfortably close to white settlements and possessing valuable land.  Hence, although 
they were able to reap some small advantage from their contributions, the Ho Chunks and 
Potawatomis had also helped men like John Reynolds and Henry Dodge realize their visions 
of the future.   
 Just as the termination of the Winnebago War in 1827 had opened the lead country to 
a deluge of miners, Black Hawk’s defeat signaled that the Americans had finally subdued the 
Old Northwest in its entirety.  During that earlier conflict, the territorial governor had 
traversed the region’s waterways in bark canoes flying the stars and stripes but manned by 
French engages who wore the red sashes of Canadiens and sang in their native tongue.45  
Now, steamboats bearing Yankee émigrés in almost inconceivable numbers drowned out the 
lusty Frenchmen’s voices.  In 1830, the non-Indian populations of Illinois and the Wisconsin 
part of Michigan Territory were 157,445 and 3,635, respectively.  Ten years later, Illinois 
had almost half a million citizens, while the population of Wisconsin increased nearly 
tenfold—a demographic feat replicated in the ensuing decade.  Made a state in 1848, 
Wisconsin boasted 305,391 citizens two years later.46  Like a glacier, the onrush of white 
settlers dramatically altered the landscape over which it passed—pushing communities out of 
its way in places and overwhelming them in others.  Formerly cosmopolitan outposts in the 
wilderness, Green Bay, Prairie du Chien, and Chicago lost their earlier character as English 
subsumed the French-Ojibwa lingua franca and their métis residents incorporated themselves 
into the dominant society.  Until 1838, Indian villages still dotted the prairies around 
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Milwaukee, but they soon moved north or westward, and only drunken beggars remained to 
remind the Americans of the people they had supplanted.47  After two centuries of 
tumultuous but remarkable existence, the pays d’en haut had ceased to exist. 
 
                                                 
 47 Alice E. Smith, From Exploration to Statehood, ed. William Fletcher Thompson, 4 vols., vol. 1, The 






 Describing the advent of white miners in the lead country years earlier, the Indians 
likened the Americans to “a drop of Racoons Grease falling on a new Blanket,” which “at 
first is scarcely perceptible, but in time covers almost the whole Blanket.”1  Tragically sage, 
this observation did not prepare the Indians for the surge of whites that enveloped their 
homes after the Black Hawk War.  It began before the ink had dried on their cession treaties 
of 1832 and 1833.  At Rock Island, anxious speculators gathered to await the outcome of 
General Scott’s negotiations with the Ho Chunks in September 1832.  According to one 
witness, “Thousands of adventurers lined the eastern shore of the Mississippi, ready to seize 
upon the possession and pre-emption rights in the new territory the moment they became 
perfect.”2  Similarly, settlers and speculators occupied the proposed Potawatomi cession of 
1833 before the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, eliciting complaints from the Indians but no 
response from the government—other than to amend the treaty to the benefit of Missouri and 
the disadvantage of the Potawatomis.3  Unabated, the tide of white immigration convinced 
some—but not all—Indians that it was time to accept removal. 
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 Led by Billy Caldwell, the Potawatomis of Illinois and southern Wisconsin prepared 
to leave their homeland in the autumn of 1835.  Before departing, they conducted a powwow, 
which Judge John D. Caton observed:  
They appreciated that it was the last on their native soil—that it was a sort of funeral 
ceremony of old associations and memories, and nothing was omitted to lend to it all 
the grandeur and solemnity possible.  Truly, I thought it an impressive scene, of 
which it is quite impossible to give an adequate idea by words alone.4 
 
Over the next year, nearly sixteen hundred Potawatomis settled in the Platte Country in what 
is today northwest Missouri.  Hoping to annex this area in 1837, Missourians reacted 
adversely to the Potawatomi settlement.  Removal brought no respite for the Indians, who 
contended with white squatters almost immediately upon arriving in their new homes.  On 19 
June 1836, the Potawatomis exchanged shots with a band of horse thieves known as the 
Heatherly Gang, killing two of the Missourians.5   
 This episode drew the U.S. Army into business of removing its former allies from the 
Old Northwest.  Like its earlier efforts to maintain peace between the Indians and white 
settlers, the army’s role in Indian removal was ambiguous, trying, and destined to frustrate 
the officers charged with its execution.  Because the Platte Country was not yet part of 
Missouri, the army moved promptly to defend the Indians from what it deemed illegal 
encroachments—even after Missouri Governor Daniel Durkin mobilized his state’s militia to 
drive the Potawatomis from the Platte.  Compelled to use other channels, Missouri politicians 
pressured the federal government to remove the Potawatomis again, this time to the Osage 
River in Iowa.  Knowing that the Potawatomis would not go willingly, the government 
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ordered Henry Atkinson to effect its wishes in June 1836.  Atkinson, a stickler for just 
treatment of the Indians and a personal acquaintance of Billy Caldwell, did not make things 
easy for his government.  Learning that the Potawatomis had yet to receive many of the 
provisions promised by the 1833 treaty, Atkinson effectively refused to move the Indians 
until the government upheld its obligations.6  Atkinson’s superior, Edmund Gaines, added to 
the government’s inconvenience by issuing provisions to the relocating Potawatomis at 
government expense and without authorization—a measure that earned censure from the 
secretary of war.  Unrepentant, Gaines spent additional government money on steamboats to 
transport the aged and infirm to their new homes.7
 Near the end of their careers and politically isolated, Generals Gaines and Atkinson 
may have taken sanctimonious satisfaction in compelling the government to afford the 
Indians justice and humanity.  Unfortunately, later tasks were less agreeable to these and 
other officers charged with removing by force Indians who refused to relinquish their former 
lands.  Poor fortune continued to befall the Ho Chunks, who lost nearly one quarter of their 
number to small pox in 1836.8  West of the Mississippi, Sauks and Mesquakies attacked 
those Ho Chunks who resettled in accordance with the Great Father’s wishes, while east of 
the Mississippi timber interests conspired to deprive the Ho Chunks of their remaining 
Wisconsin lands.9  In 1837, Waukon and One-Eyed Decorah, Winneshiek, and seven other 
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chiefs traveled to Washington where they agreed to part with all of their remaining lands east 
of the Mississippi, perhaps under duress.10  According to Henry Merrell, an early Wisconsin 
state senator, “the poor Red Men were deceived and out-witted by those who ought to have 
been their wards and protectors.”11  Whatever the circumstances, the Ho Chunks proved 
unwilling to abide by the treaty, and in February 1840 the government once more called on 
Henry Atkinson to chastise Indians who encamped on the wrong side of the Mississippi. 
 Henry Dodge, now Governor of Wisconsin Territory and a driving force behind the 
removal of Indians from his domain, advised Atkinson that most of the Ho Chunks would 
relocate peaceably, but that those residing around the Portage would require 
encouragement.12  Atkinson discovered this to be true when he convened a council with the 
Portage Ho Chunks on 1 May 1840.  Reluctantly, Atkinson threatened to withhold rations 
and annuity payments if they refused to relocate and finally arrested two of the most 
recalcitrant chiefs, Yellow Thunder and Little Soldier.  Perhaps sensitized by his part in this 
distasteful duty, Atkinson reacted immediately when he learned that the War Department 
intended to renege on its promise to station troops between the Ho Chunks and their enemies 
in Iowa.  He had personally pledged to “establish a garrison in the neutral ground,” he 
advised Secretary of War Joel Poinsett, “a promise I feel bound in honor, as an officer of the 
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army, to faithfully preserve.”13  Poinsett deferred to Atkinson, but it remained necessary to 
escort the reluctant Ho Chunks from their homes with military force. 
 From 26 May to 3 June 1840, elements of the 5th and 8th Regiments of U.S. Infantry 
ushered the Ho Chunks from the Portage to their new land on the Turkey River in Iowa.14  
While transporting the Indians to Prairie du Chien, one removal detail came across three 
wigwams at the head of the Kickapoo River.  Captain Edwin V. Sumner, a veteran of the 
Black Hawk War who later commanded a corps in the Army of the Potomac, enjoined the 
occupants to break camp and join the procession.  According to Sumner’s interpreter, three 
elderly Ho Chunk women responded by “throwing themselves on their knees, crying and 
beseeching Captain Sumner to kill them; that they were old, and would rather die, and be 
buried with their fathers mothers and children, than be taken away; and that they were ready 
to receive their death blows.”15  Moved, Sumner not only permitted them to remain, but he 
also released three young Ho Chunk warriors to stay with the women to hunt for them.16
 A little further on, the detail encountered another Ho Chunk camp.  Captain Sumner 
again attempted to perform his duty and ordered them to break camp and accompany the 
removal detail.  They loaded “their little property” into a wagon but then began to walk 
south.  When Sumner enquired where they were going, the Ho Chunks replied that “they 
were going to bid good bye to their fathers, mothers, and children.”  Uncertain that the 
Indians would return, Sumner and his interpreter followed at a distance.  “We found them on 
their knees, kissing the ground, and crying very loud, where they relations were buried,” the 
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interpreter recalled.  “This touched the Captain’s feelings, and he exclaimed ‘Good God!  
What harm could these poor Indians do among the rocks!’”?17
 In 1887, Old Decorah’s son, Spoon, recollected his life and the history of his people 
for Reuben Gold Thwaites.  Spoon had been among the hundreds of Ho Chunks who had 
avoided removal by hiding in the swamps and forests along the Fox-Wisconsin waterway and 
were later joined by others who fled their reservations and returned to Wisconsin in the years 
after 1840.18  Refugees in their own homeland, Spoon and his people neither possessed a 
reservation nor received any annuities.   “The game is not as plenty as it was,” he 
complained, and their infertile fields left them hungry.   To make matters worse, predatory 
traders plied young men with liquor to part the Ho Chunks from what little of value 
remained.  Of course not all Americans had mistreated the Ho Chunks.  Spoon Decorah 
recalled a time when he counted the officers of Fort Winnebago among his friends and John 
Kinzie represented the Ho Chunks to their Great Father.  Perhaps hoping to rekindle 
something of the alliance that framed his memories of better times, Spoon resolved to visit 
the governor and “ask him to see the Big Father, and procure for us an agent who shall be a 
good man.”  Three months after the interview, Spoon Decorah visited Madison on this 
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